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THE SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SYSTEM, 1952-1965

Political Change in a Technological Society

by

Frederic J. Fleron, Jr.

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
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
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
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INTRODUCTION

Of perennial concern to students of Soviet politics have been questions relating to the theme of continuity and change in the Soviet political system. At the basis of various theories on this subject are different interpretations of the nature of the Soviet political system. Among these different theories, the totalitarian "model" has tended to dominate the scene for almost two decades. More recently, however, this interpretation has been seriously challenged by a host of scholars, many of whom have proposed alternative "models." The bureaucratic,[1] conflict,[2] and development[3] models have received considerable support as workable alternatives. At this point in the debate, it appears that critics of the totalitarian approach have gained the upper hand.

One peculiar aspect of this discussion of the nature of the

[1]Alfred G. Meyer, "USSR, Incorporated," Slavic Review, XX, 3 (October, 1961), pp. 369-377; The Soviet Political System (N.Y.: Random House, 1965); "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," Slavic Review, XXVI, 1 (March, 1967), pp. 3-12.

[2]Robert C. Tucker, "The 'Conflict Model,'" Problems of Communism, XII, 6 (November-December, 1963), pp. 59-61. For a discussion of the major differences between the totalitarian and conflict models, see Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Party Leadership, 1957-1964 (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 1-7.

[3]Alex Inkeles, "Models in the Analysis of Soviet Society," Survey, 60 (July, 1966), pp. 5-9. Also, Robert C. Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism," World Politics, XIX, 2 (January, 1967), p. 248. Those who view Soviet history since 1917 as a sequence of different political systems can be placed in this category: Alfred G. Meyer, "The Nature of Communist Political Systems," paper delivered at the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Chicago, Illinois, April 1966; Robert C. Tucker, "The Question of Totalitarianism," Slavic Review, XX, 3 (October, 1961), pp. 377-382; Robert Sharlet, "Concept Formation in Political Science and Communist Studies," Canadian Slavic Studies, I, 4 (Winter, 1967), pp. 640-649.

Soviet political system is that it has for the most part been carried out in isolation from empirical social science theory. If blame is to be assigned, it must be shared by both the Soviet area specialists and the social scientists. For despite the rapidly increasing interest of social scientists in the theme of political development in the past decade, their attention has been focused primarily on the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Communist countries have been almost totally ignored in these discussions of political development. To the extent that social scientists have considered the Soviet Union in general studies of political development, they have done so in superficial fashion giving little attention to existing relevant monographs.[4] On the other hand, those area specialists who have considered the question of the nature of the Soviet political system and possible sources of change in that system, have demonstrated very little awareness of the relevant social science literature.[5]

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[4]Cf. Gabriel A. Almond, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), esp. pp. 274-280; C.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1966); A.F.K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (N.Y.: Knopf, 1965), esp. pp. 94-121; Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1966), esp. pp. 155-163; Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.). The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

[5]A good example is the discussion "Whither Russia?" consisting of numerous articles in Problems of Communism during 1966-67. This discussion began with an article by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?"

What appears to be bringing the Soviet area specialists and the social scientists closer together is the growing criticism of the totalitarian model. The most recent, and probably the most important, round of criticism of the totalitarian model was begun by Gabriel Almond[6] and is still continuing. The increasing disenchantment with the totalitarian approach appeared to be the result of important changes within the Soviet Union which undercut two elements central to the totalitarian model: (1) the permanent purge and the concomitant use of terror, and (2) monolithism within Soviet society.

By the mid-sixties the overt use of terror against political opponents had fallen into such disuse that Kassof was prompted to characterize the Soviet Union as an "administered society" -- that is, totalitarianism without terror.[7] In characterizing the same changes in the Soviet system, Rigby preferred to use the concept of the "organizational society."[8]

Problems of Communism, XV, (January-February, 1966), pp. 1-15. The relationship between area studies and the social sciences in the study of Communist systems will be discussed in several essays in my forthcoming volume Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969).

[6]An address before the Conference on Soviet and Communist Studies, 60th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 1964.

[7]Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," World Politics, XVI, 4 (July, 1964), pp. 558-575.

[8]T. H. Rigby, "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the USSR," World Politics, XVI, 4 (July, 1964), pp. 539-557.

Yet there were still some who preferred to retain the concept "totalitarianism" and merely added adjectives such as "mature" totalitarianism.[9] Whatever the preference, it was generally recognized that the Soviet Union of Brzezinski's Permanent Purge was no longer a reality.[10] This decline in terror in the past two decades is one of the two main elements of change increasingly discussed by students of Soviet politics.

The second major element of change to receive attention is the "growing importance of groups in the political process"[11] which has led some writers to observe that there are definite pluralistic trends in the Soviet polity. While most would agree with Barghoorn that so far organized interest groups comparable to those found in pluralistic Western societies do not now exist in the Soviet Union, nevertheless there is evidence to suggest that a limited degree of group activity takes place.[12]

This evidence has led Skilling to conclude:

> The model of a totalitarian system in which a single party, itself free of internal conflict, imposes its will on society, and on all social groups, is being replaced by

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[9] Roy D. Laird, "Some Characteristics of the Soviet Leadership System: A Maturing Totalitarian System?" Midwest Journal of Political Science, X, 1 (February, 1966).

[10] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics In Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).

[11] H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, XVIII, 3 (April, 1966), p. 442.

[12] Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Soviet Russia: Orthodoxy and Adaptiveness," in Lucian C. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), esp. pp. 507-511.

> a model that takes account of the conflicting groups that exert an influence on the making of policy by the party. This is not genuine pluralism, nor is it pure totalitarianism; it is rather a kind of imperfect monism in which, of the many elements involved, one -- the party -- is more powerful than all others but is not omnipotent. (emphasis added)[13]

If what is observed in the Soviet Union does not now constitute "genuine pluralism," then we must seek to answer questions related to the sources of this trend and to ascertain its relationship to "genuine pluralism." One frequently suggested source is the process of industrialization. Inkeles and Bauer suggest that

> The distinctive features of Soviet totalitarianism have for so long commanded our attention that we have lost our awareness of an equally basic fact. The substratum on which the distinctive Soviet features are built is after all a large-scale industrial order which shares many features in common with the large-scale industrial order in other national states of Europe and indeed Asia.[14]

In attempting to locate possible sources of change in the Soviet political system, therefore, we would do well to examine "the fabric of the industrial order"[15] and attempt to ascertain the impact of changes in society on the polity, in particular, on the political leadership system.

This study presents, as an alternative to the over-simplified totalitarian-pluralistic dichotomy, a typology of political

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[13]Skilling, *op. cit.*, p. 449.

[14]Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen; Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 383.

[15]*Ibid.*, p. 388.

leadership systems based on the nature of group participation, acquisition and utilization of skills, and leadership selection. The theoretical utility of this conceptual framework is then demonstrated through the analysis of systematically collected Soviet elite biographic data.

Chapter 1 sets out the typology of political leadership systems and introduces the theoretical formulations of the study.

Chapter 2 relates the theoretical discussion to the Soviet political system and discusses the methodology and techniques employed to test the nature and extent of change in Soviet political leadership from the 19th to the 22nd Party Congresses.

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to point out the theoretical problems involved in viewing membership in the policy-making bodies of the CPSU solely in terms of the institutional affiliations and occupational categories of those selected. An alternative and more theoretically fruitful method for analyzing the representation of interests in those bodies is elaborated. In particular, the analysis is directed toward demonstrating the nature and extent of specialist elite representation in top political elite positions: the Politburo, Central Committee, and Central Party Apparatus.

In Chapter 4 I argue that students who have previously discussed the characteristics of Soviet political leadership have overlooked a very important category of analysis -- the line-staff dichotomy -- which organization theory suggests is a most important aspect of any organization. Differences in the education and career experiences of line and staff officials in the

CPSU may have important implications for the nature of the political system. Of considerable importance is the extent to which there is differential representation of professional politicians and specialized elites in line and staff positions. Analysis of data bearing on this question will give important clues to the extent of institutionalized political advantage of professional politicians in the Soviet political elite and, hence, as we shall see, will help us to classify the Soviet political leadership system.

A concluding chapter summarizes the findings of each chapter and relates them to the broader theoretical framework of adaptation and change in political leadership systems outlined in Chapter 1.

CHAPTER ONE

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SYSTEMS

This chapter presents a discussion of some current literature on the relationship between modernization and change in political systems. It is argued that previous efforts at conceptualizing the relationship between these two processes have been culture-bound to such an extent that they do not provide an adequate framework for analyzing political change in Communist systems, in particular the Soviet Union. An alternative conceptual framework is presented which seeks to overcome this shortcoming.

There is general agreement among students of economic development and political change that one critical aspect of the industrialization process is the increased division of labor in society. Division of labor refers primarily to the specialization of function, but also involves the development of specialized structures to perform those functions. There are two aspects of the division of labor which must concern us: division of labor within a particular sector of society (e.g., economy or polity) and division of labor among the various sectors.

"Structural differentiation" refers not merely to the proliferation of structures in society, but to the proliferation of structures designed to perform different types of specialized functions. This is quite consistent with Eisenstadt's usage in which he describes the process of differentiation as referring to

> the ways through which the main social functions or the major institutional spheres of society become disassociated

> from one another, attached to specialized collectivities and roles, and organized in relatively specific and autonomous symbolic and organizational frameworks within the confines of the same institutionalized system.[1]

At this point it is important to distinguish between differentiation and segmentation in society. Parsons describes this distinction as follows:

> Two differentiated subsystems of a larger system have different functions in the system so that their 'contributions' are complementary; but they do not do the same things. The roles of husband and wife in the family are differentiated in this sense. Two subsystems are segments when they are structurally distinct units both performing essentially the same functions. Thus two infantry companies in a regiment, or two Ford assembly plants in different parts of the country are segments . . . Thus families are very small segments of the social structure. (Emphasis in original)[2]

In the present study we shall be concerned with differentiation and not with segmentation.

Both division of labor and differentiation are crucial aspects of what is referred to by many as the "process of modernization." For Etzioni, "The main sociological characteristic of modernization is differentiation."[3] What distinguishes the modern from the pre-modern society is not so much differences in the functions performed, but rather the manner in which they

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[1] S. N. Eisenstadt, "Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution," American Sociological Review, XXIX, 3 (June, 1964) p. 376.

[2] Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), p. 263.

[3] Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 106. See also, Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1956), esp. p. 255.

are performed.

> The process of modernization is one in which old functions are more efficiently served rather than one in which new functions emerge. This gain in efficiency is largely achieved by differentiation, whereby the various functions which were carried out in one social unit, the extended family, come to be served by a number of distinct social units.[4]

Pluralism, as used by most authors, requires a high degree of division of labor and structural differentiation both within and among the different sectors of society, particularly the economy and the polity. In his classic study of the division of labor, Durkheim pointed to the importance for pluralism of differentiation within these two sectors: "A nation can be maintained only if, between the State and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life . . . occupational groups are suited to fill this role, and that is their destiny."[5]

In the sphere of politics, the pluralist theorists agree that pluralism means "the diversification of power."[6] According to Kornhauser, this is accomplished by the existence of "a plurality of groups that are both independent [of state power] and

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[4]Etzioni, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

[5]Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1964), p. 28.

[6]Robert A. Nisbet, *Community and Power* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 265.

non-inclusive" in that they do not claim or receive "hegemony over many aspects of . . . members' lives." The existence of such a plurality of groups "not only protects elites and non-elites from one another but does so in a manner that permits liberal democratic control."[7] Similarly, Lipset refers to "a multitude of organizations relatively independent of the central state power" and "intermediary organizations which act as sources of countervailing power."[8]

An important notion which is implicit in much of the recent literature on political development is explicitly stated by Shils:

> All large-scale societies are inevitably pluralistic to some degree. The aspiration towards completely totalitarian control over all spheres of social life is unattainable, even by the most ruthless of elites. Incapacity on the one side, evasiveness, creativity and the necessity of improvisation on the other, introduce into totalitarian regimes, which would deny its validity, a good deal of pluralism.[9]

Shils also refers to society as "constructed of a set of spheres and systems: . . . the political system, the economic system, the religious sphere, the cultural sphere, and the like." Of course, "Different types of societies are characterized by the preponderance of one of the systems or spheres over the others." Unlike other types of systems (theocracy, plutocracy, and political

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[7]William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 80-81.

[8]S. M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 66, 67.

[9]Edward A. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956), p. 154.

absolutism), "The system of individualistic democracy or liberalism is characterized by an approximate balance among the spheres."[10]

This notion of balance among the various sectors of society occupies an important position in the thinking of the functional and systems theorists. There are problems for any society in which "the processes of differentiation and change go on relatively continuously in one part or sphere of a society without yet becoming fully integrated into a stable wider framework."[11] Eisenstadt feels that "In such situations a continuous process of unbalanced change may develop, resulting either in a breakdown of the existing institutional framework, or in stabilization at a relatively low level of integration."[12]

Parsons, too, speaks of "characteristics common to all industrial societies." Included in these common characteristics are "the pressures to genuine structural differentiation in the upper levels [which] may well prove irresistible . . ." and the fact that the modern society "is certainly a stratified society; but it no longer has anything like a unitary elite based on lineages, on wealth, on political power, or on monopoly of religious legitimation."[13] While observing that "communist totalitarian organization will probably not match 'democracy' in political

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[10] Ibid., pp. 153-154.

[11] Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 379.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Talcott Parsons, et al., Theories of Society (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1961), I, pp. 262-263.

and integrative capacity in the long run," he goes on to "predict that it will prove to be unstable and will either make adjustments in the general direction of electoral democracy and a plural party system or 'regress' into generally less advanced and politically less effective forms of organization, failing to advance as rapidly or as far as otherwise may be expected."[14]

In this view, societies which achieve industrialization, division of labor and structural differentiation among sectors, and pluralism will be successful, that is, they will be "modern," "Western" societies. Those which are less fortunate and do not achieve this outcome will fail as modern societies and, hence, "regress." Thus, unless a society conforms to the Western "model" of modernization, it cannot survive intact.

A similar view is taken of the polity. The writings of the functional theorists and systems theorists which have dominated the political development literature for the past decade reflect an inherent cultural bias which is manifested in a view of political "modernization" and "development" in the direction of the Anglo-American "civic culture." "Westernized," "modernized," "developed," and "democratic" are treated almost synonymously in this literature.

Let us now take a closer look at the polity and its relationship to society. Almond states that "What is peculiar to modern

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[14]Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," American Sociological Review, XXIX, 3 (June, 1964), p. 356.

political systems is a relatively high degree of structural differentiation. . ."[15]

> The development of . . . specialized regulating structures creates the modern democratic political system and the peculiar pattern of boundary maintenance between subsystems of the polity and the relations between the polity and the society.[16]

What appears to be the basis for the functional and systems theorists' emphasis on the division of labor is that adaptability to change in a society is greatly facilitated when the various sectors and groups within those sectors are autonomous. Hence, adaptability would be greatest where there is "good" boundary maintenance between society, economy, and polity. According to Almond, the degree of boundary maintenance is closely tied to the performance of associational interest groups which are "specialized structures of interest articulation."

> Good boundary maintenance is attained by virtue of the regulatory role of associational interest groups in processing raw claims or interest articulations occurring elsewhere in the society and the political system, and directing them in an orderly way and in agreeable form through the party system, legislature, and bureaucracy.[17]

As has been suggested in one recent criticism of Almond, "it would be extremely difficult to fit [the USSR] into a model of 'a high incidence of associational interest articulations.' Indeed, it can be argued that [it is] developed just because of

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[15]Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 18.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid., pp. 35-36.

the lack of such associational interest articulations."[18] It is quite possible that the Soviet Union could not have industrialized as rapidly as it did had there existed "good" boundary maintenance and a high degree of associational interest group activity. Rather than facilitating industrialization, a large number of associational interest groups might have retarded industrialization by acting as "veto groups" (to employ Riesman's notion) which by their very nature "exist as defense groups, not as leadership groups."[19]

To the extent that we are able to identify any form of interest articulation in the Soviet Union, it appears to come not from what Almond refers to as associational interest groups[20] but rather from what he calls institutional interest groups.[21] The predominance of institutional over associational groups and the existence of veto groups are important aspects of the Soviet political system which need to be examined in closer detail.

To summarize this discussion of the current image of the modern, developed society, we can say that there seems to be

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[18]Robert E. Dowse, "A Functionalist's Logic," World Politics, XVIII, 4 (July, 1966), pp. 613-614.

[19]David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 215.

[20]"Their particular characteristics are explicit representation of the interests of a particular group, orderly procedures for the formulation of interests and demands, and the transmission of these demands to other political structures." Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 34.

[21]These are "organizations which perform other social or political functions but which, as corporate bodies or through groups within them. . . may articulate their own interests or represent the interests of groups in the society." Ibid., p. 33.

general agreement among the leading functional and systems theorists that there is a "tendency of social systems to develop progressively higher rates of structural differentiation under the pressure of adaptive exigencies,"[22] that a wide range of differentiation in society "confers on its possessors an adaptive advantage far superior to the structural potential of societies lacking it,"[23] and that adaptability is greatest in a society where there is "good" boundary maintenance which is "attained by virtue of the regulatory role of associational interest groups,"[24] i.e., when society is pluralistic. Societies which do not conform to this ideal type are described in pathological terms.[25]

When change in the Soviet Union is viewed in terms of this body of theory, the implications are quite obvious: it _must_ become more pluralistic. In his characterization of the modern society, Parsons stresses that there is no longer "anything like _a unitary elite_ based on lineages, on wealth, on _political power_ . . ." (emphasis added).[26] Elsewhere he states more specifically that "It can . . . be definitely said that the further this differentiation of the social structure proceeds, the more difficult

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[22]Parsons and Smelser, _op. cit._, p. 292.

[23]Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," p. 357.

[24]Almond and Coleman, _op. cit._, pp. 35-36.

[25]S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," _Economic Development and Cultural Change_, XII, 4 (July, 1964), p. 349; Parsons, _et al._, _Theories of Society_, I, p. 37.

[26]Parsons, _et al._, _op. cit._, p. 262.

it becomes to press it into the mold of a rigid line of authority from the top down." Thus, we can observe "the effects of the increasing division of labor, which operate in the direction of pluralism." Parsons even goes so far as to conclude that "political democracy is the only possible outcome -- except for general destruction or breakdown" (emphasis in original).[27]

One of the most confusing aspects of these discussions of the connection between modernization, development, differentiation, division of labor, industrialization, democracy, and pluralism, is that the logical status of claims such as the one just cited from Parsons is not at all clear. There appear to be two possible interpretations of his statement: (1) that these terms are defined in terms of one another, or (2) that there is a lawful connection between the processes denoted by those concepts.

In the first case, if all of these terms were equal by definition, then it would be impossible to identify empirically a society that was "modern" and "developed" without being pluralistic, and for Parsons also democratic. There could be no pluralistic systems that were not also highly differentiated systems, and so on. In many places throughout the writings discussed in the preceding pages, one gets the distinct impression that these key concepts are related definitionally, rather than empirically.

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[27]Talcott Parsons, "Communism and the West: The Sociology of the Conflict," in Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni (eds.), Social Change: Sources, Patterns, and Consequences (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 397-398.

If this impression is correct, then all statements relating these concepts to each other are analytic statements; they tell us nothing about the world.

An alternative interpretation is that there is a lawful relationship between the processes denoted by such concepts, and statements relating these processes to each other are synthetic rather than analytic -- that is, they are empirical generalizations about the world, which may describe causal relationships but need not do so. In this case, it would be logically possible to find societies which are characterized by a high degree of division of labor and structural differentiation, but which are neither pluralistic nor democratic. Likewise, there could logically exist "modern" societies which are neither pluralistic nor democratic. In this case whether or not such systems actually exist will determine the truth or falsity of the generalizations.

However, careful examination of the modernization and political development literature reveals that this crucial distinction between definition and empirical generalization, between analytic and synthetic statements, is not rigorously observed. In many cases, it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to determine the logical status of a particular statement or set of statements. In either case, despite protestations to the contrary,[28] the concepts "modern" and "developed" appear to reflect a pronounced

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[28]Mark G. Field, "Soviet Society and Communist Party Controls: A Case of 'Constricted' Development," in Donald W. Treadgold (ed.), Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), pp. 187-188.

cultural bias in this literature.

One gets the impression from the modernization, political development and pluralism literature that what really has been accomplished is the construction of an ideal type modern society and that in so doing the Western civic culture identified by Almond and Verba has been used as the paradigm.[29] Now of course ideal types are not the end result of empirical inquiry, but merely a particular kind of methodological device "intended to institute comparisons as precise as the state of one's theory and the precision of his instruments will allow."[30] The procedure in this case would be to compare particular systems to the ideal type in order to see how closely they would approximate it. In the present case, as has been mentioned, a society will not be successful -- that is, it will not be able to maintain itself over time -- unless it very closely approximates the ideal type. To the extent that societies do not already approach the ideal, they must develop in that direction or tend toward "destruction and breakdown" (to use Parsons' phrase).

In order to investigate the relationship between industrialization (or economic development) and political change in societies,

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[29]Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[30]Don Martindale, "Sociological Theory and the Ideal Type," in L. Gross (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory, (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 58-59. The logical status and methodological function of ideal types for the study of Soviet politics have been discussed at length elsewhere. See my "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems in Communist Studies," Soviet Studies, XVII, 3 (January, 1968), pp. 329-335.

it seems more appropriate to view the relationship between concepts (and the processes which they denote) such as democracy, pluralism, division of labor, and differentiation as empirical, not definitional. We then leave open the possibility that a society could be modern (in the sense of being industrialized and adaptive to its environment) without being either democratic or pluralistic. Unless this is done, we shall be unable to progress beyond contemporary modernization and development theory which seems totally inappropriate to the study of the Soviet Union which is industrialized and, at least for the time being, seems quite capable of adapting to its environment.

Certainly the industrialization process has led to the division of labor and a certain degree of structural differentiation in Soviet society. Yet, it does not necessarily follow from the identification of groupings of individuals with different social and economic skills and positions that Soviet society is pluralistic.

In order to deal more satisfactorily with this problem I have constructed a typology of political leadership systems, based on group political participation and the utilization of skills, which promises much more theoretical utility than the oversimplified totalitarian-pluralistic dichotomy found in the literature on political change in the Soviet Union and, at the same time, avoids overtones of cultural bias in favor of the pluralistic Anglo-American political culture.

For purposes of the present study four distinct systems in

this typology will be considered. Representing the two extremes on the spectrum are the pluralistic and monocratic systems.[31] Somewhere in between are two intermediate (although not necessarily chronologically intermediate) types.

In a monocratic system political offices are held only by an elite of professional (careerist) politicians. There is no structural pluralism in the polity, but there may be pluralism in the rest of society. Where there do exist various independent structured social groups, they are excluded from active (as opposed to passive) participation in the polity. Whatever

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[31]The term "monocratic" is not original with this study. It can be found in the writings of Victor A. Thompson, especially Modern Organization (N.Y.: Knopf, 1961), and Max Weber. Thompson seems to have picked up the term from Weber (Cf. Thompson, op. cit., p. 74) and uses it interchangeably with the term "monistic." This latter term can be found in several places in the literature and is frequently employed as an antonym for pluralism. Cf. Skilling, op. cit., p. 449; Clark Kerr, et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 232; Franz Neumann, Behemoth (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 400-401; Peter H. Merkl, Political Continuity and Change (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 69-77. I have chosen "monocracy" and rejected "monism" for the following reasons. (1) While Skilling, Kerr, and Neumann use "monism," it is not at all certain what they mean by it since they do not use it extensively, but only in passing. In order to avoid confusion, therefore, it seems wise to avoid that concept. (2) When commenting on the Soviet Union, Thompson employs the term "monocratic," rather than "monistic." Cf. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 79-80. Nevertheless, in what follows I do not necessarily mean everything by "monocratic" that Thompson does. I shall stipulate my own definition. Where there is no mention of certain aspects of Thompson's concept, the reader should not assume that I am following his usage in toto. Boris Meissner has used the term "monocratic" in discussing the Soviet political system. However, he does not indicate the source of the term and does not provide any definition of his usage. Cf. Boris Meissner, "Soviet Democracy and Bolshevik Party Dictatorship," in Henry W. Ehrmann (ed.), Democracy in a Changing Society (N.Y.: Praeger, 1964), p. 168.

autonomous groups do exist, therefore, are not independent centers of political power, but could very well act as centers of power in other areas of society, e.g., the cultural or economic sectors.

The political elite in a monocratic system may possess the skills necessary to running society, although that is not an essential characteristic of a monocratic system. However, to the extent that the political elite does not possess these skills, it can obtain them at no cost from the various specialized elites in society[32] -- that is, they can extract the necessary technical information from the specialized elites without having to exchange for it a voice in the policy-making process.

In a pre-industrial society, the necessary skills are primarily, although not exclusively, political. Skills necessary to running the economy are related to the sale and ownership of land and the management of crops, etc., and historically, these too were generally possessed by the monocratic elite.

In an industiralized society, political skills are obviously still quite important, but, in addition, a great deal of specialized, technical expertise is required. In order for the monocratic political elite to maintain its exclusive control of the polity in such a society, it would have to continue to obtain the required technical information and skills at no cost. This might require the operation of a more-or-less totalitarian re-

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[32]Of course, the political elite is also a specialized elite. Throughout this study, however, the term "specialized elite" will be reserved for elites from the various non-political sectors of society.

gime which could compel the specialized elites to contribute their technical knowledge without receiving in return any degree of participation in the polity.

Friedrich and Brzezinski suggest that totalitarianism is possible only in an industrialized society since the techniques required for totalitarian control are products of an industrial technology.[33] Yet, in another respect, totalitarianism is also difficult to achieve in an industrialized society because there is a much greater amount of technical information which the monocratic political elite must extract from the specialized elites of society.

This assumes, of course, that totalitarianism is monocratic by definition, an assumption which can be substantiated by the literature.[34] I shall accept this definition of "totalitarianism," hence all totalitarian systems are monocratic, although not all monocratic systems need be totalitarian for at least two reasons: (1) monocratic systems need not have unlimited scope of power over all aspects of peoples' lives -- it is possible to conceive of a constitutional monocratic system, for example -- and (2) monocratic systems could (and did) exist in pre-industrialized societies, and industrialization is a defining characteristic (or at least a necessary condition) of totalitari-

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[33]Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, _Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy_ (2nd ed. rev.; N.Y.: Praeger, 1966), esp. ch. 2.

[34]_Ibid._, _passim_, and Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), _Totalitarianism_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

anism, as the term is generally used.[35]

We must note here, however, that there is a second meaning of the word "totalitarianism" which does not make monocracy a defining characteristic of that concept. In such usages, the term means, generally, a political system in which the scope of political power is unlimited, that is, it has effective power over all aspects of peoples' lives.[36]

Nothing is stipulated in the definition concerning the mechanisms of power or the structure of the decision-making process, and in that sense one could logically have democratic totalitarianism (at least, majority-rule totalitarianism).[37]

In addition to the fact that most contemporary writers use the first definition of "totalitarianism," there are other reasons why I have chosen it for the purposes of this study.[38]

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[35]Friedrich and Brzezinski, op. cit., ch. 2. While industrialization is crucial to totalitarianism for Friedrich and Brzezinski, it is difficult to tell what status they assign to it: defining characteristic or necessary condition. For a more detailed treatment of this problem see my "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences," pp. 16-25.

[36]Hans Kelsen defines totalitarianism as that system in which "the scope of the coercive order [of the state] is in principle unlimited, so that the mutual behavior of the individuals is regulated in every possible aspect of human life, especially with respect to economic and cultural life." Cf. The Political Theory of Bolshevism (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1959), p. 6.

[37]Cf. J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (N.Y.: Praeger, 1960).

[38]This is not to dismiss the theoretical significance of this second definition of "totalitarianism," as I think it would be particularly interesting and useful to study totalitarianism, so defined, in an attempt to see what types of structures of power are empirically related to that totalitarianism, particularly at different stages of economic development.

First, this definition, and the logical possibilities which it allows, run counter to a major and quite plausible thesis of pluralistic theory -- in a system where there exist independent associational groups (a non-monocratic system), these groups act as buffers between the individual and the state, thus limiting the power of the state over the lives of individuals.[39] Quite obviously, therefore, a non-monocratic system could not be totalitarian. Since much of this study will be directly relevant to, and discussed in terms of, pluralistic theory, I could not resolve this contradiction except by accepting the first definition of totalitarianism. And secondly, I am not directly concerned with the scope of political power over peoples' lives. Thus it seems all the more appropriate for present purposes to use the definition of totalitarianism which would include monocracy as a defining characteristic and not the one which deals (definitionally) only with scope of state power.

Certain aspects of pluralism have already been discussed, but a few additional points should be mentioned in order to clarify present usage. In a <u>pluralistic system</u> various specialized elites compete for political offices and for influence and participation in the policy-making process. To the extent that professional (careerist) politicians exist, they do not possess any special privileges or institutionalized advantages--that is, they have the same status as any other interest group

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[39] Cf. Nisbet, op. cit.; Kornhauser, op. cit.; Lipset, op. cit.

or specialized elite in terms of their possibilities of getting into office. The career politicians would not be a self-perpetuating elite, by heredity, cooptation or any other means. The formation of organized (associational) interest groups is considered to be a legitimate means of acquiring offices and influencing policy. While pluralism is one possible outcome of the industrialization process with its resulting division of labor and structural differentiation in society, there appear to be at least two additional possible outcomes. These I shall refer to as the adaptive-monocratic system and the cooptation system.

It was stated earlier that while a monocratic political elite might possess the technical, non-political skills necessary to running society, it was not necessary that they do so. In a system in which the political elite is not interested in controlling large parts of the non-political sectors of society, it is not necessary that they possess more than elementary non-political skills. Where the monocratic political elite wishes to control and direct the non-political sectors, it is quite necessary that they either possess the technical skills themselves or get them "at no cost" from the various specialized elites in society.

Where the latter alternative is employed, the risk is ever present that these specialized elites might attempt to trade their skills for some degree of participation in the political policy-making process. To the extent that such attempts are successful, the system ceases to be monocratic. Thus, in order

to perpetuate the monocratic order, the political elite must be prepared to use various forms of coercion in order to extract the skills from the specialized elites. Where persuasion and propaganda are unsuccessful, violence and terror must be employed. Ultimately, of course, there is no assurance that such techniques would be successful. Hence, this approach could be self-defeating; it could prevent the system from adapting to the environment in the desired fashion.

A more satisfactory alternative would be change in the direction of what I shall call an adaptive-monocratic system, which results from a situation in which the monocratic elite does not itself have the skills necessary to make and effectively carry out policy in all areas in which it desires to do so. A very obvious example here would be political control over a complex, industrialized society, and the technical skills necessary to that task. The monocratic political elite may choose to acquire these skills themselves, rather than forcing (by one means or another) members of specialized elites to contribute freely these skills to the political system. To reiterate an important distinction, the political elite in a purely monocratic system does not attempt to change its skill characteristics, whereas the political elite in an adaptive-monocratic system does attempt to do so. In both systems the distribution of political power is essentially monocratic. Hence, an adaptive-monocratic system must be viewed in a temporal context where at one time the monocratic elite does not possess all the

skills it needs and employs certain methods in acquiring those skills for itself, thus enabling it to maintain monocratic control without the use of force.

In an adaptive-monocratic system there are two basic methods by which the political elite can acquire the desired non-political technical skills. The first alternative involves the retraining of existing cadres. This alternative appears to be inefficient in terms of the allocation of resources. It would involve relieving cadres from official duties during the retraining or providing a system of part-time retraining while still in office. In the first case, the administrative chaos would be great, but for a short period of time. In the second case, the chaos would be less, but would last for a longer period of time.

A more satisfactory alternative from the point of view of minimizing administrative disruption would entail recruiting into the lower echelons of the polity younger cadres who have already completed technical training. This method is much more efficient in terms of allocation of resources, but would take much longer to bring cadres with specialized skills into leading positions. In such a system there would obviously be little need to compel the specialized elites to contribute their skills and technical knowledge to the monocratic elite and, therefore, much less necessity to employ coercive techniques which might prove to be dysfunctional to the system. Problems related to the legitimacy of the monocratic elite are reduced since there

would appear to be less feeling among the specialized elites that decisions are being made by unskilled politicians on the basis of technical information which has been extracted from them and for which they are not compensated by being given any voice in policy-making.

The fourth political leadership system to be discussed in the present study I shall call the cooptation system. Like an adaptive-monocracy, the cooptation system must be viewed in a temporal context in which at one time a monocratic elite does not possess all the skills it needs to do what it desires. Here the similarity ends. As we have seen, the political elite in an adaptive-monocratic system acquires technical skills by the processes of retraining and recruitment. In the cooptation system, however, these skills are acquired by coopting into the political elite members of various specialized elites in society, thus giving them direct access to the policy-making process.

What distinguishes this process from the recruitment procedures in an adaptive-monocratic system is that coopted specialists would be men who had already established a career in one of the non-political sectors of society and, thus, would be entering the political elite mid-way or late in their careers. They would already have earned a reputation outside the political elite and would be coopted because of their expertise in a particular skill area. We might expect their primary affiliation to be with their non-political professional-vocational group. This is to be contrasted with the process in an adaptive-

monocratic system in which young men are recruited into the political elite very early in their careers as specialists. Such recruits would not have already established careers and reputations in the non-political sectors, nor would they have established firm relations with non-political professional-vocational groups.

While the difference between the two systems is made initially in terms of the processes utilized by the political elite in acquiring specialized skills, these processes could lead to other, far-reaching differences. The different socialization processes to which these two distinct types might be subjected seems to warrant such a categorical distinction between recruitment and cooptation. In the context of Soviet politics, Hodnett has drawn attention to this distinction in his study of CPSU *Obkom* First Secretaries:

> Perhaps a qualitative change in the character of the *obkom* leadership depends not so much on how many young men with fresh technical diplomas are drawn into lower Party work [recruitment] as on how many older, experienced non-*apparatchiki* transfer *to* the Party apparatus well along in their careers [cooptation], affecting its character rather than vice versa.[40]

Selznick defines cooptation as "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence."[41] While in one sense both recruited and

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[40]Grey Hodnett, "The *Obkom* First Secretaries," *Slavic Review*, XXIV, 4 (December, 1965), p. 652.

[41]Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 13.

coopted individuals with new skills represent "new elements" within the political elite, it is felt (for a variety of reasons that will be elaborated later) that only individuals who enter the political elite after having established a non-political professional career constitute "genuinely" new elements.

The implications of using either retraining and recruitment or cooptation are immense. In the cooptation system the various specialized social elites are given virtual representation in the political elite. This means that there is a certain degree of participation of these specialized elites in the policy-making process. The extent of participation could be quite varied, of course, and could differ from one cooptation system to another. Likewise, the degree or extent of cooptation and the number of specialized elites involved could differ from one system to another. All of this serves to distinguish the cooptation system from (1) the monocratic and adaptive-monocratic system, in which there is no participation of the specialized elites in the polity, and (2) the pluralistic system, in which the specialized elites and associational interest groups can participate _as groups_ in the polity and can _openly_ compete with each other and with professional politicians for political office and political influence.

Those who argue that pluralism is a necessary political outcome of an industrialized society tend to view the Soviet political system as being in a process of change from a totalitarian-

monocratic system to a pluralistic system. That the Soviet political system is currently described as "limited pluralism"[42] or "not genuine pluralism"[43] points to the inadequacies of existing conceptualization and theorizing. There is certainly no reason to assume that existing specialized elites in the Soviet Union will necessarily transform themselves into associational interest groups and, hence, participate in a "genuinely" pluralistic Soviet political system. This is a possible alternative, but I would certainly disagree with Parsons and others who view it as the only possible outcome short of destruction or decay. Change from a totalitarian-monocratic system into either an adaptive-monocratic system or a cooptation system is both a logical and an empirical possibility. Both of these alternative courses of development would permit adaptation and the latter would permit extensive political change as well.

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[42] Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change," Problems of Communism, XV, 6 (November-December, 1966), p. 61.

[43] Skilling, op. cit., p. 449.

CHAPTER TWO

METHODOLOGICAL AND TECHNICAL QUESTIONS

Scope of the Study

This study is concerned with certain aspects of the Soviet political leadership system in an effort to learn more about the relationship between political change and the process of industrial and concomitant societal development in the Soviet Union. The inquiry will proceed within the framework of the scheme for classifying political leadership systems discussed in the previous chapter. By viewing changes in the Soviet political leadership from 1917 to the present in terms of this taxonomy we would be in a better position to evaluate a major proposition frequently appearing in the literature on political development and pluralism--that industrialization and economic development must lead to pluralism, otherwise society will regress and will be unable to adapt to modern conditions.

While it is hoped that future research will permit such analysis, it should be stated at the outset that the aim of the present study is much more modest. Here we shall examine the changes only at one level of the Soviet political elite and for a much shorter period of time: Central Committees selected at 19th, 20th, and 22nd Party Congresses. The selection of this universe and time period for analysis was motivated by several factors. First, since this is merely an exploratory study, the scope had to be brought into immediately manageable limits. Secondly, for

individuals who held top positions in the Soviet political leadership prior to 1952, there are both widespread and critical gaps in the type of data required to test relevant hypotheses. These gaps increase to frustrating proportions in the data available on the careers of middle- and lower-level officials. Unfortunately, this phenomenon exists, although to a lesser extent, in the post-1952 period. Needless to say, it was impossible to circumvent these problems related to the lack of data. All that could be done was to limit the study to that time period in which data are more readily accessible to Western researchers. Thirdly, in order to limit the present study still further, it was decided to exclude government officials from the analysis. It is fully recognized, of course, that these factors place limitations on the generalizability of the findings to be presented and that a more thorough analysis of the process of political change in the Soviet Union would have to expand the present analysis to include consideration of pre-1952 party careers and careers of government officials for the whole period since 1917.

Research Strategy

In the past decade students of Soviet politics have given increasing attention to elite biographic data as a possible source of important clues about the operation of the Soviet political system. Prior to the late fifties, the only noteworthy study of the career and social background characteristics of the Soviet political elite was George Schueller's The

Politburo.[1] Written in 1950-51 when biographic information on members of the Soviet political elite was exceedingly scarce, Schueller's work stood for almost a decade as the only systematic effort to analyze available data on the social backgrounds and careers of officials in the Party's top policy-making body. The Politburo consists of a presentation of every available bit of minutia concerning the social backgrounds and careers of the members of that body from 1917 to 1951. The theoretical significance of many of these factual details is not demonstrated and, on the whole, the monograph can be best described as an exercise in raw empiricism with little attempt to go beyond the facts themselves.

A work of a quite different nature, John Armstrong's The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite,[2] appeared in 1959. Confining his efforts to the study of the Ukrainian Party Apparatus, Armstrong did not attempt to present all known facts about social background and careers of the defined universe of officials in his study, but rather sorted through the plethora of details and presented only those facts with known theoretical significance. Armstrong draws on the bureaucracy and organization theory literature for many of his concepts and basic propositions. As com-

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[1]George K. Schueller, The Politburo (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1951). This monograph has been reprinted with others from the RADIR project in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 97-178.

[2]John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus (New York: Praeger, 1959).

pared with Schueller's exercise in raw empiricism, Armstrong's approach could best be described as limited deductive empiricism.

In order to place the approach of the present study in the proper perspective, some discussion of research strategies and their relevance to the analysis of the Soviet political leadership system is necessary. There are three distinct research strategies which can be used to study any nomothetic research problem: deductive empiricism, raw empiricism, and inductive empiricism.[3]

In the deductive empirical strategy a set of operational statements or empirically verifiable hypotheses is deduced from an interrelated set of postulates and theorems. When verified, these hypotheses serve as instances of the verification of the theorems and postulates from which they were deduced. Three distinct types of deductive empiricism can be identified. Operational hypotheses can be deduced from (I) an empirical theory, (II) a theoretical model (such as game theory), and (III) a theory constructed more or less by intuition. Type I can be used in either the context of discovery or the context of verification. Types II and III are used primarily in the realm of discovery. Discovery refers to "the origin of ideas or the hypotheses which express them";[4] verification refers to the processes related to

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[3]For a defense of the acquisition of nomothetic knowledge in Soviet studies, see my "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems of Communist Studies," Soviet Studies, XIX, 3 (January, 1968), pp. 317-321.

[4]Milton Hobbs, Logical Positivism and the Methodology of Political Science: Analysis and Program (Unpublished Ph.D.

the confirmation or testing of these hypotheses.

The raw empirical strategy and deductive empirical strategies II and III are used in areas where there exists relatively little literature on the subject and where there are few readily available hypotheses. The raw empiricist, however, would approach the data without having gone through the aforementioned process of establishing verifiable hypotheses by deducing them from an interrelated set of postulates and theorems. Rather, he would "immerse" himself in the data or "play" with the data to see what regularities emerge from the data, that is, to see what generalizations can be formulated. The strategy of raw empiricism is used in the context of discovery.

Inductive empiricism occupies a middle ground between raw empiricism and deductive empiricism, and is usually employed in areas of research characterized by numerous conflicting theories. The strategy in this case is to test the propositions from these conflicting theories against some body of data. This approach is employed in the realm of verification and its contribution is two-fold--it results in a more systematic statement of the various propositions and, at the same time, permits a systematic attempt at the resolution of the conflicts among these theories.[5]

Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 1961), Ch. 5, Section A. For further discussion of discovery and verification, see Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 6-7.

[5]The only example of inductive empiricism which comes to mind in the context of Soviet studies is an unpublished paper by Richard Brody and John Vesecky, Institute of Political Studies,

The decision of which strategy to employ in a given instance is determined by the nature of the research problem under consideration, the amount of literature and previous research on the subject, and the availability of relevant data. After careful consideration, it appears that the strategy of inductive empiricism is clearly more appropriate in guiding the study of Soviet political elites than either of the other two strategies. The considerations which lead to this conclusion are of interest here.

Raw empiricism was rejected primarily for the reason that it seems wasteful and inefficient from the point of view of the advancement of systematic, cumulative knowledge to start with a *tabula rasa* when studying Soviet political elites. To proceed according to this strategy assumes that there has been no useful research on either elites in general or Soviet elites in particular. There are, of course, numerous studies of elites in general[6]--

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Stanford University, a preliminary version of which was read at the convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Berkeley, California, December, 1965: "Soviet Openness to Changing Situations: A Critical Evaluation of Certain Hypotheses About Soviet Foreign Policy Behavior." Before we can engage in detailed inductive empiricism, it is necessary that we have available propositional inventories of various problem areas. To my knowledge, no such inventories now exist in the area of Communist studies. A few examples from the social sciences are the following: Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, *A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making* (New York: Wiley, 1964); and Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964).

[6]The extent of research undertaken on elites can be seen from an examination of the bibliography contained in Suzanne Keller's *Beyond The Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 327-342. This work is an interesting

political, economic, cultural, and social--and a few of Soviet elites.[7] Thus, in this case it is not necessary to start afresh. There is a literature on which to build and this literature can be used in either of two ways--according to the strategy of deductive empiricism or inductive empiricism. In addition, if one ignores previous attempts to study a problem, it may very well prove difficult at some later date to relate one's findings to the existing literature. Concepts might be denoted differently, thus making comparisons of findings difficult, if not impossible, and, indeed, the findings might be trivial in the light of previous research.[8]

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and comprehensive attempt to evaluate and integrate numerous studies of elites.

For some useful criticisms of the book, see the following reviews: E. Digby Baltzell, American Sociological Review, XXIX, 4 (August, 1964), pp. 632-633; John C. Leggett, American Journal of Sociology, LXX, 3 (November, 1964), pp. 391-392.

[7]Cf. Schueller, op. cit.; Armstrong, op. cit.; Yaroslav Bilinsky, Changes in the Central Committee: Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961-1966, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Denver: University of Denver, 1966-67); Severyn Bialer, "Notes on the Study of Soviet Elites," Paper presented at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 10 September 1964; John A. Armstrong, "Party Bifurcation and Elite Interests," Soviet Studies, XVII, 4 (April, 1966), pp. 417-430; Jerry Hough, "The Soviet Elite," Problems of Communism, XVI, 1 (January-February, 1967), pp. 28-35, and 2 (March-April, 1967), pp. 18-25; Borys Lewytzkyj, "Generations in Conflict," Problems of Communism, XVI, 1 (January-February, 1967), pp. 36-40; Michael Gehlen, "The Educational Backgrounds and Career Orientations of the Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU," The American Behavioral Scientist, IX, 8 (April, 1966), pp. 11-14.

[8]For a criticism of this approach as used in a recent study of Soviet politics, see my review of Political Succession in the USSR by Myron Rush in the Journal of Politics, XXVIII, 1 (February, 1966), pp. 221-222. Cf. also comments by Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When, and How," World Politics, XVIII, 4 (July, 1966), p. 702.

Deductive empiricism seems to be a more worthwhile approach to the study of Soviet political elites in the sense that the problems of waste and inefficiency are not encountered. Yet in studying any aspect of the Soviet system, deductive empiricism has a very important shortcoming and limitation. Because of the paucity of data on the Soviet Union, it is difficult to proceed in this fashion. Available data permits us to test certain hypotheses and propositions from various theories, but it does not appear that we have enough data about any one aspect of the system to test a group of interrelated hypotheses from one theory. As we fill in the gaps in our data, of course, this approach will become increasingly applicable to the study of different aspects of the Soviet system.

This lack of data is the main reason for the rejection of the deductive empirical strategy, but there are other considerations which relate to different types of this strategy. Type I involves testing hypotheses which have been deduced from an empirical theory. Type II involves testing hypotheses which have been deduced from a theoretical model, such as game theory. Type III involves testing hypotheses which have been deduced from a theory constructed more or less by intuition. Each of these three types will be discussed separately.

Type I deductive empiricism can be illustrated by reference to group theory which has recently been given increasing attention as a possible framework for the analysis of Soviet politics.[9]

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[9]See the following: H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, XVIII, 3 (April, 1966), 435-

Numerous articles and books have appeared in the past few years which have attempted to explain the behavior of individuals and the occurrence of certain events by means of the group affiliations of the relevant actors.[10] To date, few of these writers have explicitly used either interest or reference group theory,[11] probably because of a lack of relevant data. However, recently Schwartz and Keech have amply demonstrated that some important problems can be examined with existing data.[12]

A completely satisfactory use of reference group theory would require information concerning the informal affiliations of the actors. Most existing studies of Soviet politics which

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451; Gehlen, _op. cit._, pp. 11-14.

[10]For example, see Roger Pethybridge, _A Key to Soviet Politics: The Crisis of the Anti-Party Group_ (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962); Myron Rush, _Political Succession in the USSR_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965); Robert Conquest, _Russia After Khrushchev_ (New York: Praeger, 1965); Wolfgang Leonhard, _The Kremlin Since Stalin_ (New York: Praeger, 1962); and the several sources cited in Skilling, _op. cit._

[11]Both Skilling (_op. cit._) and Rigby ["Crypto-Politics," _Survey_, 50 (January, 1964), pp. 183-194] have called for the explicit use of interest group theory, but neither has come forth with any specific applications although Skilling is preparing a book on the subject.

Sidney Verba points to the problems of denotation and operationalization in attempting to bridge the gap between laboratory and field under general conditions. In the Soviet context, these problems are horrendous. Cf. Sidney Verba, _Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership_ (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), chapter IV.

[12]Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," _The American Political Science Review_, LXII, (September, 1968), forthcoming.

use group affiliation as a device for explaining the behavior of actors are rather crude, oversimplified, and frequently misleading in that they utilize only overt, manifest interest group affiliations.[13] Information on the informal group affiliations of Soviet leaders is presently unavailable and, until it becomes available, the usefulness of reference group theory as a framework for the study of Soviet politics will be greatly limited.

Type II deductive empiricism--testing hypotheses which have been deduced from a theoretical model--is currently subject to the same general shortcoming with regard to availability of data as is Type I. Taking game theory, or more specifically the theory of political coalitions, several interesting questions emerge when one considers its application to the Soviet political scene. Do factions within the Politburo (Presidium) attempt to win only a minimal winning coalition or are there limitations on complete and/or perfect information which cause coalitions to tend to maximize their size? Or it might be useful to view Soviet politics in these terms: there exist at least two games which are played simultaneously, one for the office of First Secretary (General Secretary) and the other for policy. Perhaps these two games are played according to entirely different sets of rules. It is generally accepted that the game

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[13]For a methodological criticism of Pethybridge's attempt to explain the behavior of Soviet leaders in terms of overt group affiliations, see my review of A Key to Soviet Politics in Slavic and East European Studies (Montreal), X, 3-4 (Fall-Winter, 1965-66), pp. 130-132. Rigby's comments on the use of group theory in the study of Soviet politics are brief but useful. Cf. "Crypto-Politics".

for the office of First Secretary is played in the Politburo, but there is at least one instance--the Anti-Party Crisis of June 1957--when it appears that this game was played in the Central Committee.[14] Presumably the game over policy is always played in the Politburo. The connection between the two games may be that the majority in the first game is used to win in the second game. Elaboration and verification of this line of reasoning would shed considerable light on the perplexing problem of the relationship between power and policy which has been the subject of considerable debate among students of Soviet politics.[15]

In regard to the size of the coalition and marginality, it appears that Marshal Zhukov played the role of the marginal man in the June 1957 Anti-Party Crisis. In this role, he was indispensible to Khrushchev whose very political existence depended upon Zhukov's support. Once this game for First Secretary had been won and a new N-person game was started (with the elimination of the anti-Party group as relevant players), Zhukov was

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[14]There is considerable conflicting opinion concerning the actual importance of the Central Committee in the 1957 Anti-Party Crisis. For discussions of this point, see T. H. Rigby, "Khrushchev and the Resuscitation of the Central Committee," Australian Outlook, XIII, 2 (September, 1959), pp. 165-180; L. G. Churchward, "The Central Committee Today," and T. H. Rigby, "A Note on Mr. Churchward's Comments," Australian Outlook, XIV, 1 (April, 1960), pp. 82-89; T. H. Rigby and L. G. Churchward, Policy-Making in the U.S.S.R., 1953-1961: Two Views (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1962); and Pethybridge, op. cit.

[15]Cf. Carl Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

no longer marginal and the application of the size principle resulted in his ouster from the winning coalition.[16]

These are intriguing and important questions indeed, but one wonders how much further we could press exploration of them given existing limitations on Soviet data. At this point, we must be careful to distinguish between the contexts of discovery and verification. As suggested by the above examples, the theory of political coalitions and game theory can be most useful to the student of Soviet politics in the context of discovery by suggesting hypotheses which might not otherwise be apparent. The problems arise when one shifts to the realm of verification. Attempts to apply the theory of games to the study of U.S. Congressional committees indicate the many problems and pitfalls confronting the researcher who attempts verification even where there is relatively easy access to information.[17] To some extent these early attempts were successful and indicate the importance

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[16]For discussions, both theoretical and evidential, see William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. Although couched in different terms, this interpretation of Zhukov's ouster is quite similar to Robert C. Tucker's "king-maker" hypothesis. See "The 'Anti-Party Group,'" Problems of Communism, XII, 4 (July-August, 1963), p. 43, and "Khrushchev - Challenged Leader", The New Republic, 12 March 1962, pp. 26-29.

[17]For example, see L.S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, XLVIII, 3 (September, 1954), pp. 787-792; R. Duncan Luce and Arnold A. Rogow, "A Game Theoretic Analysis of Congressional Power Distributions for a Two-Party System," Behavioral Science, I, 2 (April, 1956), pp. 83-95; and William H. Riker, "A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index," Behavioral Science, IV, 2 (April, 1959), pp. 120-131.

of future efforts toward verification. Yet the student of Soviet politics will most likely be frustrated by the lack of adequately detailed data and the impossibility of field observations. In sum, there is little hope of systematic and detailed verification in the Soviet context in the immediate future.

Finally, Type III deductive empiricism involves testing hypotheses which have been deduced from a theory constructed more or less by intuition or from some major premise which is posited at the outset. A variety of problems are raised by employing such an approach. First, such procedures can be justified in the context of discovery, particularly in areas characterized by little or no meaningful research. The study of political elites would hardly seem to qualify as such an area, therefore, such an approach in the study of Communist elites is inefficient. Secondly, overemphasis on discovery increases problems at the level of verification.[18] As Rustow has observed in a review of

[18] It is not intended here to debunk either originality or discovery. They are crucial in any scholarly arena. Nor is it an attempt to burden those operating in the realm of discovery with the baggage of accepted methodology and techniques. It is important that they remain unencumbered by methodological and technical orthodoxy. The ostracism of Immanuel Velikovsky from the fraternity of "respectable" physical scientists is a recent example of the dogma of scientific orthodoxy. This writer stands in support of the "rationalistic" receptive system as opposed to the indeterminacy, power, and dogmatic models. On this point, see Alfred de Grazia, "The Scientific Receptive System and Dr. Velikovsky," The American Behavioral Scientist, VII, 1 (September, 1963). The only exceptions I would be willing to grant are some of the rules concerning the use of language in order to facilitate communication. Here I would include the two basic rules of scientific concept formation: (1) empirical reference and (2) theoretical significance. Cf. "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences," pp. 323-329.

several recent elite studies, unawareness of certain methodological problems has made comparability of data in existing studies difficult, if not impossible, thus frustrating cross-polity verification. In order "to insure comparability with other countries, the researcher should abstract from peculiarities of the local culture and follow, wherever possible, the classifications of earlier elite studies."[19]

For these reasons the reconceptualization of political change in the Soviet Union presented in Chapter 1 was given careful consideration before it was introduced. While it would have been most desirable to view political change in the USSR within the context of existing concepts and theorizing, the analysis in the foregoing chapter indicates that this would have been unsatisfactory, if not impossible. Hence, the conceptual scheme in the previous chapter should not be viewed as a sterile exercise in generating concepts with little theoretical significance merely for the sake of originality. Rather it is an effort to provide a more adequate conceptual framework for the study of Soviet political change, one which would eliminate the inherent cultural bias in previous conceptualizing and theorizing. That bias was, in fact, the most important factor militating in favor of reconceptualization.

One of the primary concerns of the present study is to clarify and resolve some of the conflicting theories of political change in the USSR, and the conceptualization in the previous chapter

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[19]Rustow, _op. cit._, p. 702.

is well suited to that purpose of inductive empiricism. Although three of my categories (monocracy, adaptive-monocracy, and cooptation) are not commonly used in the literature on political change, the variables used to define each system and to distinguish it from each of the others (i.e., the infrastructure) are certainly not new. In addition, it is also contended that this framework has much more theoretical utility and would, therefore, be well suited for inquiry at the level of deductive empiricism. The limitations on use of that approach in this study are based in the data, not in the conceptual framework itself. So, to a limited extent at least, it will be possible to draw on various theoretical approaches for hypotheses to test in the Soviet context. Hence, this conceptual scheme may be used within the context of the existing literature while operating at the levels of both discovery and verification through inductive empiricism and deductive empiricism, although the latter is not attempted here.

The task of this study is to examine some of the essential characteristics of the post-Stalin Soviet political leadership system in order to see which of the major types of systems it most closely approximates. In this way, the conceptualization of Soviet political change can become much more refined as we no longer need to rely on the gross totalitarian-pluralistic dichotomy. The framework in Chapter 1 should not be viewed as an exhaustive list of the logical and empirical possibilities. A further development and elaboration of that conceptual approach

might produce other basic types of leadership systems. Hence, the types are not jointly exhaustive, although as we shall see, they are mutually exclusive. Since the present work was conceived as an exploration into the reconceptualization of Soviet political change and a demonstration of the theoretical utility of that preliminary effort, no attempt was made to be exhaustive.

Once the post-Stalin political leadership system is classified according to basic type, it will be possible to refine the analysis to the extent of comparing the system at various time intervals in order to determine extent and direction of any change. In addition, it will be possible to compare the Soviet leadership system to those in other countries, both Communist and non-Communist.

In light of the recent impetus given to comparative Communist studies,[20] it is important that new conceptual frameworks readily lend themselves to such comparative analysis. Thus, while we would ultimately wish to engage in comparative, and even quantitative research on political leadership systems, the first operation must necessarily be that of classification, i.e., both com-

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[20]Cf. Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," Slavic Review, XXVI, 1 (March, 1967), esp. pp. 10-12; Robert C. Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism," World Politics, XIX, 2 (January, 1967), pp. 242-257; Gordon B. Turner, "A Report on Comparative Communist Studies," American Council of Learned Societies, Newsletter, XVIII, 1-2 (January-February, 1967), pp. 7-12. A much earlier report which has received very little discussion is H. Gordon Skilling, "Soviet and Communist Politics: A Comparative Approach," The Journal of Politics, XXII, 2 (May, 1960), pp. 300-313.

parison (nonmetrical ordering) and quantification (measurement) presuppose classification.[21]

Operational Definitions

The term political leadership system is used throughout this study to refer to that part of the political system which is the rules, institutions, and practices according to which leaders are selected, assigned, and removed; the descriptive characteristics of those leaders; and the extent of non-leader influence over those leaders. I have used this term to indicate that I am not herein concerned with all aspects of the political system.

Perhaps the most critical step in analyzing the post-Stalin Soviet elite in terms of the typology of political leadership systems introduced in the last chapter is the stipulation of operational definitions of the defining characteristics of each leadership type. In Hospers' terms, this involves a statement of the characteristics "designated" by each term so that we can determine what leadership systems are "denoted" by each term.[22] For purposes of clarity, it will also be necessary to treat

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[21]Cf. Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 50-62; Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 135-171; Arthur L. Kalleberg, "The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems," World Politics, XIX, 1 (October, 1966), esp. pp. 73-78.

[22]Cf. John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1953), pp. 25-26.

certain prominent accompanying characteristics.

It was stated earlier that one of the most important distinguishing characteristics of a monocratic political system is the place of professional (careerist) politicians. While professional politicians may exist in each of the four systems discussed and, therefore, their presence cannot be used to distinguish one system from another, their relationship to other groups in society and the extent of their control of political offices can be used to differentiate these systems. What distinguishes both types of monocratic systems from cooptative and pluralistic systems is that in the former political offices are held _only_ by professional politicians, that is, by individuals who began holding political offices before they had spent more than seven years in a professional, technical or skill vocation and thereafter occupied political offices more or less continuously. Thus, political office holding by professional politicians is a defining characteristic which possibly accompanies cooptative and pluralistic systems.

From this it follows that we can classify a political leadership system as essentially monocratic if we find political offices being occupied only by professional politicians. What is needed in addition is some criterion or set of criteria to distinguish between the two monocratic types: pure and adaptive. While there may be a variety of accompanying characteristics which could serve to distinguish pure and adaptive monocratic systems, the only distinguishing defining characteristic to be stipulated here

focuses on the types of individuals brought into the political elite.

The only new entrants into a pure monocratic political elite tend to represent those whom they replace in terms of acquired skills; that is, during the normal process of personnel turnover no effort is made to bring into the political elite individuals with essentially different skills than the cadres whom they replace. In an adaptive monocratic system, on the other hand, the introduction of new cadres (either because of the normal turnover of personnel or increase in the size of the political elite) results in a very definite change in the skill characteristics of the political elite. This is usually the result of a conscious effort to recruit cadres with skills previously not possessed by the political elite. An obvious example is the effort of the Bolsheviks during the Twenties to bring into the Party individuals with economic (technical and managerial) skills, rather than those with purely political (ideological and organizational) skills.

An alternative method of introducing new skills into a monocratic political elite is to retrain existing cadres. The use of either retraining or recruitment to introduce new skills into the monocratic political elite would enable us to classify that system as adaptive monocratic.

TABLE 2.1

CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SYSTEMS

	Monocratic	Adaptive Monocratic	Cooptative	Pluralistic
Professional politicians in political office	Yes	Yes	Possibly	Possibly
Specialized elites in political office	No	No	Yes	Yes
Political elite responsible to people	No	No	No	Yes
Institutionalized advantage for professional politicians	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
New skills acquired by political elite	No	Yes	Possibly	Possibly
Method of replenishing political elite	Recruitment	Recruitment	Cooptation	Election (also possibly cooptation)

Possibly = df. not a defining characteristic, i.e., presence or absence of that characteristic is an empirical, not a definitional matter.

Table 2.1 lists the defining characteristics of each of the four political leadership systems discussed in Chapter 1. "Yes" indicates the presence of that characteristic for that system and "no" indicates the absence of that characteristic for that system. Both the absence and presence of certain attributes should be viewed as defining characteristics of systems. Hence, the presence of specialized elites in political offices is a defining characteristic of both cooptative and pluralistic systems, while the absence of specialized elites in political offices is a defining characteristic of monocratic and adaptive-monocratic systems. "Possibly" indicates that the attribute is not a defining characteristic of a particular system. If it is present, it is an accompanying characteristic.

It is not necessary to spell out these characteristics in further detail at this point. In the course of the analysis a more detailed consideration of these various attributes will be presented. However, before turning to a discussion of the specific research techniques to be employed in this study, it is important to spell out the distinction between "cooptation" and "recruitment" as used throughout this work.

The theoretical orientation of this study makes it necessary for us to distinguish between two distinct types of political office holders: (1) those who entered the political elite at very early stages in their careers and who thus had little opportunity to form close ties with a professional-vocational group and (2) those who entered the political elite later on in their

careers and who had probably established close professional-vocational ties outside of the political elite. The former are called recruited officials, and the latter, coopted officials. To dichotomize the variable "years spent in professional occupation prior to entry into the political elite" so that we can distinguish operationally between recruited and coopted officials, it is necessary to establish a cutting point along the continuum described by that variable. Rather than arbitrarily selecting some figure as the cutting point between these two types, it was decided to use the "objective" standard of mean number of years spent in professional occupation prior to entry into the political elite computed on the basis of all individuals in the present study population. The mean was 7.2 years for the political and 7.4 years for the Party elite. In both cases, these figures were rounded off to 7 years.

An individual was classified as "recruited" if he began occupying political or Party offices more or less regularly before he had spent more than seven years in a professional or technical vocation. Individuals who spent more than seven years in a professional or technical vocation before holding political or Party positions were classified as "coopted." For purposes of this study, "political elite" equals by definition all persons holding political office. "Political office" means any formal position in the Party, government, Komsomol, or trade unions. "Party elite" means all persons holding office in the CPSU or Komsomol. Hence, the Party elite is part of the political elite,

but does not exhaust it. Mere membership in the Party or Komsomol does not count as either a political or Party office in present usage. As indicated earlier, the term "specialized elite" refers to all non-political elites.

Because of the preliminary nature of this study, we shall be concerned with analysis of gross aggregate data on the political elite. Hence, it seems quite appropriate to treat cooptation-recruitment in simple dichotomous terms. If this line of inquiry proves to be fruitful, the distinction can be made in more refined terms such that one could construct an ordinal scale of cooptation-recruitment. This could be accomplished (1) by appropriate operationalization of one defining characteristic in such a way that cooptation and recruitment are at opposite ends of a single continuum or (2) by employing more than one defining characteristic in which case several measures would be employed. In either case, cooptation and recruitment would then be treated as comparative concepts. In the following analysis, however, cooptation and recruitment will be treated as classificatory concepts. In breaking new ground, this approach has certain merits. First, this operationalization of the concepts permits more simplified procedures. Secondly, and perhaps more important from a theoretical perspective, this procedure results in a definition of the concept which is unidimensional, i.e., the number of defining characteristics is kept to a minimum. As a result, we leave the maximum number of questions open to empirical investigation. Such an approach does not preclude future

refinement of definitions by narrowing or broadening the concepts, and/or by altering the measures to convert classificatory concepts to comparative or even quantitative concepts, etc.

In terms of the present conceptualization, then, it is quite appropriate to stipulate length of time in pre-political career as the defining characteristic of cooptation. One could include other measures such as age, education, skills, etc. in the definition of cooptation. To do so, particularly at this stage of exploration, would mean that so much was put into the definition that (1) very little would be left over to relate with cooptation and (2) we would run the risk of incorporating nomological networks into our definitions.[23] Therefore, in order to leave as much room as possible for empirical observation of variables related to cooptation (e.g., type of education, career experiences, functional powers within political elite), the concept is given a very narrow operational definition in terms of the one characteristic mentioned above.

To summarize this discussion of operationalization, we can say that some determination of the absence or presence of five of the six characteristics of each of the four basic leadership systems (Table 2.1) can be made by examination of the career characteristics of individuals occupying top political offices

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[23]The methodological problems inherent in definitional nomological networks are discussed in "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences," p. 325, and May Brodbeck, "Logic and Scientific Method in Research on Teaching," in Nathan L. Gage (ed.), _Handbook of Research on Teaching_ (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 44-93.

in the Soviet Union. The presence of professional politicians and specialized elites in political offices; the acquisition of new skills by the political elite; replenishing the political elite by recruitment or cooptation; and institutionalized advantages for professional politicians. This latter point will be dealt with in considerable detail later, but requires some slight elaboration here.

Institutionalized advantage for professional politicians can be measured in at least three ways, all of which require the use of biographic data: (1) the degree of over-representation of professional politicians in the Politburo given their representation in the Central Committee and their over-representation in both of these higher bodies given their representation in the Party Congress, (2) the extent to which professional politicians dominate the "staff" (as opposed to "line") agencies within the Central Party Apparatus represented in the Central Committee, especially those concerned with cadres and personnel assignment, and (3) differences in tenure and upward mobility of professional politicians and specialized elites in political offices. The first measure will be examined in Chapter 3, the second in Chapter 4, and the third left to future research on the problem.

The extent to which the political elite is responsible to the people is the only one of the six characteristics which cannot be assessed in terms of elite biographic data analysis. Certain aspects of this question will be considered at appropriate

points in the discussions which follow in Chapters 4 and 5, but it is presently not susceptible to the same kind of specific data-based analysis as are the other five characteristics.

Data

The basic data analyzed in this study are selected aspects of the career characteristics of Full Members of the Central Committees from 1952 to 1965 which relate to the operational definitions of the four major political leadership systems. As mentioned earlier, several factors have militated in favor of confining the present analysis to Party office-holders, reserving examination of the relevant career characteristics of Soviet government officials for a later, more detailed study.

The many problems which confront researchers utilizing Soviet biographic data have been recounted elsewhere and need not be reiterated here.[24] It should be pointed out, however, that some of the most frustrating problems in Soviet biographic data analysis are in the realm of social background characteristics, rather than career patterns. Particularly troublesome here is the reliability of information concerning parental occupation, early labor activity, etc. Bialer has discussed at length

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[24]Bialer, op. cit., esp. pp. 11-18; Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr. and William A. Welsh, "The Intellectuals-Politics Nexus: Studies Using a Biographical Technique," American Behavioral Scientist, VII, 7 (March, 1964), pp. 3-4; Carl Beck, "Change and Continuity in the Political Leadership of Eastern Europe," Paper presented at the 24th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Chicago, Illinois, April 28-30, 1966; Charles W. Thayer, "The New Soviet Oligarchy," Harper's, April, 1965, pp. 64-74.

the problem of outright distortions of various social background factors in official Soviet sources.[25]

The kinds of problems encountered in Soviet information on career patterns appear to be errors of omission, rather than errors of commission such as those found in social background data. In the course of collecting career data on the 291 Full Members of the Central Committee from 1952 to 1965 who constitute the present study population (and on another 800 or so members of the political elite which will be analyzed in follow-up research), no evidence of direct distortion was discovered, i.e., there were no conflicts among the various sources used on whether or not an individual actually held a particular office at a particular time. To be sure, there were some disagreements among the sources on the exact period of time the individual held the office, but most of these were disagreements in terms of months. This type of error was present in less than 10% of the total number of career entries for the entire study population. There were some disagreements of about one year's duration. These were found in less than 5% of the total entries. Disagreements of more than one year in the length of time a position was held were present in less than 1% of the total entries. None of these differences were large enough to distort the present analysis since the only periodization necessary involves the time periods between the various post-Stalin Party Congresses at which elections to the

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[25]Bialer, op. cit., pp. 14-18 and Appendix A.

Central Committee were held. The only other calculation requiring information on length of time in office is the classification of officials as either recruited or coopted. None of the discrepancies over inclusive dates of positions held were of such a nature as to upset these calculations.

The sources of biographic data employed in this study are listed below. One problem encountered in this collection of data is the great differences which exist in the amount of biographic data available on certain categories of officials. It appears that biographic data on certain types of officials are treated as a state secret.[26] The refusal to divulge the functional assignments of many CC Secretaries and use of the title "Responsible Official" (Otvetstvennyi sotrudnik) are two examples. The experience of data collection in this study bears out Armstrong's finding that there is less information available on police and Agitprop cadres than most other categories of officials. The most complete biographic data are available on members of the Politburo. With very few exceptions, there are considerable data available on members of the Central Committee. The major problems come with officials in the Central Party Apparatus and regional Party and government officials who were not in the Central Committee. These need not concern us here, however, since they are not part of the present study population.

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[26]Thayer, op. cit., p. 65.

Non-Soviet Sources

5000 Sowjetkoepfe--Gliederung und Gesicht eines Fuehrungskollektivs. Hans Koch, ed. Koeln: Deutsche Industrieverlags GmbH, 1959.

Portraets der UdSSR-Prominenz. H. Schulz, ed. Munich: Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, 1960. A translated and updated edition of this collection is currently being published in serial form under the title Portraits of Prominent USSR Personalities. A. I. Lebed, ed. Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1966-68.

Biographic Directory of the USSR. Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany. New York: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1958.

Who's Who in the USSR, 1961/62. Heinrich E. Schulz and Stephen S. Taylor, eds. Montreal: Intercontinental Book and Publishing Co., Ltd., 1962.

Who's Who in the USSR, 1965/66. Andrew I. Lebed, Heinrich E. Schulz and Stephen S. Taylor, eds. New York: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1966.

Directory of Soviet Officials. Division of Biographic Information, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U. S. Department of State. Several editions of this directory have appeared: November 30, 1955; July, 1957; January 1, 1958; August, 1960; June, 1961. After this last date, publication of the directory was taken over by the Central Intelligence Agency. The following editions have appeared under CIA auspices: November, 1963; February, 1966; June, 1966.

Soviet Leaders. George W. Simmonds, ed. New York: Crowell, 1967.

Sowjetische Kurzbiographien. Borys Lewytzkyj and Kurt Mueller, eds. Hannover: Verlag fuer Literatur Zeitgeschehen, 1964.

Official Soviet Sources

Deputaty verkhovnogo soveta SSSR, piatoi sozyv. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiia," 1959.

Deputaty verkhovnogo soveta SSSR, shestoi sozyv. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiia," 1962.

Politicheskii slovar'. B. N. Ponomarev, ed. Moskva: Gosizdat, 1958.

XXII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, stenograficheskii otchet. Moskva: Gosizdat, 1962.

Bol'shaia Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, I and II editions.

Ezhegodnik B. S. E., 1958-1966.

Malaia Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, II and III editions.

Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia, vols. 1-5.

Entsiklopedicheskii slovar', vols. 1-3.

The final point concerns the reliability of biographic information published in non-Soviet sources. There was no way to check the reliability of information in the directory edited by Hans Koch. This was the least important of all the non-Soviet sources and was used primarily as an independent check for information gathered from other sources. In the early editions of the Directory of Soviet Officials the exact sources (usually the Soviet periodical press) and dates were given with every entry. This practice was discontinued in the editions after 1961.

The major non-Soviet sources of information were the directories published by the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, Germany. Each of these publications contains several thousand biographical sketches selected from the extensive files of the Institute's Biographic Research Section. These files consist of approximately 300,000 entries for 73,000 prominent individuals in the Soviet Union. Included in these figures are fairly extensive dossiers on some 16,000 individuals. This information was gathered from official Soviet sources (including radio broadcasts and searches of the periodical press) and from interviews with emigres. While the reliability of the latter source is certainly open to serious question, the information obtained by monitoring Soviet sources can be considered reliable in terms of career information. The important shortcomings have already been mentioned. Official Soviet sources provide the great bulk of biographic data and are the only sources of actual

career information used by the Institute. Hence, while emigre distortions might color certain aspects of the data, they did not affect information on career positions held.

Unfortunately these vast files are not in machine readable form and must be used manually. One advantage of this situation is that it is possible to check the reliability of entries in the dossiers since exact sources and dates of publication are listed beside each item of information taken from Soviet sources. During a trip to Munich in the fall of 1965, I had the opportunity to check the reliability of a small (200) random sample of career entries taken from the Institute's published directories. These were items on positions held in the Party, Government, and Komsomol and tenure dates for each position. In every instance of locating the entry in the manual file, the official Soviet source was listed. Half of these 200 items were then checked in the Soviet publications cited and all were found to be accurate. On the basis of these tests, I feel confident that the career entries in the Institute's files and publications can be assumed to be highly accurate.

Another check on the reliability of the Institute's biographic data files was undertaken by the Institute itself. During 1966-67 the Institute undertook an experiment in which they asked 150 persons whose biographies appeared in the 1965-66 edition of the Who's Who in the USSR to review their biographies, make any corrections they felt necessary and add information which they felt to be pertinent. At last count (September, 1967) they had re-

ceived more than fifty replies, all positive, which supplied new information. No one found a major fault in his or her biography. While this experiment is interesting, I choose to place more confidence in my own reliability check and am satisfied with its results.

Techniques of Data Analysis

The nature of the theoretical questions posed in the preceding discussion indicates that our primary interest in the data for purposes of the present preliminary analysis is our ability to describe the career characteristics of a segment of the Soviet political leadership (the Central Committee), the differences which obtain in certain career characteristics in several categories of that leadership, and the changes which occur in both realms throughout the post-Stalin period.

The analysis in Chapter 3 is geared toward establishing the absence or presence of four of the six defining characteristics of political leadership systems in the post-Stalin period: (1) professional politicians in political offices, (2) specialized elites in political offices, (3) new skills acquired by the political elite, and (4) institutionalized advantage for professional politicians. In demonstrating the first two points, it will be shown that the more traditional approach of analyzing the representation of various occupational-institutional categories within the Central Committee and Politburo possesses less theoretical utility than the analysis of the representation of recruited and

coopted officials in these two bodies. The introduction of new skills into the political elite can be measured, at least in part, by the increase in coopted members of specialized elites within the political elite. Institutionalized advantage for professional politicians is measured here in terms of the over-representation of professional politicians in the Politburo given their representation in the Central Committee and their over-representation in these two bodies given their representation in the Party Congress. Another, and perhaps more important measure of institutionalized advantage for professional politicians will be discussed in Chapter 4. In analyzing this point in Chapter 3, however, it is shown why changes in the representation of occupational-institutional categories in the Central Committee and Politburo over time do not offer the best index of change in the nature of the Soviet political leadership system. As will be seen in Chapter 3, the above questions can be explored by the use of nominal (enumerative) data.

The population studied in Chapter 3 is not viewed as a sample of some specified universe and, hence, no attempt is made to generalize on the basis of the findings. Rather the population constitutes a complete universe (minus 79 out of 291 because of missing data) of Full Members of the Central Committee from 1952 through 1965. Because each item of analysis centers on a description of change in frequencies in one set of nominal categories over time, these changes are simply and appropriately discussed in terms of percentage changes.

The major exception to this in Chapter 3 is the analysis of change over time of the representativeness of the Politburo in terms of occupational groupings in the Central Committee. Because of the large number of categories (14) in the independent variable (occupational categories), it is almost impossible to establish the degree of representativeness of the Politburo without employing some aggregative statistical device, in this case Goodman and Kruskal's Tau_b. The nature of that statistic and its appropriateness to the present inquiry are discussed in Chapter 3. The use of such a precise aggregative statistic is central to this analysis since we wish to compare changes in the degree of representativeness over time.

The analysis in Chapter 4 centers on another measure of institutionalized advantage for professional politicians. Here we are concerned with the extent to which professional politicians dominate the so-called "staff" agencies within the Central Party Apparatus. In addition, differences in training and career experiences between Central Party Apparatus line and staff officials in the Central Committee will be analyzed as possible sources of conflict between these two functional categories of officials.

In many respects the types of data and analysis employed in Chapter 4 are very similar to those discussed above. The study population is officials of the Central Party Apparatus in the Central Committee from 1952 through 1965. These represent a complete enumeration (minus 10 out of 70 because of missing data) and not a sample of that universe. Since it represents only

Central Party Apparatus officials in the Central Committee, it cannot be viewed as a random sample of all Central Party Apparatus officials. Hence, we can only describe the characteristics of that universe, not generalize from it to all Central Party officials.

Of course, this greatly limits the theoretical utility of these findings, but at this point it is impossible to proceed otherwise. It would not help to expand the universe to include CPA officials not in the Central Committee since data on cooptation/recruitment are available on only 8 of 237 bureau, department, and section chiefs and deputy chiefs who were not in the Central Committee from 1952 through 1965. CPA officials in the Central Committee constitute about 23% of all CPA officials at these levels. Further, an argument could be made that those in the Central Committee are more important members of the political elite than those not having Central Committee status. All that can be done with the presently available data is to describe the differences among categories of officials within specified segments of a universe and to suggest the theoretical significance of those differences if they are later found to be characteristic of the complete universe.

Finally, it should be mentioned that it is not the purpose of this study to demonstrate the utility of particular techniques or to develop any new techniques to analyze career data. Rather, the contribution is substantive. Hence, some very basic techniques are employed to shed light on substantive questions. An

attempt is made to be rigorous at the level of methodology, but no attempt is made to be imaginative or original at the level of technical considerations. This does not mean that technical considerations are ignored, but merely that the conclusions are made with full cognizance of the technical limitations imposed on this study by the nature of the data.

CHAPTER THREE

SPECIALIZED ELITES AND GROUPS IN THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM

The challenge to the monolithism component of the totalitarian model which has been widely employed to explain various aspects of the Soviet political system raises many critical questions. The growth of Kremlinology with its stress on the struggle for power among the top leadership within the Party focused attention on factional cleavages within the political elite. As Linden suggests, the conflict school built onto the Kremlinological version of Soviet politics by considering policy issues in the context of factionalism.[1] A natural question arising from inquiries into factionalism concerns the basis for the formation of factions. This has led to increased interest among students of Soviet politics with various aspects of group politics.[2] This chapter focuses on several dimensions of group representation in the Central Committee and Politburo during the post-Stalin period. Such analysis is essential in determining the applicability to the Soviet Union of several of the defining characteristics of political leadership systems presented in Table 2.1 and, hence, is requisite to a classification of the Soviet political leadership system.

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[1]Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 5-6.

[2]Cf. H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, XVIII, 3 (April, 1966), pp. 435-451, and the several studies cited below.

At this point it is useful to examine the ways in which various writers have conceptualized the question of groups in Soviet politics. Pethybridge carried out his analysis of the 1957 anti-Party crisis in terms of the conflict among several interest groups and the individuals comprising those groups which are defined as "those influential bodies of men within and without the Presidium and the Central Committee whose composite power makes them a force to be reckoned with in Soviet politics."[3] Two major groups (the party apparatus and the government bureaucracy) and two minor groups (the economic elite and the army) are identified. Of these four, Pethybridge argues that the "party apparatus takes pride of place as the group which towers in importance over three others."[4] Under Stalin, a third major group (the secret police) was important.

Pethybridge's groups correspond to what Leonhard refers to as the "five pillars of Soviet society": (1) the Party machine--"composed of the officials of the Soviet state party"; (2) the economic machine--which "consists of the directors of undertakings, industrial managers, senior engineers, technicians, and members of the central planning staffs"; (3) the state or governmental apparatus--which "includes those who form part of the central state machinery and of that of the Republics and the Soviet in the regions and districts'; (4) the army; and (5) the

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[3]Roger Pethybridge, A Key to Soviet Politics: The Crisis of the "Anti-Party" Group (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1962), p. 17.

[4]Ibid.

state police.[5] For Leonhard, "the party machine was and is the essential 'pillar' of Soviet society."[6]

Slightly enlarging this list of more or less traditional interest groups in Soviet politics, Aspaturian identifies "six principal groups within Soviet society that have accumulated sufficient leverage, either through the acquisition of indispensable skills and talents or through the control of instruments of persuasion, terror, or destruction, to exert pressure upon the Party. These are: (1) the Party Apparatus, consisting of those who have made a career in the Party Bureaucracy; (2) the Government Bureaucracy; (3) the economic managers and technicians; (4) the cultural, professional, and scientific intelligentsia; (5) the Police; (6) the Armed Forces."[7]

Elsewhere Aspaturian identifies "social and institutional groups in Soviet society which appear to benefit from an aggressive foreign policy and the maintenance of international tensions": (1) the armed forces, (2) the heavy-industrial managers, and (3) professional party apparatchiki and ideologues.[8] Other social groups "would seem to benefit from a relaxation of international

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[5]Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (N.Y.: Praeger, 1962), pp. 11-15.

[6]Ibid., p. 12.

[7]Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," in Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 164, 169-175.

[8]Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Soviet Case: Unique and Generalizable Factors," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 261-277.

tensions": (1) the state bureaucracy, (2) light-industrial, consumer goods and services, and agricultural managers, (3) the cultural-professional-scientific groups, and (4) the Soviet consumer (the white collar groups, the working class and the peasantry).[9]

Still another array of groups is identified by Gehlen in his analysis of the Central Committee: (1) the party apparatus, (2) the state bureaucracy, (3) the military bureaucracy, (4) the scientific elite, (5) the writers, (6) the trade unions, (7) the workers, and (8) the consumers.[10]

Finally, in his study of the political survival of members of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission elected at the 23rd CPSU Congress, Christian Duevel employs the following categories when analyzing the "representation of various groups of Soviet society in the CPSU Central Committees and Central Auditing Commissions elected by the 20th, 22nd and 23rd CPSU Congresses": (1) Central Party Apparat, (2) Regional Party Apparat, (3) Central Government Bureaucracy, (4) Regional Government Bureaucracy (including industrial managers), (5) Armed

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[9]Ibid., pp. 277-283. For further elaboration of Aspaturian's position, see his "Social Structure and Political Power in the Soviet System," Paper presented at the 1963 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 4-7, 1963.

[10]Michael P. Gehlen, "The Relevance of Group Theory to the Study of Soviet Politics," Unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon, n.d., pp. 6-9, and "The Educational Backgrounds and Career Orientations of the Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU," The American Behavioral Scientist, IX, 8 (April, 1966), pp. 12-14.

Forces, (6) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (7) KGB, MVD, Justice, (8) Supreme Soviet Apparat, (9) Trade Unions (including Cooperatives), (10) Komsomol, (11) Scientists, Academicians, etc., (12) Writers, Artists and Public Figures, and (13) Leading Workers, Farmers, etc.[11]

For the most part, the groups identified by these writers are what we might call "institutional" groups, that is, they are groups which are defined in terms of certain formal institutions in society.[12] The relevance of the identification of such groups

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[11]Christian Duevel, "The Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission Elected by the 23rd CPSU Congress: A Study of the Political Survival of Their Members and a Profile of Their Professional and Political Composition," Radio Liberty Research Paper, No. 6, 1966 (N.Y.: Radio Liberty Committee, 1966), pp. 17-20.

[12]In addition to those already mentioned, many other writers have discussed Soviet Politics in terms of formal, institutional groups. Cf. Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change," Problems of Communism, XV, 6 (November-December, 1966), p. 59, Severyn Bialer, "Notes on the Study of Soviet Elites," Paper presented at the 1964 Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 10, 1964, pp. 20-25; Yaroslav Bilinsky, Changes in the Central Committee: Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961-1966, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 4., 1966-67 (Denver, Colorado: University of Denver, 1967), Tables 4, 7-9; T. H. Rigby, "Crypto-Politics," Survey, 50 (January, 1964), p. 191; Thomas H. Rigby, "The Extent and Limits of Authority," Problems of Communism, XII, 5 (September-October, 1963), pp. 36-41; Herbert Ritvo, "The Dynamics of Destalinization," Survey, 47 (April, 1963), pp. 22-23; Herbert Ritvo, "Twenty-First Party Congress--Before and After, Part 2," The Slavic Review, XX, 3 (October, 1961), pp. 437, 441-442, 451; Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R. (London: Macmillan, 1961), Chapter 2.

Formal, institutional groups have also been mentioned in studies of other Communist political systems. Cf., inter alia, Franklin W. Houn, "The Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: A Study of an Elite," The American Political Science Review, LI, 2 (June, 1957), pp. 401-403; Richard F. Staar, "The Central Committee of the United Polish Workers' Party," Journal of Central European Affairs, XVI, 4 (January, 1957), p. 374.

is that their members are viewed as having certain common interests which they seek to realize when they participate in the political process. Or, to state it somewhat differently, the political behavior of various members of the polity, particularly the elite, can be explained, at least in part, by the attempt to further the interests of the groups to which they belong.

Thus, for example, Pethybridge analyzes the 1957 anti-Party crisis in terms of the opposition of various groups and finds that positions taken by members of the top elite tend to be consistent with the interests of the group with which they are primarily affiliated. The two deviations from this pattern of interest group alignment--Shepilov and Mikoian--are treated as aberrations. Mikoian is described as being "unpredictable and independent," even "a traitor to his group."[13]

If the various occupational-institutional groupings in Soviet society do possess differing attitudes and policy orientations as some writers suggest, then certainly one way to approach the question of change in the Soviet political system is to look at the representation of these groupings in the top (nominally) decision-making bodies of the CPSU, e.g., the Central Committee and its Politburo. In doing so, there might be some disagreement over the recognition of certain categories, but the logic of this type of analysis can be demonstrated without reach-

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[13]Pethybridge, op. cit., p. 132. For a discussion of problems inherent in this method of explanation, see my review in Slavic and East European Studies (Montreal), X, 3-4 (Fall-Winter, 1965-66), pp. 130-132.

ing complete agreement on categories. Table 3.1 indicates the representation of fourteen institutional-occupational categories among Full Members of the Central Committees selected at the 19th, 20th, and 22nd Party Congresses.

Affiliation with a particular grouping was determined by position held at time of entry into the Central Committee. While some categories are self-explanatory, others require some clarification. The Central and Regional Government Apparatus categories exclude officials attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KGB, MVD, Military, and Economic Managers and Planners. As can be seen, these officials have separate categories. For example, the USSR Minister of Defense, who holds military rank, is included in the Military category even though he is a central government official. "Economic Managers and Planners" includes all central and regional government officials engaged in that type of work: Minister of Finance, Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Medium Machine Building, Chairman of State Committee for Construction Affairs, Chairman of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), etc. The USSR Minister of Culture would be classified as "Central Government Apparatus." While any such classification is at least in part arbitrary, this scheme was developed to reflect the kinds of categories employed by most practioners of the occupational-institutional approach to groups in Soviet politics, especially Duevel, Bilinsky, and Gehlen.

Table 3.1 indicates increase in the representation of Central Government Apparatus, Trade Union and Public Organization officials,

Foreign Affairs officials, and decrease in the representation of the Regional Party Apparatus, police and Komsomol officials, and individuals in scientific and academic positions. Generally the changes which can be observed over time here are very slight indeed.

Table 3.2 compares the representation of groupings in the Central Committee to the Politburo. It is clear that certain groupings (Central Party Apparatus, Central Government Apparatus, Military, Economic Managers and Planners, and Foreign Affairs officials) continue to be over-represented in the Politburo compared to their representation in the Central Committee. Other categories (Regional Party and Government Apparatus, Trade Unions and Public Organizations, and Writers and Artists) continue to be under-represented. The proportional representation of still others (Police, Komsomol, and Scientific and Academic) tends to fluctuate from one period to the next.

An interesting question concerns what conclusions about the nature of the Soviet political leadership system can be drawn from such data. Certainly we can describe the increase and decrease in representation of various occupational categories in these two bodies and the proportional or disproportional representation of Central Committee groupings in the Politburo.

Table 3.1

REPRESENTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1961

	1952		1956		1961	
Central Party Apparatus	9.6%	(12)	5.3%	(7)	9.1%	(16)
Regional Party Apparatus	48.0	(60)	50.2	(67)	38.9	(68)
Central Gov't. Apparatus	2.4	(3)	4.5	(6)	5.7	(10)
Regional Gov't Apparatus	8.8	(11)	9.8	(13)	7.4	(13)
Econ. Managers & Planners	11.2	(14)	12.0	(16)	13.7	(24)
Military	7.2	(9)	8.3	(11)	8.0	(14)
KGB, MVD	2.4	(3)	1.5	(2)	.6	(1)
Komsomol	1.6	(2)	.8	(1)	.6	(1)
Trade Unions & Public Orgs.	.8	(1)	.8	(1)	3.4	(6)
Scientific & Academic	2.4	(3)	1.5	(2)	1.7	(3)
Writers & Artists	1.6	(2)	.8	(1)	1.1	(2)
Workers & Farmers	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)	2.3	(4)
Foreign Affairs (Gov't.)	1.6	(2)	4.5	(6)	6.3	(11)
Industrial Plant Managers	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)	1.1	(2)
Unknown	2.4	(3)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)
TOTALS	100.	(125)	100.	(133)	100.	(175)

Table 3.2

REPRESENTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES IN THE POLITBURO AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1961

	1952		1953		1956		1961	
	CC	P	CC	P	CC	P	CC	P
CPA	9.6%	16.7%	9.6%	7.1%	5.3%	17.7%	9.1%	37.5%
RPA	48.0	19.4	48.0	14.3	50.2	23.5	38.9	25.0
CGA	2.4	8.3	2.4	21.4	4.5	11.8	5.7	18.8
RGA	8.8	5.6	8.8	7.1	9.8	0.0	7.4	12.2
EM&P	11.2	22.2	11.2	21.4	12.0	17.6	13.7	0.0
Mil	7.2	8.3	7.2	14.3	8.3	17.6	8.0	0.0
KGB	2.4	5.6	2.4	7.1	1.5	0.0	.6	0.0
Kom	1.6	2.8	1.6	0.0	.8	0.0	.6	0.0
TU&PO	.8	2.8	.8	0.0	.8	5.9	3.4	6.3
Sci & Ac	2.4	2.8	2.4	0.0	1.5	0.0	1.7	0.0
Wri & Art	1.6	0.0	1.6	0.0	.8	0.0	1.1	0.0
Work & F	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	0.0
For Aff	1.6	5.6	1.6	7.1	4.5	5.9	6.3	0.0
Ind P M	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0
Unknown	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTALS	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.
	(125)	(36)	(125)	(14)	(133)	(17)	(175)	(16)
	$\text{Tau}_b = .257$		$\text{Tau}_b = .285$		$\text{Tau}_b = .177$		$\text{Tau}_b = .165$	

Given the slight increases and decreases in representation which do occur in certain categories, should we begin to talk in terms of change in the political system, or at least part of it -- the CPSU? I would hope that there would be few, if any, who would care to defend such an enterprise. I suppose by observing the continuity in over-representation of Central Committee groupings in the Politburo, one could speculate about the institutionalized advantage those groupings enjoyed in the system. In doing so, we find that the Central Party Apparatus, Central Government Apparatus, economic managers and planners, the military, and officials of trade union and public organizations seem to enjoy such institutionalized advantage during the period 1952-1965 (the latter date being the terminal point of this study). Certainly such statements describe the relative representation of occupational-institutional groupings in the Central Committee.

But such facts are not interesting in themselves; they become interesting only when related to some sorts of theoretical questions. Previous analyses of the representation of various groupings in the Central Committee have been rich in descriptive detail, but lacking in theoretical orientation.[14]

One type of analysis which has not been fully exploited is a measure of the degree to which the various occupational-insti-

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[14]Cf. Duevel, _op. cit._; Bilinsky, _op. cit._; Severyn Bialer, "Leadership in the Soviet Union," Paper presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 6-10, 1966.

tutional categories have succeeded in acquiring representation on a higher Party organ--the Politburo--in proportion to their representation in a larger and hierarchically lower body--the Central Committee. If we had divided the memberships of these two bodies into just a few broad categories, we could get an impression of the extent to which the Politburo is representative of Central Committee groupings by merely comparing the percentage distributions of the groupings in the two bodies. Because we have chosen to divide the membership of these two bodies into fourteen occupational-institutional categories, it is almost impossible to get a clear picture of the extent to which any given Politburo was representative of the groupings in the Central Committee from which it was drawn. Furthermore, by observing only the percentages, it would be impossible to draw accurate conclusions concerning changes in the group representativeness of the Politburo over time.

Goodman and Kruskal's Tau_b is a statistical device which can be quite useful in aggregating representativeness in a situation such as this where the independent variable--group affiliation--is divided into many categories.

A brief description of the nature of this statistic would be appropriate here in order to appreciate fully the results of its application to the present problem. As Blalock observes, the statistic Tau_b is calculated by computing the number of errors (E_1) made when assignment to cells are made knowing only the marginals of the dependent variable--total membership of

the Politburo and Central Committee.[15] Then one computes the number of errors (E_2) made when the assignment is made with knowledge of the independent variable--group affiliation. The value for the statistic is computed by the following formula:

$$Tau_b = \frac{E_1 - E_2}{E_1}$$

The value of Tau_b ranges from 0 to 1.

In terms of the evaluative schema presented and discussed by Costner,[16] Tau_b is a "proportionate reduction in error" (PRE) measure which discloses the extent of association between two variables by the improvement made in predicting the dependent variable by means of the independent variable.

In the present context, we can interpret Tau_b in the following fashion. If each group is represented in the Politburo in exactly the same proportion that it is represented in the Central Committee, the effect of the independent variable will be nil and the value of Tau_b will be zero. In such a situation we would conclude that (1) we could not reduce errors in predicting Politburo membership by knowing group affiliation, (2) there is no association between group membership and inclusion

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[15]Cf. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 232-234. For a more detailed discussion of this statistic, see Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," Journal of the American Statistical Association, XLIX (December, 1954), pp. 732-747.

[16]Herbert L. Costner, "Criteria for Measures of Association," American Sociological Review, XXX, 3 (June, 1965), pp. 341-353.

in the Politburo, and (3) the Politburo is perfectly proportionally representative of Central Committee groupings. On the other hand, a value of 1. for Tau_b would mean that (1) by knowing the group affiliation of members of the Central Committee we could predict membership in the Politburo without error and (2) there is a perfect relationship (correlation) between group membership and inclusion in the Politburo.

An application of this statistic to the representativeness of the Politburos selected at the 19th, 20th, and 22nd Party Congresses and the Politburo formed immediately following Stalin's death in March, 1953, indicates that by knowing the group affiliations of members of the Central Committee we could reduce errors in predicting Politburo membership by 25.7% in 1952, 28.5% in 1953, 17.7% in 1956, and 16.5% in 1961. From this we can conclude that the Politburo (1) was fairly representative of Central Committee groupings throughout the whole time period and (2) became increasingly representative of those groupings from 1952 to 1961.

The statement by Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn that "both symbolically and functionally, the Central Committee unites, at virtually the top of the pyramid, the various groups that make up Soviet society"[17] is a widely held characterization. If we can assume as valid Lasswell's notion that the composition of the elite (in this case one sector of it--the Central

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[17]Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 160.

Committee) reflects structural relationships in society, then we would expect that changes in the composition of the elite will follow changes in the structural relationships in society.[18] It may be possible to demonstrate such a relationship, but it has not as yet been done. Furthermore, even if it were to be demonstrated, we might not be certain in any particular case whether changes in the composition of the elite were the result of changes in the structural relationships in society or some other phenomenon. This raises a host of methodological and empirical problems with regard to the explanation of change in the composition of the political elite in any society. No attempt is made to solve them here; but they must be fully recognized as problems.

Another problem which is specific to this type of analysis of group representation in the Central Committee is the method of classifying individuals. As previously stated, Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are based on classification of individuals according to formal position held at time of selection to Central Committee and Politburo. Such practice could be greatly misleading if there were individuals whose positions at time of entry into

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[18]Cf. Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," American Journal of Sociology, XLVII (1941), pp. 455-468; the chapter "The Garrison State Hypothesis and Specialists in Violence" in Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behavior (London: Kegan Paul, 1948), pp. 146-157; Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State Today," in Samuel P. Huntington (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 51-71. Aspects of the garrison state hypothesis are discussed in Lasswell's early work World Politics and Personal Insecurity (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1935).

the Central Committee were quite different from their major career patterns. To take an extreme and hypothetical case to illustrate this point, let us examine the career of Nikolai Nikolaevich Kachalov (Cf. Table 3.3). Kachalov's major career is in a specialized elite. In 1958 at the age of 75 he assumed his first post in the Party elite--Deputy Head, Construction Section, Central Committee, CPSU--and in so doing became a member of the Central Party Apparatus. If he had retained that position through 1961 and had entered the Central Committee at the time of the 22nd Party Congress, we would classify him as a member of the Central Party Apparatus. The question now arises: To what extent would we be justified in viewing Kachalov as a representative of the Central Party Apparatus? Given that Kachalov had a 42-year career in the glass and ceramics industries, it would seem more reasonable to view him as a member of a specialized elite. The same principal in less extreme form is illustrated by the career of Rasulov (Table 3.7) who spent the first 27 years of his career in agricultural work, both inside and outside of the government apparatus, before becoming 1st Secretary, Central Committee, Tadzhikestan CP and a member of the Central Committee in 1961. In applying our positional criterion, however, we would have to classify him as a representative of the Regional Party Apparatus in the Central Committee. The number of such cases in the three Central Committees under study here is large enough to suggest that application of the positional criterion of classification is grossly misleading of the actual representation of interests in the Central Committee.

But other criteria present similar problems. Formal education certainly does not constitute a satisfactory criterion. As Akhminov aptly suggests, "one could hardly, for example, consider a man like Leonid Brezhnev, who graduated from a metallurgical institute and who has spent the last thirty years doing Party work, as a 'representative of the managers.' Some reliable criterion has to be found for these questions, as also for the question how we are to regard Party officials who have been given ministerial posts, 'specialists' who have been transferred to Party work, etc."[19]

For reasons to be discussed shortly, an individual's career experiences appear to be a more appropriate criterion for classification. In this context we could then classify Kachalov as a representative of the technical intelligentsia or specialized elites and Brezhnev as a representative of the Party Apparatus.

Even employing this criterion of classification considerable care must be taken in the conclusions drawn from an examination of group representation in the Politburo and Central Committee. Can we assume, for instance, that the relative standing of the police in the Soviet political system was increased when Andropov recently became a member of the Politburo? Or that the relative position of the army increased when Zhukov entered the Presidium and that it decreased when he was removed after the resolution of the anti-Party crisis? As Hammer has suggested,

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[19]Herman Akhminov, "On Methods of Analyzing Soviet Politics," Institute for the Study of the USSR, Bulletin, XIV, 10 (October, 1967), p. 15.

"What do we mean. . .by the 'army'? Are we justified in assuming that the 'army' was somehow personified by Marshal Zhukov in such a way that the army's standing in the system rose and fell with his personal fortunes?"[20]

The emergence of the interest group school of Soviet politics has had the desirable effect of casting serious doubt on, if not disproving the totalitarian school's monolithic theory of Soviet politics by demonstrating that there is factional activity within the Soviet polity.[21] In doing so, however, it has had the undesirable effect of creating the impression that the various institutional-occupational groups themselves tend to be internally monolithic entities. We know enough about certain aspects of Soviet politics to know that such an impression is grossly misleading. Perhaps one of the most outstanding examples is the conflict between Soviet literary factions centered around Tvardovsky's liberal journal _Novy mir_ and Kochetov's conservative journal _Oktiabr_.[22] Students of Soviet military-civilian relations have amply documented the extent of factional-

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[20]Darrell P. Hammer, "Statistical Methods in Kremlinology," Government Department, Indiana University, unpublished manuscript, n.d., p. 31.

[21]For an interesting discussion of this problem, see Skilling, _op. cit._

[22]Cf. Patricia Blake, "Freedom and Control in Literature, 1962-63," in Alexander Dallin & Alan F. Westin (eds.), _Politics in the Soviet Union: 7 Cases_ (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), pp. 165-205; Priscilla Johnson, _Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964_ (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965).

ism in the Soviet military hierarchy.[23]

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[23]Cf. Herbert S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (N.Y.: Praeger, 1962); Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (N.Y.: Praeger, 1962); A. Galay, "The Soviet Armed Forces and the 22nd Party Congress," Institute for the Study of the USSR, Bulletin, IX, 1 (January, 1962), pp. 3-16; A. Galay, "Changes Among the Leaders of the Soviet Armed Forces," Institute for the Study of the USSR, Bulletin, X, 6 (June, 1963), pp. 36-40; Dinerstein, et al., in Introduction to Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

Table 3.3

Nikolai Nikolaevich Kachalov (b. 1883)

Age	Date	Position
28	1911	Graduated, St. Petersburg Mining Institute
33	1916	Construction Manager, Petrograd Optical Glass Factory
33	1916	Technical Director, Petrograd China Factory
35	1918	Member, Scientific Collegium, Leningrad State Ceramic Research Institute
37	1920	Deputy Director, Leningrad State Ceramic Research Institute
40	1923	Technical Director, Optical Glass Factory
46	1929	Collegium Chairman, Leningrad State Ceramic Research Institute
47	1930	Head, Scientific Section, All-Union Association of Optical-Mechanical Industry
47	1930	Head, Glass Technical Department, Leningrad Technical Institute
50	1933	Corresponding Member, Sector for Chemical Sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences
54	1937	Deputy Director, Institute for Scientific and Educational Work
65	1948	Deputy Director, Silicone Chemical Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences
75	1958	Deputy Head, Construction Section, CC, CPSU

Table 3.4

Ivan Aleksandrovich Grishmanov (b. 1906)

Age	Date	Position
30	1936	Graduated, Leningrad Engineer-Construction Institute
30	1936-49	Engaged in construction managerial work in Smolensk, Leningrad, and Pskov
43	1949-51	Chairman, Kirov District Executive Committee, Leningrad
45	1951-56	1st Deputy Chairman, Executive Committee, Leningrad City Soviet
50	1956-61	Head, Construction Department, CC, CPSU
55	1961-63	Chairman, State Committee on Construction Affairs, USSR Council of Ministers
55	1961	Member, Central Committee, CPSU
57	1963-65	1st Deputy Chairman, USSR Gosstroi
59	1965	Minister, Construction Materials Industry, USSR Council of Ministers

Table 3.5

Zoia Petrovna Tumanova (b. 1921)

Age	Date	Position
20	1941	Komsomol Organizer
25	1946	Graduated, Moscow University
26	1947	Taught Literature, 3rd Model Secondary School, Moscow
26	1947	Member, Moscow Oblast Komsomol Committee
27	1948	Head, School Section, Moscow Oblast Komsomol Committee
29	1950	Head, Pioneer Section, Central Committee, All-Union Komsomol
31	1952	Candidate Member, Central Committee, CPSU
32	1953	Secretary, Pioneer Section, Central Committee, All-Union Komsomol
33	1954	Member, Central Committee, All-Union Komsomol
33	1954	Secretary and Bureau Member, Central Committee, All-Union Komsomol
35	1956	Vice-President, Executive Committee, International Union of Students
35	1956	Candidate Member, Central Committee, CPSU
35	1956	Deputy Chief, Section for Science, Schools and Culture for RSFSR, Central Committee, CPSU

Table 3.6

Dmitri Trofimovoch Shepilov (b. 1905)

Age	Date	Position
26	1931-33	Studied at Law Faculty, Moscow University; Studied at Agriculture Department, Moscow Institute of Red Professors
26	1931-33	Instructor of Political Economy
28	1933	Head, Political Department, Sovkhoz Board of Western Siberia
30	1935	Deputy Head, Agriculture Department, Central Committee, All-Union CP(b)
30	1935	Instructor of Political Economy, Agriculture Division, Institute of Red Professors
36	1941	Political Commissar at Ukrainian Front
42	1947	Deputy Head, Department of Agitprop, Central Committee, CPSU
43	1948	Head, Department of Agitprop, Central Committee, CPSU
45	1950	Inspector, Central Committee, CPSU
47	1952	Member, Central Committee, CPSU
47	1952	Editor in Chief, Pravda
49	1954	Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, Council of Nationalities, USSR Supreme Soviet
51	1956	Member, Central Committee, CPSU
51	1956	Candidate, Presidium, Central Committee, CPSU
51	1956	USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs
51	1956	Secretary, Central Committee, CPSU

Table 3.7

Dzhabar R. Rasulov (b. 1913)

Age	Date	Position
21	1934	Graduated, Central Asian Cotton Institute
21	1934	Scientific Farmer
22	1935	Senior Agronomist, Tadzhikestan People's Commissariat of Agriculture
		Head, Grain Board, Tadzhikestan People's Commissariat of Agriculture
		Head, Cotton Board, Tadzhikestan People's Commissariat of Agriculture
28	1941	1st Deputy People's Commissar of Agriculture, Tadzhikestan SSR
28	1941	Tadzhikestan Representative at USSR People's Commissariat of State Purchasing
32	1945	Tadzhikestan People's Commissar of Agriculture
33	1946	Tadzhikestan Minister of Industrial Crops
33	1946	Chairman, Tadzhikestan Council of Ministers
39	1952	Member, Central Auditing Commission, CPSU
41	1954	Member, Central Committee, Tadzhikestan CP
41	1954	Member, Bureau, Central Committee, Tadzhikestan CP
42	1955	USSR Deputy Minister of Agriculture
45	1958	Secretary, Central Committee, Tadzhikestan CP
47	1960	USSR Ambassador to Togo
48	1961	1st Secretary, Central Committee, Tadzhikestan CP
48	1961	Member, Central Committee, CPSU
49	1962	Member, Central Asian Bureau, Central Committee, CPSU

The striking fact of much of the writing produced by the interest group school of Soviet politics is its basic over-simplification of the political process which borders on naivete and simple determinism. Perhaps the greatest gap in this literature is the failure to recognize the important problem of multiple group membership and the resulting phenomenon of cross pressures. The problem of multiple membership is illustrated by Rigby's observation that "the competing groups were not always identical with particular instruments of rule taken as a whole, as these might be divided along departmental, territorial, and other lines."[24] Informal groupings which cut directly across formal organizational lines may be the result of interaction at the local level. Examples of this type of group can be seen in Conquest's discussion of the Leningrad and Georgian cases.[25] In addition, the widespread process of <u>blat</u> gives certain informal groupings of individuals a common frame of reference. It may be in certain cases that such informal affiliations are more important in influencing behavior than are formal institutional affiliations.

Rigby has observed that "the groupings best attested in our empirical material on Soviet political conflict appear to be personal followings, which characteristically cut right across formal organization lines. The bond appears to stem from close collaboration in the same organization at some time in the past,

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[24]Rigby, "Crypto-Politics," p. 191.

[25]Conquest, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., Chapters 5 and 7.

sometimes the remote past."[26] In his study of the Ukrainian apparatus Armstrong found evidence of just such cross-institutional ties:

> Types of training, career lines, and association in common activities tend to form cross-institutional alignments which, as power groups, may often be more important than formal structural divisions. These alignments, as the speculation concerning the police officials suggests, center around personal affiliations.[27]

Other types of bonds of seemingly great importance--"common opinions, common non-official interests, compatibility of personality, family friendships"[28]--are much more difficult to prove. Given the current limitations on availability of certain types of data, it appears quite unlikely that we shall be able to investigate these kinds of ties for some time to come.

Rigby felt that "bonds based on age, education, social background, and local origin may be easier to study, but have received scant attention."[29] At the time Rigby made this comment, there were only a few extant studies of Communist elite biographic data, yet all of them dealt with these variables. Since that time, there have appeared several studies using elite

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[26]Rigby, op. cit., p. 192. For studies demonstrating the importance of personal bonds, see the following: Bialer, op. cit., pp. 38-40; Severyn Bialer, "How Russians Rule Russia," Problems of Communism, XIII, 5 (September-October, 1964), pp. 51-52; John Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite (N.Y.: Praeger, 1959), pp. 11, 12, 146; Conquest, op. cit., Chapters 5 and 7.

[27]Armstrong, op. cit., p. 146.

[28]Rigby, op. cit., p. 192.

[29]Ibid.

biographic data. Once again the emphasis has been on age,[30] education,[31] social background,[32] and geographic (including

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[30]Cf. Meissner, op. cit., p. 59; Jerry Hough, "The Soviet Elite: II, In Whose Hands the Future?" Problems of Communism, XVI, 2 (March-April, 1967), p. 20; Borys Lewytzkyj, "Generations in Conflict," Problems of Communism, XVI, 1 (January-February, 1967), pp. 36-40; Thomas H. Rigby, "Changing Composition of the Supreme Soviet," The Political Quarterly, XXIV, (July-September, 1953), p. 309; Bilinsky, op. cit., Table 5; Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 21-22; Herbert Ritvo, "Twenty-First Party Congress--Before and After, Part 1," The American Slavic and East European Review, XX, 2 (April, 1961), p. 219; John Armstrong, "Party Bifurcation and Elite Interests," Soviet Studies, XVII, 4 (April, 1966), pp. 427-429; George K. Schueller, The Politburo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), pp. 15-17, 45; Grey Hodnett, "The Obkom First Secretaries," Slavic Review, XXIV, 4 (December, 1965), p. 642; Gehlen, "The Educational Backgrounds and Career Orientations of the Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU," p. 11.

For studies of other Communist systems which deal with age variables, see Richard V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 62; Houn, op. cit., p. 394; Staar, op. cit., p. 380; Chao Kuo-chün, "Leadership in the Chinese Communist Party," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 321 (January, 1959), pp. 44-46.

[31]Cf. Lewytzkyj, op. cit., pp. 39-40; Severyn Bialer, "Twenty-four Men Who Rule Russia," The New York Times Magazine, November 1, 1964, p. 105; Bilinsky, op. cit., Table 6; Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite, pp. 31-42; Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus (Chicago: Regnery, 1966), pp. 90, 339; Schueller, op. cit., pp. 23-24; Hodnett, op. cit., p. 644; Gehlen, "The Educational Backgrounds and Career Orientations of the Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU," p. 12.

For studies of other Communist systems which deal with education variables, see John W. Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 145-175; Chao, op. cit., pp. 44-47; Houn, op. cit., pp. 397-398; Staar, op. cit., p. 380.

[32]Cf. Bialer, "Notes on the Study of Soviet Elites," pp. 40-46; Rigby, "Changing Composition of the Supreme Soviet," pp. 310-311, 314; T. H. Rigby, "Social Orientation of Recruitment and Distribution of Membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," The American Slavic and East European Review, XVI, 2 (April, 1957), pp. 275-290; Avtorkhanov, op. cit., pp. 81, 87, 89, 215; Schueller, op. cit., pp. 7-8; Hodnett, op. cit., p. 643; Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), Chapter 8.

nationality and ethnic) variables.[33] If these factors in any way constitute the basis for group cohesion, there has been little attempt to demonstrate this fact. Indeed, since we must view the Soviet political process from afar, it may be impossible to demonstrate the point. At any rate, existing studies in this area suggest that at least there is a great likelihood of the formation of groupings based on social and demographic factors which would cut across formal organizational-institutional lines and, thus, upset the picture presented to us by the interest group school.

In the context of the conceptual framework elaborated in the previous chapters, it is possible to analyze the membership of the central CPSU organs in a way that promises more theoretical relevance to the question of change in the Soviet political leadership. The shortcomings of viewing change in the political leadership system in terms of change in the formal education of members of the Central Committee and Politburo or the occupational positions they held at time of entry into the Central Committee

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For studies of other Communist systems which deal with social background variables, see Burks, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 21, 26, 28, 35, 40, 44, 52; Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 108; Chao, *op. cit.*, p. 48; Staar, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

[33]Cf. Bialer, "Notes on the Study of Soviet Elites," pp. 28-40; Bialer, "Twenty-four Men Who Rule Russia," p. 105; Bialer, "How Russians Rule Russia," pp. 45-52; Bilinsky, *op. cit.*, Tables 3, 4; Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, p. 16; Avtorkhanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 171, 174, 175, 335, 336; Schueller, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-12, 46.

For studies of other Communist systems which deal with geographic, nationality, and ethnic variables, see Burks, *op. cit.*, pp. 126, 134, 141, 151, 169; Chao, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-47; Houn, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

and Politburo have already been discussed. Of the available alternatives, some analysis of career pattern information seems to be more appropriate. Gehlen's brief analysis of the career orientations of members of the Central Committee is one approach to this problem.[34]

Of considerable relevance here is the distinction posited earlier between recruited and coopted officials.[35] Since classification in either of these categories is based on an individual's early political and non-political career experiences, we will be dealing with one particular dimension of individual career patterns. To reiterate the difference, recruitment into the political elite occurs when an individual had a maximum of seven years in a non-political occupation, whereas an individual is classified as coopted if he spent more than seven years in a non-political career before entering the political elite. Seven years is also the dividing point between cooptation and recruitment in the Party elite. Recall that the Party elite (as defined here) includes all CPSU and Komsomol officials, whereas the political elite includes these plus all government (except military), trade union, and public organization officials. Hence, the political elite includes all members of the Party elite by definition.

The career patterns presented in Tables 3.3-3.7 illustrate

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[34]Gehlen, op. cit., p. 12.

[35]Chapter 1, pp. 23-25; Chapter 2, pp. 16-18.

the basic types with which we will be concerned in this study. Although not a member of the Central Committee at any point in his career, Kachalov is an extreme example of cooptation into the Party elite. Grishmanov was coopted into both the non-Party (1949) and Party (1956) political elites. Tumanova was recruited into the Party elite (1947), but never held a position in the non-Party political elite. Shepilov was recruited into the Party elite (1933) and later held positions in the non-Party political elite. Finally, Rasulov was recruited into the non-Party political elite (1935), but then later coopted into the Party elite (1952). These are examples of the types of careers represented among recruited and coopted officials in Party elite and more general political elite.

Now that the basic differences between cooptation and recruitment have been posited and illustrated we can proceed to analyze the representation of coopted and recruited officials within both types of elites in the Central Committee and Politburo between 1952 and 1965. Table 3.8 indicates the change in representation of recruited and coopted officials in the Central Committees selected at the 19th, 20th, and 22nd Party Congresses. Rather than being based on individuals who occupied political and Party elite positions only at the time of each Congress, it is based on individuals who held either or both types of elite positions at any point in their careers. The striking fact here is the sizable increase in the proportion of coopted officials represented in the Central Committee at the expense of recruited officials. Since these recruited officials are by definition

professional politicians, Table 3.8 indicates that in the first post-Stalin decade professional politicians in the Central Committee dropped in representation from 75.4% to 49.7%. At the same time, the representation of professional Party officials dropped from 78.0% to 47.2%.

If we recalculate the distribution of recruited and coopted officials on the basis of type of position held at the time of entry into the Central Committee, we observe very similar results (Tables 3.9 and 3.10). Within the political elite (Table 3.9), the greatest change occurs among individuals who held Party elite positions at the time of the Congresses. Here the proportion of officials coopted into the political elite increased 23.8%, from 20.0% in 1952 to 43.8% in 1961. At the same time among those holding non-Party elite positions, the proportion of individuals coopted into the political elite increased 15.8%, from 33.3% in 1952 to 49.1% in 1961.

A similar picture emerges when we examine the change in representation within the Central Committee of officials who had been recruited and coopted into the Party elite (Table 3.10). As with the political elite, there was a sharper increase in the number of coopted officials among those holding Party elite positions from 1952-1961 (25.3%) than among officials holding non-Party elite positions (18.6%).

One major difference between the political and Party elites is the time when the greatest change in the direction of cooptation occurred. Among those who held both Party and non-Party

elite positions at the time of the Congresses, the greatest increase in representation of coopted officials occurred between the 20th and 22nd Congresses (Table 3.9). The change among officials coopted into the Party elite is somewhat different (Table 3.10). For those who held Party elite positions at time of entry into the Central Committee, the greatest increase in acquisition of coopted officials occurred between the 20th and 22nd Congresses. Among those who held non-Party elite positions, however, the greatest increase in coopted officials occurred between the 19th and 20th Congresses.

While there was a linear increase in the proportion of officials who had been coopted into both the Party and non-Party political elites from the 19th to the 22nd Party Congresses, the situation in the Politburo during this period was somewhat different (Table 3.11). While between 1952 and 1966 there was a net increase of 17.1% among officials coopted into the political elite and 12.8% among those coopted into the Party elite, this increase was not linear and there were substantial deviations during the intervening years. At the time of the 20th Congress, for example, the representation in the Politburo of officials who had been coopted into the political elite dropped from 25.0% to 7.2% and those who had been coopted into the Party elite dropped from 26.1% to 7.2%. Or, to put it somewhat differently, the number of professional politicians had risen from 75.0% to 92.8% and the number of professional Party officials had risen from 73.9% to 92.8%. Interestingly enough,

this occurred at the same time that the number of professional politicians and professional Party officials in the Central Committee was dropping from 75.4% and 78.0% to 69.9% and 29.4%, respectively (Table 3.8).

At two different times since 1952 (July 1955 and February 1957), the Politburo was completely dominated by professional politicians and professional Party officials. Since the reshuffling of the Politburo following the anti-Party crisis of June 1957, however, there has been an almost continuous increase in the percentage of individuals who had been coopted into both the political and Party elites, so that just prior to the 23rd Congress the professional politicians had decreased from 80.0% to 57.9% and professional Party officials had decreased from 80.0% to 61.1%.

In terms of the theoretical orientation of this study,the important conclusions from the above discussion are that the representation of professional politicians on the Central Committee declined markedly between the 19th and 22nd Congresses to such an extent that they no longer held a majority among Full Members of the Central Committee after February 1956. While decline in the representation of professional politicians can also be observed in the Politburo, they have nevertheless continued to constitute a majority of that body.

There are substantial differences among various occupational categories in the decrease of professional politicians within their ranks. Tables 3.12 and 3.13 indicate the extent

of these differences between (1) the Central Party Apparatus and (2) the economic managers and planners. Professional politicians within the Central Party Apparatus declined from 66.7% at the 19th Congress to 59.4% at the 22nd Congress, but still retained a majority of the Central Committee Full Members (Table 3.12). Among the economic managers and Planners in the Central Committee, however, the professional politicians decreased from 66.7% in 1952 to 26.1% in 1961 (Table 3.13). The differential decrease in professional Party officials in these two categories is even more impressive. The representation of members of the Party elite in the Central Party Apparatus declined from 66.7% in 1952 to only 56.2% in 1961. At the same time, however, professional Party officials among the economic managers and planners dropped from 100.% in 1952 to 37.5% in 1961. Because of the small number of cases (3 and 8, respectively) one should exercise caution in making too much out of this substantial decrease in professional Party officials among economic managers and planners. The mere fact that there are so very few members of the Party elite among the managers and planners is an interesting finding and would seem to indicate (1) that very few managers and planners have ever held Party positions and (2) that very few individuals who have ever held Party positions have later held economic management and planning positions in the government apparatus.

This observation is confirmed by the data presented in Table 3.14 which indicate the extent to which economic managers

and planners are members of the Party elite. Several things are of interest here. First, for all three Central Committees the majority of economic managers and planners never held Party elite positions. Secondly, the percentage of economic managers and planners who had been recruited into the Party elite declined from 33.3% in 1952 to 13.0% in 1961. Conversely, during the same time period, the percentage of economic managers and planners coopted into the Party elite increased from 0.0 in 1952 to 21.7% in 1961. If these figures are recalculated on the basis of cooptation and recruitment of only those managers and planners who were ever members of the Party elite, rather than as percentages of all managers and planners in the Central Committee, the differences are even more impressive. In this case, economic managers and planners who had been recruited into the Party elite declined sharply from 100.% to 60.0% to 37.5% at the 19th, 20th, and 22nd Congresses, respectively. At the same time, those who had at some earlier point been coopted into the Party elite increased from 0.0 to 40.0% to 62.5% respectively.

Table 3.8

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO POLITICAL AND PARTY ELITES:
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

		Political Elite		Party Elite	
1952	Recruited	75.4%	(43)	78.0%	(39)
	Coopted	24.6	(14)	22.0	(11)
1956	Recruited	69.9	(65)	70.6	(60)
	Coopted	30.1	(28)	29.4	(25)
1961	Recruited	49.7	(74)	47.2	(60)
	Coopted	50.3	(75)	52.8	(67)

Table 3.9

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO POLITICAL ELITE: CENTRAL COMMITTEE

		Type of Position Held at Time of Entry into Central Committee					
		Total Political Elite		Party Elite		Non-Party Political Elite	
1952	Recruited	75.0%	(42)	80.0%	(28)	66.7%	(14)
	Coopted	25.0	(14)	20.0	(7)	33.3	(7)
1956	Recruited	70.8	(68)	75.0	(42)	65.0	(26)
	Coopted	29.2	(28)	25.0	(14)	35.0	(14)
1961	Recruited	53.2	(75)	56.2	(46)	50.9	(29)
	Coopted	46.8	(64)	43.8	(36)	49.1	(28)

Table 3.10

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO PARTY ELITE:
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Type of Position Held at Time of Entry into Central Committee

		Total Political Elite		Party Elite		Non-Party Political Elite	
1952	Recruited	78.0%	(39)	77.8%	(28)	78.6%	(11)
	Coopted	22.0	(11)	22.2	(8)	21.4	(3)
1956	Recruited	72.9	(62)	77.2	(44)	64.3	(18)
	Coopted	27.1	(23)	22.8	(13)	35.7	(10)
1961	Recruited	55.0	(66)	52.5	(42)	60.0	(24)
	Coopted	45.0	(54)	47.5	(38)	40.0	(16)

Table 3.11

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO POLITICAL AND PARTY ELITES: POLITBURO/PRESIDIUM

			Political Elite		Party Elite	
October	1952	Recruited	75.0%	(18)	73.9%	(17)
		Coopted	25.0	(6)	26.1	(6)
March	1953	Recruited	90.0	(9)	90.0	(9)
		Coopted	10.0	(1)	10.0	(1)
July	1955	Recruited	100.	(11)	100.	(11)
		Coopted	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)
February	1956	Recruited	92.8	(13)	92.8	(13)
		Coopted	7.2	(1)	7.2	(1)
February	1957	Recruited	100.	(12)	100.	(12)
		Coopted	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)
July	1957	Recruited	80.0	(16)	80.0	(16)
		Coopted	20.0	(4)	20.0	(4)
September	1958	Recruited	81.8	(18)	81.8	(18)
		Coopted	18.2	(4)	18.2	(4)

Table 3.11 (continued)

			Political Elite		Party Elite	
May-July	1960	Recruited	85.7%	(12)	85.7%	(12)
		Coopted	14.3	(2)	14.3	(2)
November	1961	Recruited	75.0	(12)	75.0	(12)
		Coopted	25.0	(4)	25.0	(4)
November	1963	Recruited	66.7	(12)	66.7	(12)
		Coopted	33.3	(6)	33.3	(6)
March	1965	Recruited	58.8	(10)	58.8	(10)
		Coopted	41.2	(7)	41.2	(7)

Table 3.12

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO POLITICAL AND PARTY ELITES
AMONG CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE:
1952-1965

		Political Elite		Party Elite	
1952	Recruited	66.7%	(10)	66.7%	(10)
	Coopted	33.3	(5)	33.3	(5)
1956	Recruited	78.1	(25)	75.0	(24)
	Coopted	21.9	(7)	25.0	(8)
1961	Recruited	59.4	(19)	56.2	(18)
	Coopted	40.6	(13)	43.8	(14)

Table 3.13

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO POLITICAL AND PARTY ELITES AMONG ECONOMIC MANAGERS AND PLANNERS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1961

		Political Elite		Party Elite	
1952	Recruited	66.7%	(6)	100. %	(3)
	Coopted	33.3	(3)	0.0	(0)
1956	Recruited	41.7	(5)	60.0	(3)
	Coopted	58.3	(7)	40.0	(2)
1961	Recruited	26.1	(6)	37.5	(3)
	Coopted	73.9	(17)	62.5	(5)

Table 3.14

MEMBERSHIP IN THE PARTY ELITE OF ECONOMIC MANAGERS AND PLANNERS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1961

	Recruited into Party Elite	33.3%	(3)
1952	Coopted into Party Elite	0.0	(0)
	Excluded from Party Elite	66.7	(6)
	Recruited into Party Elite	25.0	(3)
1956	Coopted into Party Elite	16.7	(2)
	Excluded from Party Elite	58.3	(7)
	Recruited into Party Elite	13.0	(3)
1961	Coopted into Party Elite	21.7	(5)
	Excluded from Party Elite	65.3	(15)
	Recruited into Party Elite	20.5	(9)
1952-61	Coopted into Party Elite	15.9	(7)
	Excluded from Party Elite	63.6	(28)

Another way to view career differences among members of the Central Committee and Politburo was suggested by Meissner when he stated: "The top-level bureaucracy and the intelligentsia . . . constitute two social groups which, irrespective of their further subdivisions, are clearly distinct in terms of their origin, their social functions, and their relationship to power."[36] One method of analyzing the relationship to power of the top-level bureaucracy and the intelligentsia is to compare the representation of these two categories in the top (at least according to the Party rules) decision-making bodies of the Party: the Congress, Central Committee, and Politburo. Table 3.15 illustrates the representation of these two groupings plus workers and farmers in these bodies from the 19th to 20th Party Congresses inclusive.

In Table 3.15 "Leadership Cadres" refers to Meissner's "top-level bureaucracy" and includes the following categories from Table 3.1: Central Party Apparatus, Regional Party Apparatus, Central Government Apparatus, Regional Government Apparatus, KGB and MVD, Trade Unions and Public Organizations, and Foreign Affairs Officials. The Scientific, Economic, Cultural, and Technical Intelligentsia (SECTI) includes the following categories from Table 3.1: Economic Managers and Planners, Scientific and Academic, and Writers and Artists. It might have

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[36]Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change," p. 58. For further elaboration of this theme, see Meissner's Sowjetgesellschaft im Wandel: Russlands Weg zur Industriegesellschaft (Stuttgart, 1966). Also his "Die soziale Struktur der KPdSU," Osteuropa, September, 1966.

been more appropriate to include Economic Managers and Planners in the Leadership Cadres category, but the sources employed for data on the Party Congresses do not separate government managers and planners from their non-government counterparts and, hence, they have to be lumped together for the present analysis.[37] Ideally, the Leadership Cadres would include all Party, government, police, Komsomol, and trade union officials, as is the case in all later tables. The result of having to include this one category of government officials--economic managers and planners--in the SECTI is to inflate the SECTI representation in all three bodies while, at the same time, giving conservative estimates of the representation of Leadership Cadres in all three. In light of this bias, the distributions in Table 3.15 are all

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[37]Data on the Party Congresses were obtained from the Credentials Commission Reports for the 19th, 20th, and 22nd Congresses. Cf. (1) N. M. Pegov, "Report of Credentials Commission of 19th Congress of All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), Pravda, October 9, 1952, p. 6 [Translated in Leo Gruliow (ed.), Current Soviet Policies, I (N.Y.: Praeger, 1953), pp. 93-95]; (2) A. B. Aristov, "Report of Credentials Commission of 20th Party Congress," Pravda, February 17, 1956, p. 5 [Translated in Leo Gruliow (ed.), Current Soviet Policies, II (N.Y.: Praeger, 1957), pp. 66-68]; (3) V. N. Titov, "Report of the Credentials Commission of the 22nd Party Congress," Pravda, October 22, 1961, pp. 5-6 [Translated in Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Gruliow (eds.), Current Soviet Policies, IV (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 117-119].

Data on the Central Committee and Politburo come from Table 3.2.

The percentage of Leadership Cadres in the 19th Party Congress could not be calculated from available sources. The figure 30.1% is estimate and represents the maximum possible value given the representation of Intelligentsia and Workers and Farmers (69.9%). Use of this maximum value for Leadership Cadres gives a conservative estimate of their positive disproportional representation in the Central Committee and Politburo.

In all other columns the figures do not add to 100.% because the Military is excluded from all of these calculations as in all the tables which follow.

the more impressive.

Several points become quite obvious from an examination of Table 3.15. First, between 1952 and 1961 representation of the intelligentsia decreases slightly in the Congress, remains fairly constant in the Central Committee, and decreases significantly in the Politburo. Secondly, while workers and peasants have continued to constitute between one-fourth and one-third of the members of the Party Congress, they were never directly represented in the Politburo and did not acquire direct representation in the Central Committee until 1961 when they got 2.3% of the membership. Thirdly, by the time of the 22nd Party Congress, the Leadership Cadres had come to completely dominate the Politburo. Fourthly, it is quite clear that neither the Politburo nor the Central Committee are proportionally representative of the three major sectors of Soviet society represented in the Party Congress. On the other hand, the intelligentsia receive greater proportional representation in the Politburo than they do in the Central Committee, except for the 22nd Congress, although they are under-represented in terms of the Congress membership. The implications of the disproportional representation of these three social categories in these three Party bodies for questions of legitimacy, power, and responsibility in the Soviet political system will be examined in Chapter 5. It is sufficient for the present discussion to observe that the Leadership Cadres continue to be overly represented in the Central Committee and Politburo given their numbers in the Party Congress.

Table 3.15

LEADERSHIP CADRES, INTELLIGENTSIA, AND WORKERS AND FARMERS IN THE PARTY CONGRESS, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND POLITBURO: 1952-1961*

		Party Congress		Central Committee		Politburo	
Oct. 1952	L C	30.1%	(359)	75.2%	(94)	66.7%	(24)
	SECTI	40.6	(484)	15.2	(19)	25.0	(9)
	W & F	29.3	(349)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)
Totals		100.	(1192)	90.4	(125)	91.7	(36)
March 1953	L C	30.1	(359)	75.2	(94)	64.3	(9)
	SECTI	40.6	(484)	15.2	(19)	21.4	(3)
	W & F	29.3	(349)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)
Totals		100.	(1192)	90.4	(125)	85.7	(14)
Feb. 1956	L C	51.8	(702)	77.4	(103)	64.7	(11)
	SECTI	15.9	(215)	14.3	(19)	17.8	(3)
	W & F	32.3	(438)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)
Totals		100.	(1355)	91.7	(133)	82.5	(17)
Nov. 1961	L C	39.2	(1728)	72.0	(126)	100.	(16)
	SECTI	34.6	(1614)	17.7	(31)	0.0	(0)
	W & F	22.3	(983)	2.3	(4)	0.0	(0)
Totals		96.1	(4408)	92.0	(175)	100.	(16)

*L C = Leadership Cadres; SECTI = Scientific, Economic, Cultural and Technical Intelligentsia; W & F = Workers and Farmers. Totals in % columns are based on % of each body included in these three categories. Totals in N columns represent total membership of each body. The discrepancy is accounted for by the fact that the military is excluded from these calculations.

To conclude from the data presented in Table 3.15 that the interests of the Scientific, Economic, Cultural, and Technical Intelligentsia are disproportionately under-represented in the Central Committee and Politburo may be quite misleading. In Table 3.15 individuals were included in one of the three occupational categories on the basis of the positions they held at the time of each Party Congress. As in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, previous career patterns were not taken into account in assigning individuals to these categories. As a result, "Leadership Cadres" includes individuals who were both coopted and recruited into the political elite and Party elite.

The disadvantages encountered in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are encountered again in Table 3.15; the assignment of individuals to occupational categories solely on the basis of position held at time of entry into Central Committee may give a mistaken impression of stability in Central Committee membership. Table 3.16 indicates that there was no significant change in the representation of Leadership Cadres and the Intelligentsia within the Central Committees selected at the 19th, 20th, and 22nd Party Congresses. Throughout this period, the Leadership Cadres continued to constitute about 75% and the Intelligentsia about 15% of the Central Committee. The deviations in each case are only a few percentage points. This gives the impression of considerable stability in Central Committee membership between these two basic social categories.

By again distinguishing between individuals who were co-

opted and recruited into the political elite, we can distinguish between individuals with basically different types of early career patterns. Table 3.16 indicates what happens when we separate from the Leadership Cadres individuals who had been coopted into the political elite from the specialized elites and combine them with the Intelligentsia. The remaining Leadership Cadres are those who had been recruited into the political elite and who are, by definition, professional politicians. The results of this calculation indicate that the representation of professional politicians in the Central Committee decreased over time from 59.2% in 1952 to 41.1% in 1961.

Table 3.17 indicates a similar trend when we include with the Intelligentsia the Leadership Cadres who had been coopted into the Party elite. The result is a decrease in professional Party officials in the Central Committee from 59.2% in 1952 to 37.3% in 1961.

As in Table 3.15, the figures in Tables 3.16 and 3.17 include Economic Managers and Planners among the Intelligentsia. Since these individuals do occupy official positions in the government apparatus, it is more desirable to include them in the Leadership Cadres. In Tables 3.18 and 3.19, the Economic Managers and Planners have been included in the Leadership Cadres. Once again we notice considerable stability in the representation of the Leadership Cadres and Intelligentsia in the Central Committee. In addition to this continuity in representation, a very striking feature of the data in these two tables is the

very great difference in representation of the two groupings (about 86% and 4%, respectively).

By removing individuals coopted into the political and Party elites from the Leadership Cadres and combining them with the Intelligentsia, both the stability in representation over time and the great differences in percentage of Central Committee membership tend to disappear. In the case of the political elite (Table 3.18), the professional politicians in the Central Committee decrease from 64.8% in 1952 to 45.7% in 1961. In the case of the Party elite (Table 3.19), the professional Party officials in the Central Committee decrease from 67.2% in 1952 to 44.0% in 1961.

Table 3.16

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO POLITICAL ELITE AMONG LEADERSHIP CADRES AND SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1961

	1952 (N=125)		1956 (N=133)		1961 (N=175)	
Leadership Cadres	75.2%	(94)	77.4%	(103)	72.0%	(126)
Scientific, Economic Cultural, and Technical Intelligentsia (SECTI)	15.2	(19)	14.3	(19)	17.7	(31)
Recruited Leadership Cadres	59.2	(74)	60.9	(81)	41.1	(72)
Coopted Leadership Cadres and SECTI	31.2	(39)	30.8	(41)	48.6	(85)

Table 3.17

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO PARTY ELITE AMONG LEADERSHIP CADRES AND SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1961

	1952 (N=125)		1956 (N=133)		1961 N=175)	
Leadership Cadres	75.2%	(94)	77.4%	(103)	72.0%	(126)
Scientific, Economic, Cultural, and Technical Intelligentsia (SECTI)	15.2	(19)	14.3	(19)	17.7	(31)
Recruited Leadership Cadres	59.2	(74)	55.6	(74)	37.7	(66)
Coopted Leadership Cadres and SECTI	31.2	(39)	36.1	(48)	52.0	(91)

Table 3.18

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO POLITICAL ELITE AMONG LEADERSHIP CADRES AND SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1961

	1952 (N=125)		1956 (N=133)		1961 (N=175)	
Leadership Cadres	86.4%	(108)	89.5%	(119)	85.7%	(150)
Scientific, Economic, Cultural, and Technical Intelligentsia (SECTI)	4.0	(5)	2.3	(3)	4.0	(7)
Recruited Leadership Cadres	64.8	(81)	63.9	(85)	45.7	(80)
Coopted Leadership Cadres and SECTI	25.6	(32)	27.8	(37)	44.0	(77)

Table 3.19

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO PARTY ELITE AMONG LEADERSHIP CADRES AND SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1961

	1952 (N=125)		1956 (N=133)		1961 (N=175)	
Leadership Cadres	86.4%	(108)	89.5%	(119)	85.7%	(150)
Scientific, Economic, Cultural, and Technical Intelligentsia (SECTI)	4.0	(5)	2.3	(3)	4.0	(7)
Recruited Leadership Cadres	67.2	(84)	63.2	(84)	44.0	(77)
Coopted Leadership Cadres and SECTI	23.2	(29)	28.6	(38)	45.7	(80)

The data presented in the foregoing discussion indicate that while there was relative stability in the representation of various occupational-institutional categories in the Central Committee between the 19th and 22nd Party Congresses, there was at the same time a decided change in the types of individuals who represented certain of these categories in the Central Committee. Specifically, within both the political and Party elite categories represented, there was a marked increase in the proportion of individuals who had been coopted into the Party elite and the more general political elite. Viewed from a different perspective, this meant that there were corresponding decreases in professional politicians in the political elite categories and professional Party officials in the Party elite categories. The question which now needs to be confronted concerns the implications for the Soviet political system of relatively stable institutional representation in the Central Committee accompanied by substantial change in the representation of basic career types represented in those institutions.

Up to this point the various institutions and occupations represented in the Central Committee have been referred to as categories or groupings. To refer to them as "groups," as some writers have done,[38] is to make some assumptions about the relationships of the individuals within those categories, especially when they are referred to as "interest groups." If by interest

[38] Cf. the works cited earlier in this Chapter in footnotes 3-12.

group we mean "a group of individuals who are linked by particular bonds of concern or advantage, and who have some awareness of these bonds,"[39] then we must demonstrate that the various occupational and institutional categories represented in the Central Committee satisfy these criteria before we can refer to them as interest groups.

One would expect that these institutional categories have certain interests in common, for example, that the military elite is interested in some degree of professional autonomy or obtaining budgetary allocations. In such cases we would also expect demands to be made on the political system which are consonant with those interests. There is, of course, an available literature on this subject which sheds light on the nature of the bonds within the military and other professional elites.[40] A recent study by Schwartz and Keech describes the kinds of demands made by the educational establishment in one particular situation and the circumstances under which they are likely to influence the decisional outputs.[41]

Soviet officials have at times been openly critical of the

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[39]Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 75.

[40]Cf. the sources cited above in footnotes 24 and 25. In addition, see the outstanding work by Jeremy Azrael, Managerial Power and Soviet Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[41]Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," The American Political Science Review, LXII, 3 (September, 1968), forthcoming.

formation of group attitudes, especially within the cultural elite,[42] and have also criticized Western scholars for suggesting that these group attitudes are widespread. Skilling's discussion of the CPSU as an aggregator of such interests drew a sharp rebuttal from one Soviet commentator.[43] Yet there has been little systematic research designed to inquire into the question of "groupness" among these occupational-institutional categories. One effort to deal more satisfactorily with this problem is the research of Lodge, Singer, and Angell.[44] Lodge's research is the most relevant to the substantive theoretical problems at hand and will serve as the basis for the following discussion.

Operating under the assumption that Soviet specialist journals are vehicles for at least limited articulation of elite interests, Lodge proceeds to content analyze a sample of articles from the specialist journals of five Soviet elites from 1952 to 1965: the Party Apparat (Kommunist and Partiinaia zhizn'), the

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[42]Cf. the two articles from Pravda (November 22 and 24, 1964) cited by Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 373.

[43]Cf. article by B. Krymov in Literaturnaia gazeta, 1967, No. 44, p. 9.

[44]Robert C. Angell and J. David Singer, "Social Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes of Soviet and American Elites," Journal of Conflict Resolution, VII, 4 (December, 1964), pp. 329-491; Milton G. Lodge, "Soviet Elite Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Era," The American Political Science Review, LXII, 3 (September, 1968), forthcoming; and Milton G. Lodge, "'Groupism' in the Post-Stalin Period," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII, 2 (May, 1968), forthcoming.

economic elite (Voprosy ekonomiki and Ekonomicheskaia gazeta), the military (Krasnaia zvezda), the legal profession (Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo and Sovetskaia iustitsia), and the literary elite (Oktiabr, Literaturnaia gazeta, and Novi mir). In studying the views articulated in these journals, Lodge was looking for clues to groupness. Accordingly, three "operational conditions" would have to be met if these five occupational-institutional categories were "to meet the sociological conditions of a group":

> First, group self-consciousness, the elites must be conscious of themselves as distinct entities. In the Soviet political context the specialist elites must conceive of themselves as distinct from the apparatchiki.
> Second, ascribed group status, the elites must be perceived as groups by the other elites.
> Finally, the elites must possess a set of shared values which distinguish them from the other elites, here again particularly from Party values.[45]

On all three dimensions Lodge found that the five elites under study satisfied the conditions of groupness and that substantial increases in group feeling could be observed throughout the post-Stalin period.

Leaving aside the methodological problems involved in the conduct of this research and assuming, as may well be the case, that Lodge's findings are indeed an accurate description of feelings of group consciousness within the Party Apparatus and several specialized elites in the Soviet society, the implications of these findings for the data reported earlier in this chapter are quite striking. While not all of Lodge's five

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[45]Lodge, "'Groupism' in the Post-Stalin Period."

elites correspond exactly to the occupational-institutional categories presented in Table 3.1 (even when several of these latter are combined), it is possible to make some tentative comparisons of these two sets of research findings.

Lodge reached some important conclusions regarding the nature and degree of attitudinal conflict between the Party elite and four specialized elites:

> 1) the specialist elites perceive their decision-making role as expanding over time;
> 2) the specialist elites aspire to a co-participant role with the Party *apparatchiki* in the making of policy;
> 3) Party-specialist elite attitudinal conflict on the question of participation increases throughout the post-Stalin period;
> 4) *Apparatchiki*-specialist elite conflict, not accomodation, characterizes Party-elite relations in the post-Stalin period and conflict increases over time.[46]

Yet, at the same time that group feelings were increasing among the specialized elites and their views were diverging from those of the Party elite, the representation of those interests remained fairly constant in the Central Committee (Cf. Table 3.1). This is not to suggest that *ipso facto* the specialized elites continued to have the same influence in the Central Committee or the policy-making process in general. Furthermore, even if it can be said that all members of specialized elites in the Central Committees selected at the 19th, 20th, and 22nd Party Congresses shared the same attitudes that Lodge found within the specialized elites in his sample, we could not necessarily conclude that the attitudes Lodge found among specialized elites

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[46]*Ibid.*

received the same representation in the Central Committee over time. By looking merely at the representation of the political and Party elites versus the specialized elites, one would be tempted to draw such conclusions.

What such an interpretation overlooks, of course, is that there were important changes in the types of individuals who represented the political and Party elites in the Central Committees. As suggested earlier by the data in Tables 3.9, 3.10, 3.12, and 3.13, the percentage of coopted officials within both the political and Party elites increased substantially between 1952 and 1961.

A central assumption of this study is that because of early career experiences in specialized elites, coopted officials tend to share some of the attitudes of the groups from which they were coopted, and that these views differ from the attitudes of professional politicians. These latter probably resemble the attitudes Lodge attributes to the Party _apparatchiki_ in his study. No effort is made to test this assumption in the present study; that task must be left to a later research effort. Although it is posited here only as an assumption, it should be pointed out briefly that such an assumption is generally born out by the literature on the subject. The study of professionalization and career socialization in other social systems seems to confirm the assumption that early career experiences can be important factors

in shaping the individual's attitudinal structure.[47] Dibble refers to the "engineering" approach to human problems and Armstrong has found that this approach to broader human problems is prevelant among Soviet administrators.[48] Presumably, the "approach" of the professional politician who had not had professional experience as an engineer would be quite different. In addition, there is no reason to expect that the engineering approach would suddenly be disowned by those engineers coopted into the political elite. It would be expected that strength of retention of that orientation would vary with length of professional career prior to cooptation. Armstrong's finding that among Soviet administrators "Performance criteria tend to replace eschatalogical criteria as the production administrator's motivations"[49] raises problems concerning the political re-education of administrators coopted into the political elite, particularly

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[47] Cf. Percy H. Tannenbaum and Jack M. McLeod, "On the Measurement of Socialization," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXI, 1 (Spring, 1967), pp. 27-37, especially p. 28 and the sources they cite in footnote 3. Cf. also Morris Rosenberg, Occupations and Values (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957).

Not only does it appear that early career experiences result in different attitudes toward problems and problem-solving, organization theory suggests that "there often are substantial differences between the 'cultures' of program and sustaining units" in the same organization. Cf. Robert T. Golembiewski, Organizing Men and Power: Patterns of Behavior and Line-Staff Models (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 71-73.

[48] Vernon K. Dibble, "Occupations and Ideologies," American Journal of Sociology, XLVIII, 3 (November, 1962), pp. 229-241. John A. Armstrong, "Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons," The American Political Science Review, LIX, 3 (September, 1965), pp. 643-655.

[49] Armstrong, op. cit., p. 652.

the Party elite.

On the basis of data presented above, we can discuss the implications for change in the Soviet political system if the hypothesis concerning the relationship between early career experiences and values is confirmed by later empirical research. To view the membership of the Central Committee and Politburo solely in terms of occupational-institutional representation is not only misleading in that it ignores the question of change in the types of individuals who represent those categories, it can also be misleading in terms of the types of interests represented in those two bodies. Representation of specialist elites has been viewed solely in terms of individuals holding specialist elite positions at the time of entry into the Central Committee or Politburo. Table 3.18 indicates that formal specialist elite representation in the Central Committee is very low (2.3%-4.0%). It very well may be the case, however, that individuals coopted into the political elite from the specialist elites are virtual representatives of the specialist elites. This point remains to be demonstrated, of course, but to the extent it is confirmed by later research we will get an entirely different picture of interest representation in the Central Committee and Politburo. If coopted officials within the Leadership Cadres retain their specialist elite orientations and values (and, hence, can indeed be considered virtual representatives of the specialist elites), the representation of specialist attitudes and interests in the Central Committee (1) is much

greater than previously interpreted and (2) increases significantly over time (Cf. Tables 3.16-3.19).

The data on cooptation and recruitment presented earlier in this chapter enable us to discuss several of the characteristics of political leadership systems presented in Table 2.1. Our analysis of the composition of the Central Committee and Politburo between the 19th and 22nd Congresses inclusive indicates that both professional politicians and individuals from specialized elites occupied political offices. Since one of the defining characteristics of a Monocratic political leadership system is that specialized elites do not occupy political offices, we can conclude that during the period studied (1952-1965) the Soviet Union cannot be considered a Monocratic system even though data have not been presented on a wide range of different political offices.

Another characteristic of political leadership systems which can be illuminated by the data presented so far is the acquisition of skills by the political elite. At the risk of generalizing from one small sector of the political elite, it can be said that the significant increase in coopted officials within the Central Committee indicates that specialist elite career experiences brought into the political elite by these men points to at least some introduction of new skills into the political elite at the time of their cooptation. This conclusion is based on the fairly safe assumption that skills of recruited and coopted officials would differ noticeably. Since

a Monocratic system is one in which no new skills are acquired by the political elite, we have another reason for rejecting classification of the Soviet Union as a Monocratic political leadership system.

A fourth characteristic of political leadership systems which can be mentioned at this point is the institutionalized advantage of professional politicians. One preliminary measure of institutionalized advantage can be made by combining data from Tables 3.8 and 3.11 into Table 3.20. Here we are comparing the representation of recruited and coopted political officials in the Central Committee and Politburo. A greater representation in the Politburo than in the Central Committee could be interpreted as some form of institutionalized advantage. Our confidence in disproportional positive representation as a measure of institutionalized advantage would increase if at least the direction of disproportional representation remained the same over time.

Table 3.20 indicates that while the professional politicians continue to dominate the Politburo from the 19th through 22nd Congresses by percentages of between 75% and 92.8%, their representation in the Central Committee declines over time in linear fashion. This results in an increase in the proportional representation of professional politicians in the Politburo from 0.0% in 1952 to +50.0% in 1961. According to this preliminary measure, therefore, it appears that professional politicians increased their institutionalized advantage in the system during the decade following Stalin's death.

Table 3.20

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO THE POLITICAL ELITE: POLITBURO AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE

		Central Committee		Politburo		Deviation from Proportional Representation
1952	Recruited	75.4%	(43)	75.0%	(18)	0.0%
	Coopted	24.6	(14)	25.0	(6)	
1953	Recruited	75.4	(43)	90.0	(9)	+20.0
	Coopted	24.6	(14)	10.0	(1)	
1956	Recruited	69.9	(65)	92.8	(13)	+32.7
	Coopted	30.1	(28)	7.2	(1)	
1961	Recruited	49.7	(74)	75.0	(12)	+50.0
	Coopted	50.3	(75)	25.0	(4)	

The analysis to this point has focused on the extent of specialist elite representation in top Party bodies and changes which have occurred in the types of officials who represent the political elite in these bodies. Presentation of data relevant to these questions permitted discussion of four characteristics of political leadership systems elaborated in Chapter 2: (1) professional politicians in political offices, (2) specialized elites in political offices, (3) new skills acquired by the political elite, and (4) institutionalized advantage for professional politicians. In order to explore further these and other characteristics, it is necessary to analyze the careers of officials who exercise different types of functional power in the Soviet political system. It is to this task that we now turn.

CHAPTER FOUR

ACCESS TO THE POLITICAL ELITE AND FUNCTIONAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS

This chapter is concerned with further refining the distinctions among the types of political leadership systems discussed in Chapter 1 by reference to data on the career characteristics of functional categories of officials within the political elite and the relationship of the political elite and the non-elite. That analysis will center on the specific question of career differences among Central Party Apparatus line and staff officials in the Central Committee in the context of the broader question of access to the political elite. It should be kept in mind throughout the discussion which follows that the data and conclusions drawn from it apply only to various categories of Central Party Apparatus officials who were in the Central Committee from 1952 through 1965; the findings cannot legitimately be generalized to all CPA officials or to other categories of the political elite.

When he refers to the access of the non-elite to the elite, Kornhauser means "the sum total of all ways in which non-elites impinge on elites, and the net effect of these influences on the conduct of elites."[1] An examination of the representation of different institutional groups and specialized elites in the policy-making bodies of the polity in Chapter 3 has indicated

[1] William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), p. 53.

the extent to which these groups have one particular type of opportunity to "impinge on elites." Those groups which are represented have an advantage of at least one avenue of access to policy-making over those groups which are not represented in the political elite. That they may not use that avenue to best advantage, or that the non-represented groups may put to better use those channels available to them, is another matter. Those groups which are represented at least have a potential advantage.

The type and style of interest articulation in a political system is greatly influenced by the number and variety of points of access to power. In a relatively "closed" system where there are few points of direct access to those who make the important political decisions, there may be less reliance on formal, associational interest articulation and more use of informal approaches characteristic of non-associational interest group activity. In the Soviet Union, where associational interest group activity is all but non-existent, it is likely that the techniques of personal connection and elite representation are more frequently employed.[2]

There are those who would argue that in a pluralistic polity, interest groups find it more effective to exert pressure and influence on decision-makers, rather than seeking office themselves. To be sure, in the American political system, with its numerous

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[2]Cf. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 82-83.

points of group access to the decision-making process, "the presence of associational interest-group members in Congress or the executive is frowned upon (though hardly absent)."[3] As Almond and Powell have observed, however, "the legislatures of Great Britain, France, Germany, and other nations include many interest-group representatives in their ranks."[4]

Thus, even in pluralistic polities, elite representation appears to be a frequently employed means for gaining access (and direct access at that) to the decision-making arena. It is not strange, therefore, that in a polity with a limited number and variety of access points elite representation would be utilized as a reliable means of interest articulation. "Rather than having to use personal connection or formal channels to gain access, the group that has elite representation can rely on _direct and continued_ articulation of its interest by an involved member of the decision-making structure."[5] Yet it is impossible to distinguish a pluralistic from a cooptative system solely in terms of the representation of various skill and interest groups in the political elite. In both systems the specialized elites participate in the polity and, hence, are represented on the various policy-making bodies.

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[3] _Ibid._, p. 84.

[4] _Ibid._

[5] _Ibid._, p. 83. Cf. also Harry Eckstein, "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, _Comparative Politics: A Reader_ (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1963), p. 396.

In his study of The Politics of Mass Society, Kornhauser makes the important distinction between the "ease of entrance into elites" and the "ease of influence over elites."[6] These are not one and the same thing, and must be clearly distinguished if we are to illuminate the problem of the accessibility of political elites--a problem essential to the distinction between monocratic, adaptive-monocratic, cooptative, and pluralistic systems. Identification of the ease of entrance into the political elite may not give us an accurate picture of the ease of influence over the elite by the non-elite. As Kornhauser appropriately suggests,

> representative social composition of elites is not a dependable basis for inferring the extent to which elites are open or closed. A formally representative elite may constitute a closed system in which the members recruited from the various social strata are subsequently separated from the groups from which they came and are absorbed into a group with different (and often conflicting) standards and interests. From the standpoint of an elite, representative recruitment may be merely one way of taking into account the interests and values of non-elites, and it may be sufficient for an elite bent on its own exclusiveness to do only that much in order to free itself from more thorough-going dependence on non-elites.[7]

Not only is this consideration relevant to the influence of non-elites on elites, it is likewise germane to the influence of middle- and lower-level elites on the top elite, or, in terms of the present analysis, the influence of specialized elites on the political elite.

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[6] Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 52.

[7] Ibid., pp. 52-53.

In the context of the classificatory scheme in Table 2.1 this becomes particularly relevant to some distinctions between pluralistic and cooptative systems, having to do with the place of the selectors of the elite in the system. (1) In a cooptative system there is external cooptation--that is, the political elite itself coopts those who enter the political elite from the political non-elite (i.e., the specialized elites and all non-elites).[8] In a pluralistic system, however, entrance into the elite is determined, at least in part, through election by the non-elite. (2) At the level of administrative positions (and even some policy-making positions) both systems utilize both internal and external cooptation. The major difference is that in pluralistic systems those coopted administrators and policy-makers are responsible ultimately to the elected officials who coopted them. For example, the Secretary of Defense of the United States could be classified as a coopted policy-maker (e.g., Wilson and McNamara), but (1) he is responsible ultimately to the elected official who coopted him--the President--and (2) his selection has to be confirmed by other elected policy-makers--the Senate.

Most observers are of the opinion that in practice members of policy-making bodies in the CPSU are appointed from above

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[8]This should be distinguished from internal cooptation which refers to the method of vertical and horizontal movement <u>within</u> the elite. External cooptation refers only to the method <u>of entrance into</u> the elite. Unless otherwise indicated, "cooptation" means "external cooptation" throughout this study.

rather than elected from below.[9] The appointive principle operates throughout the Party structure and is also characteristic of the relationship between the Party and the Komsomol. Schwartz's study of this question indicates that Party representatives attend the Komsomol meetings at which the candidate lists for most Komsomol positions are drawn up, and it appears that their influence is decisive.[10]

The importance of control of cadres and personnel agencies

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[9]For a discussion of this critical point see the following: Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 77-78, 247-250, 254-256; Zbigniew K. Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (N.Y.: Viking Press, 1964), p. 197; Herbert McClosky and John E. Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 209, 231-233; John S. Reshetar, Jr., A Concise History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (N.Y.: Praeger, 1960), pp. 218-219, 241, 246; Richard C. Gripp, Patterns of Soviet Politics (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 143; Andrei Lebed, "The Soviet Administrative Elite: Selection and Deployment Procedures," Studies on the Soviet Union (Munich), V, 2 (1965), pp. 47-55; Boris Meissner, "Soviet Democracy and Bolshevik Party Dictatorship," in Henry W. Ehrmann (ed.), Democracy in a Changing Society (N.Y.: Praeger, 1964), p. 169; Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System (N.Y.: Random House, 1965), p. 111; K.A. Krylov, "Party Protection and Privileged Status in Soviet Society," Institute for the Study of the USSR, Bulletin, XIII, 3 (March, 1966), pp. 39-44; Ghita Ionescu, The Politics of the European Communist States (N.Y.: Praeger, 1967), pp. 55-64; Christian Duevel, "The Dismantling of Party and State Control as an Independent Pillar of Soviet Power," Institute for the Study of the USSR, Bulletin, XIII, 3 (March, 1966), pp. 3-18; Borys Lewytzkyj, "Die Nomenklatur: Ein wichtiges Instrument Sowjetischer Kaderpolitik," Osteuropa, XI, 11 (November, 1961), pp. 408-412; Borys Lewytzkyj, "Die Fuehrungskraefte des Sowjetischen Parteiapparats," Osteuropa, XV, 11/12 (November/December, 1964), pp. 741-749; Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus (Chicago: Regnery, 1966), Chapter 11; Boris Meissner, "Party Supremacy: Some Legal Questions," Problems of Communism, XIV, 2 (March-April, 1965), p. 32.

[10]Joel J. Schwartz, "Communist Party Recruitment from the Komsomol," Paper presented at the 1966 Meeting of the Midwest Conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Columbus, Ohio, March 24-25, 1966, p. 9.

stems in large part from the fact that the selection and assignment of cadres in the Soviet political system has been carried out under the principal of "democratic centralism." This system was altered in 1934 when the Seventeenth Party Congress adopted a resolution based on a report by Kaganovich which called for the decentralization of personnel selection and assignment:

> Following the example of the Central Committee Department for Agriculture, all the work for a given branch--Party organizational work, the distribution and training of cadres, mass propaganda and production propaganda--is to be concentrated in a particular production branch department.[11]

The Eighteenth Party Congress reversed this trend toward decentralization, however, by adopting the following resolution:

> Dispersal of the function of cadre selection among the production branch departments has decreased the scope of organizational work and has encumbered the vital movement of officials from one branch to another, as well as promotion and employment in those districts which at a given time are of special importance to the Party. This task requires that all cadre work be directed from a single center by concentration in a single apparatus where experience in cadre selection, training and placement must be gathered.
>
> In view of this, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) has adopted a number of measures to concentrate selection in the Department of Leading Party Organs (ORPO). However, taking into account the paramount importance of cadre training and selection as well as the considerable volume of this work, the ORPO must be reorganized by entrusting cadre work in all branches to an independent Cadre Administration, leaving Party organizational administration to a special Organization and Training Department.[12]

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[11] Pravda, February 11, 1934.

[12] KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh, III (Moskva: Gosizdat, 1954), pp. 371-372. For discussions of cadres and personnel staff agencies during this period, see the following: John A. Armstrong, The Politics of Totalitarianism (N.Y.: Random House, 1961), Chapter 8; Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (rev. ed.;

That cadres and personnel agencies continued to occupy a critical place in the Soviet political leadership system during the post-Stalin period can be seen from the following remarks by F. K. Iakovlev, Deputy Chief of the Central Committee Section for Party Organs for Union Republics, during an interview with an Italian Communist Party Delegation to Moscow in 1958. In response to Longo's question concerning the functions of the Party Organs Department, Iakovlev replied in part:

> The Department keeps index cards of Party leaders and officials and prepares statistical data relative to the cadres and to the composition of various organs to suggest eventual modifications to the Central Committee. We follow all questions to do with systematisation and allocation of cadres either for the Party or for Communists working in the Trade Unions, in the Soviets and in social activities generally. . . . Questions referring to the officials in all branches of work of the central Party apparatus also pass through this Department. For example, our Department sanctions the nomination of officials in the "Agricultural" Department, the "Transport" Department, etc.
>
> As for the Soviets, our Department gives its opinion on candidates for the more responsible posts down to the level of Chairman and Deputy Chairman of Regional Soviets (lower jobs come under the control of the local Party organs). Moreover, we deal with candidates for ministerial jobs in the Union Republics. . . .[13]

In order to be fully appreciated, these powers of the Party Organs Department must be viewed in the context of the whole system for the selection, assignment, and dismissal of personnel

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Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 172-173; Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (N.Y.: Random House, 1960), pp. 450-451; Boris Meissner, Russland im Umbruch (Frankfort a/M: Verlag fuer Geschichte und Politik, 1951), pp. 20-21.

[13] Problemi e Realta dell' U.R.S.S. (Rome, 1958). Cited by Conquest, op. cit., pp. 464-465.

within the Soviet political leadership system. This is the so-called nomenklatura system which consists of a series of lists of administrative posts which cannot be filled without the approval of certain specified organs within the Party.

While the exact details of the nomenklatura system are not a matter of public record, there are certain aspects of it relevant to the present discussion which can be documented from available Soviet sources. The 1961 Party rules indicate that the Central Committee is responsible to the Party Congress and that both the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee are responsible to the Plenum of the Central Committee. Further, paragraph 39 of the 1961 rules states that the main function of the Secretariat is "to direct current work, chiefly the selection of personnel and the verification of the fulfillment of Party decisions" (emphasis added).[14] It is quite likely, therefore, that the heads of the various Central Committee Departments, including the Party Organs Department, are responsible to the Central Committee Secretariat. Some would argue that these departments are in fact responsible to the Politburo, but resolution of that controversy is not necessary to what follows since both the Secretariat and the Politburo are responsible to

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[14]Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted by the Twenty-second Party Congress, October 31, 1961, Section 39. A similar statement of the functions of the Secretariat can be found in the second edition of Politicheskii slovar' (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo, 1958), p. 506. Avtorkhanov has provided a lengthy, but undocumented, list of "responsible posts" in the nomenklatura system. Cf. Avtorkhanov, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

the Plenum of the Central Committee which, in turn, is responsible to the Party Congress.

Since delegates to the All-Union Party Congress are elected at Union Republic congresses and regional conferences according to procedures set forth by the Central Committee, one might be tempted to conclude that all elements of the political elite selected through the nomenklatura system are ultimately responsible to the people. However, there are certain aspects of the process of selecting Congress delegates which militate against such an interpretation. To be sure, the Party Rules adopted at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 state only that "The rates of representation at a Party congress are determined by the Central Committee."[15] Yet several scholars have concluded that the central Party organs, especially the Party Organs Department of the Central Committee, subject to careful screening the candidates selected by regional bodies for election to the Congress and, in effect, can exercise a veto power over those nominated.[16]

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[15]Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted by the Twenty-second Party Congress, October 31, 1961, Section 31, paragraph 2.

[16]Cf. Fredrick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 185; Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation (N.Y.: Random House, 1965), p. 162; Avtorkhanov, op. cit., p. 194; Gripp, op. cit., p. 143.

Probably because Soviet sources do not describe the mechanics of the nomenklatura system, this apparently central institution has received scant attention in the standard works on the Soviet political system, including those by Fainsod, Hazard, Barghoorn, Kulski, Gripp, Meyer, and McClosky and Turner. Detailed discussions of the nomenklatura can be found in the previously cited works (footnote 9) of Ionescu, Lebed, and Avtorkhanov. Both Ionescu and Lebed base much of their analyses on undocumented

To the extent that this point can be documented, it provides important evidence of the central role of the cadres and personnel agencies in the nomenklatura system. In exercising their veto power over candidates nominated to the Party Congress, these cadres officials can force the lower nominating bodies to keep nominating candidates until ones acceptable to them are put forward. This gives cadres officials, particularly in the Party Organs Department, an important voice in deciding the composition of bodies to which they are responsible. When available evidence is added together it points to the cadres and personnel officials in the Central Party Apparatus as the ultimate "selectors" in the Soviet political leadership system.

Whichever turns out to be the more accurate description of the "selector" powers of the cadres officials in the Central Party Apparatus--the maximum powers described by Avtorkhanov and implied by Meyer, Gripp, and Barghoorn, or the minimum "selector" powers described by Iakovlev--that power can surely be said to provide an institutionalized advantage for the in-

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discussions by Avtorkhanov, who cannot be considered a wholly objective and reliable source. This is unfortunate since his is the most complete available discussion of the nomenklatura and, therefore, must be cited with reservations in the present study.

Fainsod and Hough have described in some detail the operation of the nomenklatura system at the provincial and local levels, but these studies shed little light on its operation at the highest levels. Cf. Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 64-66, 73-74, 99-100; Jerry F. Hough, "The Technical Elite vs. the Party--A First-Hand Report," Problems of Communism, VIII, 5 (September-October, 1959), pp. 56-59.

dividuals who occupy those positions.[17]

In Western administrative terminology, these selectors are among the so-called "staff" officials. These should be distinguished from officials performing "line" and "auxiliary" functions. The following definitions are offered for use throughout this study. "Line" in its general sense refers "to those organizational positions which hold ultimate responsibility for production or output of an organization's manifest product or service. In this often-quoted version the line organization is said to hold exclusive authority over production processes."[18] Examples of line agencies in the Central Party Apparatus between 1952 and 1965 are listed in Table 4.1.

While there is not general agreement in the literature on organizations concerning a definition of "staff," the meaning of present usage is reflected in Armstrong's statement that the purpose of staff agencies is "not to direct the substantive operations of the Party and subordinate spheres of Soviet life, but to see that these operations [proceed] efficiently in accord

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[17]For an operational definition and earlier discussion of institutionalized advantage, see pp. 57, 133.

[18]Peter B. Hammond, "The Functions of Indirection in Communication," in James D. Thompson, *et al.* (eds.), *Comparative Studies in Administration* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959). This definition is consistent with those offered in some standard public administration texts: Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (N.Y.: Knopf, 1964), pp. 262, 280-295; Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (4th ed.; N.Y.: Macmillan, 1955), Chapters 14-15.

with the will of the central authorities."[19] Within the Central Party Apparatus there are three distinct types of staff agencies which can be differentiated according to the types of functions performed: (1) auditing and checking,[20] (2) administration and organization,[21] and (3) cadres and personnel.[22] Examples of staff agencies in the Central Party Apparatus between 1952 and 1965 are listed in Table 4.2.[23]

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[19]John A. Armstrong, The Politics of Totalitarianism (N.Y.: Random House, 1961), p. 115. Unfortunately, little attention has been given to the line-staff dichotomy in either intra-Party politics or Party-state relations in the Soviet Union. Cf. T. H. Rigby, "Crypto-Politics," Survey, 50 (January, 1964), pp. 192-193. Armstrong's study of the Ukrainian Party apparatus is to date the most detailed study of line and staff agencies in the Soviet political system. Cf. John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite (N.Y.: Praeger, 1959).

[20]For discussions of auditing and checking organs within the Party, see Louis Nemzer, "The Kremlin's Professional Staff: The 'Apparatus' of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union," The American Political Science Review, XLIV, 1 (March, 1950), pp. 68-72; Avtorkhanov, op. cit., pp. 199-209.

[21]For discussions of organs performing administration and organization functions within the Party, see Nemzer, op. cit., pp. 69-72; Avtorkhanov, op. cit., pp. 199-209.

[22]For discussions of cadres and personnel organs within the Party, see Nemzer, op. cit., pp. 65-68; Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.: The Study of Soviet Dynastics (London: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 38-40; Avtorkhanov, op. cit., pp. 199-209.

[23]Several staff agencies perform more than one of these three types of functions, e.g., the Party Control Commission and the Administrative Organs Department have some personnel functions. However, since all agencies are classified according to their primary function, the Party Control Commission appears under "Auditing and Checking" and the Administrative Organs Department appears under "Administration and Organization." For a discussion of the functions of Central Party Apparatus staff agencies after the 20th Party Congress, see Armstrong, The Politics of Totalitarianism, pp. 274-276.

Finally, there are "auxiliary" agencies which perform general "housekeeping" functions such as Party budgeting, purchasing of supplies, maintenance of quarters, etc. The Administration of Affairs Department is an example of an auxiliary agency in the Central Party Apparatus. We are not concerned with these relatively unimportant auxiliary agencies in the following analysis.

Table 4.1

LINE AGENCIES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Line Agencies: Ideological

- Commission on Ideology (and its various Departments and Sectors)
- Department for Propaganda and Agitation for Union Republics
- Department for Propaganda and Agitation for RSFSR
- Ideological Department for RSFSR Agriculture, RSFSR Bureau for Management of Agriculture
- Ideological Department for RSFSR Industry, RSFSR Bureau for Management of Industry

Line Agencies: Non-Ideological

- Bureau for the RSFSR
    - Department for Light, Food Industry and Trade
    - Department for Produce Processing and Trade
- RSFSR Bureau for Management of Agriculture
    - Department for Agriculture for RSFSR
- RSFSR Bureau for Management of Industry and Construction
    - Department for Heavy Industry, Transportation and Communication
    - Department for Machine Building
    - Department for Construction
- Bureau for Transcaucasia
- Bureau for Central Asia
- Bureau for Industry and Construction
    - Department for Construction
    - Department for Defense Industry
    - Department for Heavy Industry
    - Department for Machine Building
    - Department for Transport and Communications
- Bureau for Agriculture
- Bureau for Chemical and Light Industries
    - Department for Light, Food Industry and Trade
    - Department for Chemistry
- Department for Trade, Finance, and Planning
- Department for International Affairs
- Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries

Table 4.2

STAFF AGENCIES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Auditing and Checking

USSR Party-State Control Committee
RSFSR Party-State Control Committee
Party Control Commission

Administration and Organization

Commission on Organizational and Party Questions
Administrative Organs Department
Administrative Organs Department, USSR Party-State Control Committee

Personnel and Cadres

Department for Party Organs for RSFSR
Department for Party Organs for Union Republics
Department for Party Organs for RSFSR Agriculture
Department for Party Organs for RSFSR Industry
Department for Party Organs, Commission on Organizational and Party Questions
Department for Party Organizational Work
Department for Travel Abroad

Staff agencies exist in every organization and certainly were not new to the CPSU in the post-Stalin era. After all, it was Stalin's control of several staff agencies within the first five years after the Revolution which gave him an institutionalized advantage over his rivals for power.[24] Between 1919 and 1923 Stalin occupied crucial staff positions in the Party's control apparatus, including several agencies with the important selector power: the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (Rabkrin), the Central Committee Secretariat, the Organization Bureau (Orgburo) of the Central Committee, and the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee. Malenkov's rise to top leadership within the Party during and after World War II appears to stem from his appointment as head of the Central Committee's Cadres Department at the 18th Party Congress in 1939. As with Stalin, control of such an important staff agency within the Central Party Apparatus gave Malenkov the opportunity to fill important Party posts with his own supporters.[25]

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[24]For illuminating discussions of the importance of Stalin's control of staff agencies in his rise to power, see the following: Grey Hodnett, "Khrushchev and Party-State Control," in Alexander Dallin and Alan F. Westin (eds.), Politics in the Soviet Union: 7 Cases (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), pp. 115-118; Robert V. Daniels, "Stalin's Rise to Dictatorship, 1922-29," in Ibid., pp. 1-38; Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 157-160; E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution: 1917-1923, I (London: Macmillan, 1950), pp. 210-211; 228-230; Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (N.Y.: Random House, 1960), pp. 249-258, 318-319.

[25]Nemzer, op. cit., pp. 66-67. Cf. also Jeremy R. Azrael, Managerial Power and Soviet Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 124-125.

The extent to which professional politicians occupy staff agencies, especially the cadres and personnel staff agencies which perform the crucial selector function, is an important measure of institutionalized advantage and, hence, contributes to the distinction between cooptative and pluralistic political leadership systems. Table 4.3 indicates that professional politicians (recruited officials) have dominated the top CPA cadres staff agencies represented in the Central Committee from 1952 through 1965. According to this measure, then, professional politicians had an important institutionalized advantage over specialized elites during this whole time period. Only after the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 did some of these positions come to be held by coopted members of specialized elites.

Because of the powers of the administration and checking staff agencies, control of these positions in the Central Party Apparatus can provide us with additional indicators of institutionalized advantage. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 indicate that professional politicians and professional Party officials have dominated all CPA staff agencies represented in the Central Committee from 1952 through 1965. Hence, professional politicians seemed to enjoy considerable institutionalized advantage over specialized elites through control of all three types of staff organs. As in the case of the cadres organs, however, Table 4.6 indicates that after 1961 some of these organs were staffed by coopted members of specialized elites. In this latter period, the professional politicians still enjoyed this form of institutionalized

advantage, but it had certainly decreased over the two previous periods.

In Chapter 3 we saw that professional politicians had another form of institutionalized advantage over specialized elites in that they were over-represented in the Politburo given their representation in the Central Committee and over-represented in both of these higher bodies given their representation in the Party Congress. In sum, therefore, we can conclude that according to the two measures employed in this study professional politicians had a decided institutionalized advantage in the Soviet political leadership system from 1952 to 1965, although it appears to be decreasing over time.

Table 4.3

COOPTATION AND RECRUITMENT AMONG CADRES AND PERSONNEL STAFF OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1965

		Political Elite		Party Elite	
1952-56	Recruited	100.0%	(2)	100.0%	(2)
	Coopted	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)
1956-61	Recruited	100.0	(5)	100.0	(5)
	Coopted	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)
1961-65	Recruited	60.0	(3)	60.0	(3)
	Coopted	40.0	(2)	40.0	(2)
	* * * * *	* * * * *		* * * * *	
1952-65	Recruited	75.0%	(6)	75.0%	(6)
	Coopted	25.0	(2)	25.0	(2)

Table 4.4

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO THE POLITICAL ELITE AMONG CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS LINE AND STAFF OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BY TIME PERIOD: 1952-1965

		Staff		Line		Line-Staff Differences (Fisher test)
1952-56	Recruited	100.0%	(4)	54.5%	(6)	not significant at .05
	Coopted	0.0	(0)	45.5	(5)	
1956-61	Recruited	100.0	(10)	68.2	(15)	$p < .05$
	Coopted	0.0	(0)	31.8	(7)	
1961-65	Recruited	66.7	(6)	56.5	(13)	not significant at .05
	Coopted	33.3	(3)	43.5	(10)	
	* * * * *	* * * * *		* * * * *		
1952-65	Recruited	83.3%	(15)	53.8%	(21)	$p < .05$
	Coopted	16.7	(3)	46.2	(18)	

Table 4.5

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO THE PARTY ELITE
AMONG CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS LINE AND STAFF OFFICIALS
IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BY TIME PERIOD:
1952-1965

		Staff		Line		Line-Staff Differences (Fisher test)
1952-56	Recruited	100.0%	(4)	54.5%	(6)	not significant at .05
	Coopted	0.0	(0)	45.5	(5)	
1956-61	Recruited	100.0	(10)	63.6	(14)	$p < .05$
	Coopted	0.0	(0)	36.4	(8)	
1961-65	Recruited	66.7	(6)	52.2	(12)	not significant at .05
	Coopted	33.3	(3)	47.8	(11)	
	* * * * *	* * * * *		* * * * *		
1952-65	Recruited	83.3%	(15)	48.7%	(19)	$p < .02$
	Coopted	16.7	(3)	51.3	(20)	

Returning now to Kornhauser's thesis that examination of the composition of the selectors is a better measure of the accessibility of elites and ease of influence over elites than is study of the composition of those selected, we can see from the data presented in this and the previous chapter that there are substantial differences between the characteristics of the selectors and those selected. With very few exceptions there is a much higher representation of professional politicians among the selectors (Table 4.3) than among those selected for membership in the Party Congress, Central Committee, and Politburo (Tables 3.8, 3.9, 3.15, and 3.20). In addition there is a much higher representation of professional politicians among the selectors and other staff officials in the Central Party Apparatus than among CPA line officials (Tables 4.3-4.5). Kornhauser has provided us with a very useful perspective for viewing the way in which elites can be influenced from without--"the extent to which the non-elites participate in the selection of the elites."[26] It has been demonstrated that in the case of the Soviet political leadership system from 1952 to 1965 the political non-elite had little opportunity to participate in the selection of the political elite. Thus, while specialized elites were represented (both actually and virtually among those selected to enter the central Party political elite during that period, the specialized elites had no major voice in that selection process. Rather the professional politicians made these decisions and were thus in

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[26]Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

a position to determine how many and which members of specialized elites entered the political elite. Examination of the characteristics of only those who were selected would not have enabled us to identify the important institutionalized advantage for professional politicians which, when added to the findings presented in Chapter 3, enables us to classify the post-Stalin Soviet leadership system as cooptative in nature.

Data presented earlier (Table 3.8) indicates that the Soviet political leadership system is moving in adaptive fashion towards more cooptation of specialized elites into at least one segment of the political elite--the CPSU Central Committee. For this and other reasons already discussed, the Soviet political leadership system from 1952 through 1965 is classified as cooptative. In order to explore the existence of bases of potential conflict within the political elite in such a system, we can look for differential rates and direction of change in the types of individuals occupying different functional offices. One such functional distinction among officials is the line-staff dichotomy discussed above. Several students of Soviet politics have alluded to the conflict between line and staff officials,[27] and on the basis of studies of organizational structures in Western societies we would expect to find conflicts between these two types of agencies in the Soviet Union as well.[28]

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[27]Cf. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite, passim; Rigby, "Crypto-Politics," pp. 192-193.

[28]Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations:

Certainly one source of line-staff conflict is the different functional tasks performed by these two types of agencies within the apparatus. Conflict resulting from the different functions of line and staff agencies can be seen most clearly during the "Ezhovshchina" period of the late thirties. At this time certain staff agencies (the Cadres Section and the Organization-Inspection Section) worked closely with the police in maintaining Stalin's terroristic control over the Party. Armstrong has observed that "Malenkov's unpopularity with the Party elite is apparently due in large part to his association with the staff agencies during and after the Great Purge."[29] One might argue that the "Ezhovshchina" was a "unique" period, but it is clear that the staff agencies still perform the same type of function in the apparatus--namely, the supervision and distribution of personnel and checking the performance of various organs. To say that the tensions and conflict resulting from the different functions of the line and staff agencies may not be as great now

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A Comparative Approach (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), pp. 172-176; Melville Dalton, Men Who Manage (N.Y.: Wiley, 1959), passim; Melville Dalton, "Conflict between Staff and Line Managerial Officers," American Sociological Review, XV, 3 (June, 1950), pp. 342-351; Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization (N.Y.: Knopf, 1961), passim; Robert T. Golembiewski, Organizing Men and Power: Patterns of Behavior and Line-Staff Models (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 60-89; Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson, op. cit., Chapter 13.

[29]John A. Armstrong, Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union (N.Y.: Praeger, 1962), p. 74. For a discussion of the importance of staff agencies as "mechanisms of control" in the Ukrainian Party apparatus, see Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite, Chapter 6.

as they were under Stalin's reign is not to deny their present existence.

Dalton and others have suggested that conflicts between line and staff are also due to differences in the backgrounds and career interests of these two types of officials. The present data provide us with information on several aspects of the backgrounds of line and staff officials. One basic measure is the extent to which these posts are held by professional politicians or members of specialized elites who have been coopted into the political and Party elites. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 indicate that there are fewer professional politicians and professional Party officials in line positions (53.8% and 48.7% respectively) than in staff positions (83.3% each) represented in the Central Committee from 1952 through 1965. The percentage of professional politicians and Party officials in staff positions has been decreasing, while it has tended to remain about the same in line positions; and, therefore, the differences between line and staff officials on this dimension have been decreasing over time.

Hence, as the Soviet political leadership system has moved in adaptive fashion towards more cooptation, at least the potential for conflict based on differences in cooptation and recruitment of line and staff officials has decreased. In this context it is interesting to observe if other sources of conflict between line and staff officials have likewise decreased with the increasing use of cooptation. While there are many sources of

potential conflict which could be examined in this context (not the least of which are differences in policy positions, attitude structures, role expectations, and ascribed and achieved status), differences in two types of career experiences will be contrasted with this decrease in cooptation/recruitment differences: higher technical education and experience as a regional Party secretary.

Another possible source of tension between line and staff officials is differences in education between the two groups. In his study of the Ukrainian Party apparatus Armstrong found that at one time staff officials had superior formal training, whereas the line officials possessed little formal training, "But much practical experience in 'direct action' involving difficult economic tasks and dangerous political operations . . ."[30] Yet he felt that the picture seemed to be changing: "The increasing education of the line officials probably tends to bring them into closer contact with the staff officials, who at one time had superior formal training."[31]

There are not enough data on secondary education to test Armstrong's proposition on members of the Central Party Apparatus in the Central Committee, but there are enough data available on the higher education of this group to suggest that there are important differences among line and staff officials on this background dimension. Table 4.6 indicates that 92.3% of the staff

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[30] Armstrong, <u>The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite</u>, p. 144.

[31] <u>Ibid</u>.

officials but only 68.8% of the line officials received higher technical education among those who received any higher education at all. While this difference also appears to be decreasing over time, the decrease is not as marked as on the recruitment/ cooptation dimension. Here, as in some other tables, the N is too small to give results which are statistically significant.

It is interesting that 75.0% of the staff officials with higher technical education were recruited, whereas only 42.3% of the line officials with higher technical education were recruited (Table 4.7). According to the Fisher exact probability test, this difference is significant at the .05 level. These figures indicate that the staffing technique of cooptation is used to a much greater extent to bring men with technical education into line positions than staff positions. This holds for both the political and Party elites.

Another background characteristic which indicates further differences between line and staff officials is experience as a regional (<u>obkom</u>, <u>kraikom</u>, <u>raikom</u>, or <u>gorkom</u>) secretary. Table 4.8 indicates that 95.5% of staff officials but only 69.2% of line officials had previous career experience as a regional secretary. Unlike the differences in cooptation/recruitment and higher technical education, however, the difference in regional Party secretarial experience appears to be increasing over time. Between 1952 and 1956 80% of staff and 60% of line officials were former regional secretaries. Between 1956 and 1965, however, all the staff officials and only about 65% of

the line officials were former regional secretaries.

Of the Central Party Apparatus officials who had regional secretary experience, 76.9% of the staff officials and 47.5% of the line officials were recruited (calculated from Table 4.9). According to the Fisher exact probability test, these differences are not significant at the .05 level. The differences among line and staff officials recruited into the Party elite are even greater (76.9% and 38.1% respectively, $p < .05$). Table 4.10 indicates the range of differences among line and staff officials on all three dimensions (coopted/recruited, technical/non-technical higher education, and regional secretary experience).

Table 4.6

TECHNICAL AND NON-TECHNICAL HIGHER EDUCATION
AMONG CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS LINE AND STAFF OFFICIALS
IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1965

		Staff		Line		Line-Staff Differences (Fisher test)
1952-56	Technical	100.0%	(2)	55.6%	(5)	not significant at .05
	Non-Technical	0.0	(0)	44.4	(4)	
1956-61	Technical	85.7	(6)	72.3	(13)	not significant at .05
	Non-Technical	14.3	(1)	27.7	(5)	
1961-65	Technical	100.0	(9)	76.2	(16)	not significant at .05
	Non-Technical	0.0	(0)	23.8	(5)	
	* * * * *	* * * * *		* * * * *		
1952-65*	Technical	92.3%	(12)	78.8%	(26)	not significant at .05
	Non-Technical	7.7	(1)	21.2	(7)	

*These totals are based on distribution of total number of individuals who held office during the period 1952-65. Since the tenure of some officials stretched over two or three time periods, the totals are less than the sum of the three rows.

Table 4.7

TECHNICAL AND NON-TECHNICAL HIGHER EDUCATION AMONG COOPTED AND RECRUITED CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS LINE AND STAFF OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1965

Political Elite		Staff		Line	
Recruited	Technical	69.2%	(9)	34.4%	(11)
	Non-Tech.	7.7	(1)	12.5	(4)
Coopted	Technical	23.1	(3)	46.9	(15)
	Non-Tech.	0.0	(0)	6.2	(2)
	TOTALS	100.0	(13)	100.0	(32)

Party Elite		Staff		Line	
Recruited	Technical	69.2%	(9)	28.2	(9)
	Non-Tech.	7.7	(1)	12.5	(4)
Coopted	Technical	23.1	(3)	53.1	(17)
	Non-Tech.	0.0	(0)	6.2	(2)
	TOTALS	100.0	(13)	100.0	(32)

Table 4.8

REGIONAL SECRETARY CAREER EXPERIENCE
AMONG CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS LINE AND STAFF OFFICIALS
IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1965

		Staff		Line		Line-Staff Differences (Fisher test)
1952-56	Secretaries	80.0%	(4)	60.0%	(6)	not significant at .05
	Non-Secretaries	20.0	(1)	40.0	(4)	
1956-61	Secretaries	100.0	(12)	65.0	(13)	$p < .05$
	Non-Secretaries	0.0	(0)	35.0	(7)	
1961-65	Secretaries	100.0	(11)	63.6	(14)	$p < .05$
	Non-Secretaries	0.0	(0)	36.4	(8)	
	* * * * *	* * * * *		* * * * *		
1952-65*	Secretaries	95.5%	(21)	69.2%	(27)	$p < .02$
	Non-Secretaries	4.5	(1)	30.8	(12)	

*These totals are based on distribution of total number of individuals who held office during the period 1952-65. Since the tenure of some officials stretched over two or three time periods, the totals are less than the sum of the three rows.

Table 4.9

REGIONAL SECRETARY CAREER EXPERIENCE
AMONG COOPTED AND RECRUITED CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS
LINE AND STAFF OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE:
1952-1965

Political Elite		Staff		Line	
Recruited	Secretary	76.9%	(10)	31.3%	(10)
	Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	15.6	(5)
Coopted	Secretary	23.1	(3)	34.4	(11)
	Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	18.8	(6)
	TOTALS	100.0	(13)	100.1	(32)

Party Elite		Staff		Line	
Recruited	Secretary	76.9%	(10)	25.0%	(8)
	Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	15.6	(5)
Coopted	Secretary	23.1	(3)	40.6	(13)
	Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	18.8	(6)
	TOTALS	100.0	(13)	100.0	(32)

Table 4.10

CAREER DIFFERENCES AMONG CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS LINE AND STAFF OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1965

Political Elite			Staff		Line	
Recruited	Technical	Secretary	69.2%	(9)	28.1%	(9)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	6.3	(2)
	Non-Tech.	Secretary	7.7	(1)	3.1	(1)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	9.4	(3)
Coopted	Technical	Secretary	23.1	(3)	31.3	(10)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	15.6	(5)
	Non-Tech.	Secretary	0.0	(0)	3.1	(1)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	3.1	(1)
	TOTALS		100.0	(13)	100.0	(32)

Party Elite			Staff		Line	
Recruited	Technical	Secretary	69.2%	(9)	21.9%	(7)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	6.3	(2)
	Non-Tech.	Secretary	7.7	(1)	3.1	(1)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	9.4	(3)
Coopted	Technical	Secretary	23.1	(3)	37.5	(12)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	15.6	(5)
	Non-Tech.	Secretary	0.0	(0)	3.1	(1)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	3.1	(1)
	TOTALS		100.0	(13)	100.0	(32)

Armstrong has suggested that the careers of indoctrination specialists tend to be substantially different from those of other types of Party officials.[32] In order to test this hypothesis, the previous tables on career differences between line and staff officials were modified to separate the data on Agitprop officials and other indoctrination specialists from data on other line officials. Table 4.1 indicates the range of offices which fall into the "ideologist" and "line" categories. When the career data on Central Party Apparatus officials are divided into three categories (line, staff, and ideologists) instead of just two (line and staff), several changes occur in the observed differences between line and staff officials.

The previously noted differences on the cooptation/recruitment dimension increase (except during the period 1961-1965). The distribution of professional politicians in staff positions remains the same: 100.% in 1952-1956, 100.% in 1956-1961, and 66.7% in 1961-1965. The proportion of professional politicians in line positions over the three time periods decreases from 54.5%, 68.2%, and 56.5% to 40.0%, 53.3%, and 57.1% when the line ideologists are removed from this category. The proportion of professional politicians in line ideologist positions increased from 66.7% in 1952-1956 to 100.% in 1956-1961, and then decreased to 55.6% in 1961-1965 (Table 4.11).

It should be pointed out that there is a tendency for dif-

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[32] Ibid., Chapter 7.

ferences among all three types of officials to decrease over time on this dimension. The percentage of professional politicians in staff and ideologist positions decreases from the first to the third time period, while the percentage of professional politicians in line positions increases from 40.0% to 57.1%. Conversely, the percentage of coopted members of specialized elites has decreased in line positions, but increased in staff and ideologist positions.

As regards higher technical education, comparison of Tables 4.6 and 4.13 indicates that the observed differences between line and staff officials tend to disappear when ideologists are removed from the line category. In all three time periods almost all line and staff officials received higher technical education. This is to be contrasted sharply with the higher educational experience of ideologists. In the three time periods 80.0%, 83.3%, and 57.1% of the ideologists did not receive higher technical education (Table 4.13). To be sure, the difference tends to decrease over time, but by 1961-65 only 42.9% of the ideologists had received higher technical education as compared to 85.7% of staff and 92.9% of line officials.

Recalculations of percentage distributions in Table 4.14 indicate that recruitment is used to select the staff officials with higher technical education (75%) and cooptation tends to be used to select the line officials with higher technical education (54.6%). Among the ideologists, cooptation is used to select those with higher technical education (75%) and those

without that level of education tend to be recruited (66.7%).

Turning now to previous career experience as a regional Party secretary, Table 4.15 indicates that again some of the differences between line and staff officials tend to disappear when ideologists are separated from line officials. In 1952-1956 there was very little difference between line and staff officials on this career experience. A sizable difference emerges in 1956-1961 (100.% for staff and 66.7% for line), but is reduced somewhat in 1961-1965 (100.% for staff and 71.4% for line).

In the period 1952-56 only 25% of the ideologists had previous experience as a regional secretary. This increases sharply to 60% and 50% in the latter two periods, but in both cases this is noticeably lower than among line and staff officials. Among all CPA officials in the Central Committee from 1952 through 1965, 95.5% staff, 72.7% line, and only 50% ideologists had previous secretary experience. Table 4.16 indicates the extent of Party secretary experience among coopted and recruited officials in each of the three categories.

Table 4.11

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO THE POLITICAL ELITE AMONG CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS STAFF OFFICIALS, LINE IDEOLOGISTS, AND OTHER LINE OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1965

		Staff Officials		Line Ideologists		Other Line Officials	
1952-56	Recruited	100.0%	(4)	66.7%	(4)	40.0%	(2)
	Coopted	0.0	(0)	33.3	(2)	60.0	(3)
1956-61	Recruited	100.0	(10)	100.0	(7)	53.3	(8)
	Coopted	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)	46.7	(7)
1961-65	Recruited	66.7	(6)	55.6	(5)	57.1	(8)
	Coopted	33.3	(3)	44.4	(4)	42.9	(6)
	* * * * *	* * * * *		* * * * *		* * * * *	
1952-65	Recruited	83.3%	(15)	61.5%	(8)	50.0%	(13)
	Coopted	16.7	(3)	38.5	(5)	50.0	(13)

Table 4.12

RECRUITMENT AND COOPTATION INTO THE PARTY ELITE
AMONG CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS STAFF OFFICIALS, LINE IDEOLOGISTS
AND OTHER LINE OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE:
1952-1965

		Staff Officials		Line Ideologists		Other Line Officials	
1952-56	Recruited	100.0%	(4)	66.7%	(4)	40.0%	(2)
	Coopted	0.0	(0)	33.3	(2)	60.0	(3)
1956-61	Recruited	100.0	(10)	100.0	(7)	46.7	(7)
	Coopted	0.0	(0)	0,0	(0)	53.3	(8)
1961-65	Recruited	66.7	(6)	55.6	(5)	50.0	(7)
	Coopted	33.3	(3)	44.4	(4)	50.0	(7)
	* * * * *	* * * * *		* * * * *		* * * * *	
1952-65	Recruited	83.3%	(15)	61.5%	(8)	42.3%	(11)
	Coopted	16.7	(3)	38.5	(5)	57.7	(15)

Table 4.13

TECHNICAL AND NON-TECHNICAL HIGHER EDUCATION AMONG CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS STAFF OFFICIALS, LINE IDEOLOGISTS, AND OTHER LINE OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1965

		Staff Officials		Line Ideologists		Other Line Officials	
1952-56	Technical	100.0%	(2)	20.0%	(1)	100.0%	(4)
	Non-Tech.	0.0	(0)	80.0	(4)	0.0	(0)
1956-61	Technical	85.7	(6)	16.7	(1)	100.0	(12)
	Non-Tech.	14.3	(1)	83.3	(5)	0.0	(0)
1961-65	Technical	85.7	(6)	42.9	(3)	92.9	(13)
	Non-Tech.	14.3	(1)	57.1	(4)	7.1	(1)
	* * * * *	* * * * *		* * * * *		* * * * *	
1952-65	Technical	92.3%	(12)	40.0%	(4)	100.0%	(22)
	Non-Tech.	7.7	(1)	60.0	(6)	0.0	(0)

Table 4.14

TECHNICAL HIGHER EDUCATION AMONG COOPTED AND RECRUITED CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS STAFF OFFICIALS, LINE IDEOLOGISTS AND OTHER LINE OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1965

Political Elite		Staff Officials		Line Ideologists		Other Line Officials	
Recruited	Technical	69.2%	(9)	10.0%	(1)	45.5%	(10)
	Non-Tech.	7.7	(1)	40.0	(4)	0.0	(0)
Coopted	Technical	23.1	(3)	30.0	(3)	54.5	(12)
	Non-Tech.	0.0	(0)	20.0	(2)	0.0	(0)
	TOTALS	100.0	(13)	100.0	(10)	100.0	(22)

Party Elite		Staff Officials		Line Ideologists		Other Line Officials	
Recruited	Technical	69.2%	(9)	10.0%	(1)	36.4%	(8)
	Non-Tech.	7.7	(1)	40.0	(4)	0.0	(0)
Coopted	Technical	23.1	(3)	30.0	(3)	63.6	(14)
	Non-Tech.	0.0	(0)	20.0	(2)	0.0	(0)
	TOTALS	100.0	(13)	100.0	(10)	100.0	(22)

Table 4.15

REGIONAL SECRETARY CAREER EXPERIENCE AMONG CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS STAFF OFFICIALS, LINE IDEOLOGISTS, AND OTHER LINE OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1965

		Staff Officials		Line Ideologists		Other Line Officials	
1952-56	Secretary	80.0%	(4)	25.0%	(1)	83.3%	(5)
	Non-Secr.	20.0	(1)	75.0	(3)	16.7	(1)
1956-61	Secretary	100.0	(12)	60.0	(3)	66.7	(10)
	Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	40.0	(2)	33.3	(5)
1961-65	Secretary	100.0	(11)	50.0	(4)	71.4	(10)
	Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	50.0	(4)	28.6	(4)
	* * * * *	* * * * *		* * * * *		* * * * *	
1952-65	Secretary	95.5%	(21)	50.0%	(5)	72.7%	(16)
	Non-Secr.	4.5	(1)	50.0	(5)	27.3	(6)

Table 4.16

REGIONAL SECRETARY CAREER EXPERIENCE AMONG COOPTED AND RECRUITED CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS STAFF OFFICIALS, LINE IDEOLOGISTS AND OTHER LINE OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1965

Political Elite		Staff Officials		Line Ideologists		Other Line Officials	
Recruited	Secretary	76.9%	(10)	20.0%	(2)	36.4%	(8)
	Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	30.0	(3)	9.1	(2)
Coopted	Secretary	23.1	(3)	30.0	(3)	36.4	(8)
	Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	20.0	(2)	18.2	(4)
	TOTALS	100.0	(13)	100.0	(10)	100.1	(22)

Party Elite		Staff Officials		Line Ideologists		Other Line Officials	
Recruited	Secretary	76.9%	(10)	20.0%	(2)	27.3%	(6)
	Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	30.0	(3)	9.1	(2)
Coopted	Secretary	23.1	(3)	30.0	(3)	45.5	(10)
	Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	20.0	(2)	18.2	(4)
	TOTALS	100.0	(13)	100.0	(10)	100.1	(22)

Table 4.17

CAREER DIFFERENCES AMONG CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS STAFF OFFICIALS, LINE IDEOLOGISTS, AND OTHER LINE OFFICIALS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 1952-1965

Political Elite			Staff Officials		Line Ideologists		Other Line Officials	
Recruited	Technical	Secretary	69.2%	(9)	10.0%	(1)	36.4%	(8)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)	9.1	(2)
	Non-Tech.	Secretary	7.7	(1)	10.0	(1)	0.0	(0)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	30.0	(3)	0.0	(0)
Coopted	Technical	Secretary	23.1	(3)	20.0	(2)	36.4	(8)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	10.0	(1)	18.2	(4)
	Non-Tech.	Secretary	0.0	(0)	10.0	(1)	0.0	(0)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	10.0	(1)	0.0	(0)
	TOTALS		100.0	(13)	100.0	(10)	100.1	(22)

Party Elite			Staff Officials		Line Ideologists		Other Line Officials	
Recruited	Technical	Secretary	69.2%	(9)	10.0%	(1)	27.3%	(6)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)	9.1	(2)
	Non-Tech.	Secretary	7.7	(1)	10.0	(1)	0.0	(0)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	30.0	(3)	0.0	(0)
Coopted	Technical	Secretary	23.1	(3)	20.0	(2)	45.5	(10)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	10.0	(1)	18.2	(4)
	Non-Tech.	Secretary	0.0	(0)	10.0	(1)	0.0	(0)
		Non-Secr.	0.0	(0)	10.0	(1)	0.0	(0)
	TOTALS		100.0	(13)	100.0	(10)	100.1	(22)

Several conclusions can be drawn from these differences in background characteristics among line, staff, and indoctrination officials. First, because of their greater experience as regional Party secretaries, both line and staff officials are in a position which would likely give them a greater appreciation of the problems confronted by regional and local Party committees in attempting to solve the political, economic, and social problems within their domain. Fewer ideologists have had this career experience and, hence, could not be expected to be as informed about the problems of actually administering the affairs of the Party. Furthermore, the general lack of higher technical education among ideologists would probably make them less appreciative of the burdens of decision-making and administration in an industrialized society. In brief, almost all staff officials in the study population have had experience in line positions of general authority (regional Party secretary) while only half of the ideologists have had such experience. Hence, there is some basis at least for greater tension between ideologists and both line and staff officials than between the latter two.

To summarize this discussion of background characteristics of line, staff, and indoctrination officials, we can say that line and staff officials did not share common early career experiences since staff tended to be recruited and line tended to be coopted, but their higher educational and later career experiences tended to be similar. On the other hand, substantial

differences exist between the ideologists and both line and staff officials in higher education and later career experiences.

Secondly, as Armstrong has suggested, "If . . . the indoctrinational career is a relatively 'closed' one, one might expect solidarity of interest among its members to be reflected in certain attitudes toward other branches of the Party apparatus."[33] The data presented above suggest that the careers of indoctrination specialists in the Central Party Apparatus are not as "closed" (in the sense of "entered by one type of career avenue") as Armstrong found in the Ukrainian Party apparatus. Table 4.17 indicates that there is considerable heterogeneity in the careers of ideologists; they are distributed among seven of the eight categories in both the political and Party elites. There is much greater homogeneity in the background characteristics of both line and staff officials, although these two groups tend to differ from each other. Line officials are distributed in four and staff in only three of the eight categories.

Thirdly, one further source of conflict lies in the fact that line officials who carry out the substantive operations of the Party are most frequently engineers or other types of economic specialists; and, as Armstrong suggests, "this group is not noted for its sympathy for activities which deal primarily

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[33]Ibid., pp. 96-97.

with words rather than things."[34] On the other hand, both line and staff officials tend to have higher technical education (100.% and 92.3% respectively), which probably brings them into closer contact and provides them with a certain common orientation to problem solving, despite differences in the types of functions they perform.

This potential for tension between ideologists and both line and staff officials becomes manifest in situations when Agitprop officials begin to take on some regulatory and "watchdog" functions as they did in 1959 and the early 1960s.[35] In such cases they come into conflict with the staff officials whose functional powers they have usurped and with the line officials whom they are regulating. This change in functional role would be likely to create conflict even under favorable circumstances. When the ideologists differ so markedly in formal education and career experience from those whom they are displacing and controlling, the potential for conflict is heightened. While the staff officials with higher technical training and career experience as regional secretaries might be viewed as legitimate regulators by line officials, there is a much greater likelihood that the indoctrination specialists lacking such qualifications would not be viewed as legitimate

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[34] Ibid., p. 144.

[35] For a discussion of this point, see Erik P. Hoffman, "Ideological Administration in the Soviet Union, 1959-1963" (unpublished Doctoral thesis, Department of Government, Indiana University, 1966), pp. 47-52.

regulators. Here, then, is one example of potential for greater conflict between two types of line officials than between staff and most line officials. This is certainly consistent with the findings of studies of organizations in Western societies.[36]

Finally, as line and staff officials become less separated by differences in types of education and career experiences and as they come to have more of these kinds of experiences in common, the basis for line-staff conflict will be considerably weakened; and there will exist a greater likelihood for cooperation. Certainly the tensions arising from the performance of different functional tasks would still exist, but, as Armstrong found in the Ukraine, "Types of training, career lines, and association in common activities tend to form cross-institutional alignments which, as power groups, may often be more important than formal structural divisions."[37] One example of this is the possible relationships which exist between staff officials in the central and regional apparatuses. Since most of the staff officials in the Central Party Apparatus have had experience as regional secretaries, the "family circle" relationships which they tend to develop in that capacity with staff officials in the same regional organization may continue to influence their relationships with these regional staff officials even after they have moved from secretarial into staff positions

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[36]Dalton, Men Who Manage, pp. 18-70; Blau and Scott, op. cit., pp. 174-176.

[37]Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite, p. 146.

in the central apparatus.[38] "Such associations, which arise as part of a larger career pattern, appear to have a greater chance of continuing than have purely chance associations arising from isolated individual contacts."[39] Further analysis of these kinds of bonds could provide valuable indications of the nature and style of conflict and cooperation in the Soviet political leadership system.

It has been argued above that analysis of the background characteristics of line and staff officials is an important step toward learning more about the sources of organizational conflict within the CPSU and the Soviet political system. As the discussion in the first part of this chapter indicates, however, the characteristics of the political leadership system cannot be ignored, for in the cooptative Soviet political leadership system from 1952 through 1965 professional politicians dominated staff positions within the Central Party Apparatus and were therefore in a position to determine (at least in major part) who had access to the political elite through direct representation in that elite. Their functional powers as selectors of and "watchdogs" over the political elite not only give them a distinct institutionalized advantage over specialized elites, but have important implications for the style and content of organizational conflict, especially between line and staff agencies.

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[38] Ibid., Chapter 6.

[39] Ibid., p. 146.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The major focus of this study is the manner in which the Soviet political elite has attempted to adapt to its changing environment. In order to maintain its leadership position in an industrialized society, a political elite which does not already possess the skills necessary to managing such a society (especially to the degree of a state-controlled economy) has at least four alternative courses of action. The alternative adaptive mechanisms are (1) try to get the specialized elites to contribute their skills at no cost or force them to contribute those skills; (2) retrain some of the members of the political elite or recruit into the system as replacements new young cadres with the necessary skills; (3) coopt into the system members of specialized elites who possess the necessary skills; or finally--and this is to relinquish openly at least a portion of its leadership position--(4) share power with specialized elites on a more-or-less competitive and equal basis as in a pluralistic system.

Classification of the Soviet Political Leadership System

In Chapter 1, I sketched out a classificatory scheme for political leadership systems embodying the above adaptive forms which offers two logical and empirical alternatives to the pluralistic form of adaptation, which is frequently assumed to be

the only viable form of development. These are the adaptive-monocratic and cooptative political leadership systems (See Table 2.1). On the basis of the research findings presented in Chapters 3 and 4, we can reach some tentative conclusions concerning the nature of the Soviet political leadership system between 1952 and 1965, and the direction of the change which took place during that period. We shall begin by examining the findings in the context of the defining characteristics of those systems.

First, the data clearly indicate that there are professional politicians in political offices. They are to be found in the Party Congress, Central Committee, and Politburo, as well as in the various types of line and staff agencies in the Central Party Apparatus. This information, by itself, does not enable us to distinguish among the four types of political leadership systems, since the existence of professional politicians in political offices is a defining characteristic of monocratic and adaptive-monocratic systems, and an accompanying characteristic of cooptative and pluralistic systems.

Secondly, analysis of the composition of the Party Congress, Central Committee, and Politburo indicates that members of specialized elites also occupy political offices. According to this criterion, we would have to classify the Soviet political leadership system as cooptative or pluralistic, since only in these two systems is the presence of specialized elites in political offices a defining characteristic; the absence of such

elites is a defining characteristic of monocratic and adaptive-monocratic systems.

Thirdly, professional politicians had an institutionalized advantage in the Soviet political leadership system from 1952-1965. Two measures of institutionalized advantage yielded this conclusion: (1) the degree of over-representation of professional politicians in the Politburo given their representation in the Central Committee and (2) the extent to which professional politicians dominate the "staff" agencies in the Central Party Apparatus, which are relevant to institutionalized advantage because these agencies control (more or less) the composition of other bodies within the political elite.

The direction of change in these two measures is conflicting. According to the former, the trend is toward greater institutionalized advantage for professional politicians (Cf. Table 3.20), whereas according to the latter, the trend is toward less institutionalized advantage (Cf. Tables 4.3 and 4.4). This contradiction comes about because of the fact that coopted members of specialized elites are increasing in both Central Party Apparatus staff positions and the Central Committee. At the same time, their representation in the Politburo has remained relatively constant. One possible explanation of these findings is that the specialized elites in CPA staff agencies have met less resistance in increasing the proportional representation of specialized elites in the Central Committee, while the Politburo has remained impregnable to this trend. An additional or

alternative explanation may be that the real power of the Central Committee (esp. vis-a-vis the Politburo) has declined in the past decade such that to increase the representation of specialized elites in the Central Committee permits the professional politicians to share more responsibility with the specialized elites at less risk of sharing power. This point will be elaborated later. Perhaps these slightly contradictory findings can be partially resolved through future research on another measure of institutionalized advantage: differential rates of upward mobility and lengths of tenure in office for professional politicians and specialized elites.

Despite these differences in direction of change, both measures indicate the presence of institutionalized advantage for professional politicians. Therefore, according to this measure, we cannot classify the Soviet political leadership system as pluralistic. Since the monocratic and adaptive-monocratic alternatives have been eliminated according to other criteria, we must classify the Soviet political leadership system as a cooptative political leadership system between 1952 and 1965. (See Appendix)

In the Soviet case it is not surprising to conclude that the development of a pluralistic political leadership system has not come about. The political elite has adapted to the demands of an industrialized society in such a way that it has not abdicated its leading role in Soviet society. In this respect, the frame of reference in this study is similar to

that in Selznick's TVA study in that organizational behavior is viewed in terms of organizational response to organizational need. For Selznick, "One such need is specified as 'the security of the organization as a whole in relation to social forces in its environment.'"[1]

As we saw in Chapter 1, several writers have demonstrated that industrialization leads to alteration of the social forces; it produces in society a division of labor, functional specialization, and structural differentiation. As Eckstein has suggested, "This functional differentiation in its very nature fragments society into large numbers of groupings and tends to break the hold on social life of the primary kinship and locality groupings."[2] The resulting situation is generally referred to as social pluralism.[3] Many of these writers go on to point out that social pluralism leads to political pluralism. This is reflected in Eckstein's statement that "modernization increases the significance of pressure groups in the political process."[4] Some even view change in the direction of "genuine" pluralism in which numerous associational interest groups openly

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[1]Philip Selznick, _TVA and the Grass Roots_ (N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 259.

[2]Harry Eckstein, "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (eds.), _Comparative Politics: A Reader_ (N.Y.: Free Press, 1963), p. 395.

[3]For a discussion of social pluralism see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, _Politics, Economics, and Welfare_ (N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), esp. pp. 302-309.

[4]Eckstein, _op. cit._, p. 395.

compete in the political arena as the only satisfactory form of adaptation of the polity to the demands of an industrialized society. For Parsons, at least, the only alternative to such a pluralistic adaptation in the Soviet Union is "general destruction or breakdown."

Legitimacy

Parsons was led to this conclusion because he felt that "The basic dilemma of the Communists is that it is not possible in the long run . . . to legitimize dictatorship of the Party . . ."[5] I should like to suggest, however, that the development of a pluralistic polity is not the only solution to this multi-faceted problem of regime legitimacy.

Bauer and Inkeles conclude, for example, that legitimacy of the Party in the Soviet system may be maintained in the eyes of the specialized elites if there is a kind of "boundary maintenance" within the decision-making process, that is, the Party may legitimately decide political questions, but directives of a technical nature are not so well received by specialized elites. They state:

> there is good reason to believe that the underlying principles of Soviet political control over the ends of economic and administrative behavior are accepted by most Soviet engineers and managers, indeed are willingly supported by them. They accept these as 'political' decisions to be decided by political specialists. They are, in other words, largely with-

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[5]Talcott Parsons, "Communism and the West: The Sociology of Conflict," in Amitai and Eva Etzioni, Social Change: Sources, Patterns, and Consequences (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1964), p. 397.

> drawn from politics, 'organization men' similar to their counterparts in the United States. Their main complaint in the past was not over the principle of directing the economy, but rather over arbitrary political interference in predominantly technical decisions, the unreasonably high goals often set in the face of insufficient resources to meet them, and the treatment of failures in judgment or performance by management as if they were acts of political defiance or criminal negligence. Since Stalin's death such abuse has been tremendously reduced. Soviet managers seem, on the whole, quite satisfied with the situation.[6]

It is also interesting to note that cooptation itself has been used to legitimize the ruling political elite. Selznick has argued that "Cooptation reflects a state of tension between formal authority and social power. . . . Where the formal authority and leadership reflects real social powers, its stability is assured. On the other hand, when it becomes divorced from the sources of social power its continued existence is threatened."[7] Lacking the technical skills of real social power in an industrialized society, the Soviet political elite employed the cooptative mechanism to bring those skills into its ranks. To have remained an elite possessing merely political skills--in this case, a monocratic political elite--would undoubtedly have caused it to be viewed as parasitic by the specialized elites. Such a political elite could hardly be viewed as legitimate by those outside it who provided the specialized skills for the construction of an industrialized

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[6]Alex Inkeles, The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), p. 389.

[7]Selznick, op. cit., p. 15.

society in the Soviet Union. Yet both the recruitment and cooptative mechanisms of adaptation have been employed by the Soviet political and Party elites in order that the political elite would itself possess the skills necessary to take an active part in the administration of an industrialized society. Recruitment brings technical skills into the political elite. Cooptation has done not only that, but it has also allowed active participation of the specialized elites in the political elite. The net result is to increase the legitimacy of the political elite in the eyes of these specialized elites, for the latter have a good many actual and virtual representatives in the political elite. For this reason, I find it difficult to agree with Parsons, Meissner, Brzezinski, and others who argue that the political elite does not have legitimacy in the Soviet system and is "a foreign body in the fabric of the elite structure of an industrialized society."[8] To the extent that the Soviet political elite ever was as they describe it, the data presented in this study suggest that the political elite has rejuvinated itself by coopting into its ranks men with the skills and experience to administer a modern, industrialized society.

Circulation of Elites

This is all part of the general process of the circulation of elites which has probably come about, Lasswell asserts, be-

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[8]Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change," Problems of Communism, XV, 6 (November-December, 1966), p. 60.

cause of the "shift of the dialectic of development from the class struggle to the skill struggle."[9] In his book The Ruling Class Gaetano Mosca described the factors underlying the circulation of elites.

> What we see is that as soon as there is a shift in the balance of political forces--when, that is, a need is felt that capacities different from the old should assert themselves in the management of the state, when the old capacities, therefore, lose some of their importance or changes in their distribution occur--then the manner in which the ruling class is constituted changes also. If a new source of wealth develops in a society, if the practical importance of knowledge grows, . . . if a new current of ideas spreads, then, simultaneously, far-reaching dislocations occur in the ruling class. . . . Ruling classes decline inevitably when they cease to find scope for the capacities through which they rose to power, when they can no longer render the social services which they once rendered, or when their talents and the services they render lose in importance in the social environment in which they live.[10]

There are three distinct aspects of the circulation of elites: (1) circulation of individuals, (2) circulation of offices, and (3) circulation of groups or types of individuals. Circulation of individuals refers to the process in every system of replacing individual members of the elite who, by death, retirement, or for other reasons, have left the elite. In such cases of individual replacement, the new member possesses the same skill characteristics as the old member and, therefore, the characteristics of the elite are not changed. This is true

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[9] Harold D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity (N.Y.: Free Press, 1965), p. vi.

[10] Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1939), pp. 65-66.

of monocratic as well as cooptative and pluralistic political leadership systems.

The circulation of offices refers to whether new offices replace existing offices to perform similar functions or new functions. (In either case these may or may not be accompanied by circulation of groups.) In the former case there is circulation of offices, but continuity in the performance of certain functions within the political system. An example of this type of circulation of offices is the creation of the Comrades' Courts and Druzhina (people's volunteer squads) in 1959 to take over some of the functions of the state apparatus, the Peoples' Courts and police.[11] The functions of apprehending and correcting individuals committing certain kinds of "crimes" continued to be performed in the Soviet Union, but after 1959 they were performed by new institutions in Soviet society. The subsequent reversal of this trend must be viewed as another circulation of offices, or perhaps as recirculation of offices.

In the latter case there is circulation of offices with change in the performance of certain functions. An example here is the creation of cabinet positions of urban affairs and transportation in the United States. If, as Brzezinski suggests, there has been in the Soviet Union an institutionalization of mechanisms for dealing with superannuated individuals or those who have been removed from top political positions, this would

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[11]Cf. Darrell P. Hammer, "Law Enforcement, Social Control and the Withering of the State: Recent Soviet Experience," Soviet Studies, XIV, 4 (April, 1963), pp. 379-397.

provide a clue to change in the nature of Soviet politics. "The struggle tends to become less a matter of life or death, and more one in which the price of defeat is simply retirement and some personal disgrace."[12]

In assessing change in the Soviet political system as a result of change in the leadership system the most important of the three aspects of the circulation of elites is the circulation of groups and types of individuals which constitute the elite. The greatest single potential for change would seem to occur when groups circulate. Critics of the hypothesis that there are trends toward liberalization and pluralization in the Soviet polity argue that until inroads are made into the Party's monopoly of power there can be little hope of liberalization.[13] This study has demonstrated that in at least one sector of the political elite--the Central Committee from 1952 through 1965--both political and Party professionals were replaced by members of the technical intelligentsia and other specialized elites. Hence, this particular criticism of the liberalization hypothesis has been answered, and one could argue that perhaps a necessary condition for positive change is coming into existence.[14]

Hierarchy vs. Specialization

One by-product of the influx of members of specialized elites

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[12]Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" Problems of Communism, XV, 1 (January-February, 1966), p. 7.

[13]Meyer, op. cit., pp. 468-471.

[14]Cf. Dahl and Lindblom, op. cit., pp. 315-317.

into the political elite could be a challenge to the hierarchical organizational principles of the Party. Organization theorists have argued that the principles of hierarchy and specialization are contradictory and ultimately come into conflict.[15] The CPSU is organized according to the hierarchical principle.[16] This is reinforced by such factors as democratic centralism and the rigid hierarchy of the *nomenklatura* system of staffing.

To the extent that coopted members of specialized elites recognize as more legitimate commands made on the basis of specialized knowledge and expertise than commands emanating from some hierarchical authority, a very serious threat is posed to the Party's organizational principles, and these principles tend to be subverted. In such a situation the specialized elites have difficulty recognizing the appropriateness of separating the "right to make decisions with the ability to do so,"[17] a fact which gives this discussion implications for legitimacy as dis-

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[15]Cf. Victor A. Thompson, "Hierarchy, Specialization, and Organizational Conflict," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, V, 4 (March, 1961), pp. 485-533; Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organization* (N.Y.: Knopf, 1961), Chapters 3 and 4; Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), *passim*; James G. March, *Organizations* (N.Y.: Wiley, 1958), *passim*; Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), *passim*; Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (N.Y.: Free Press, 1965), *passim*.

[16]Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 160-161; Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 390.

[17]Thompson, "Hierarchy, Specialization, and Organizational Conflict," p. 497.

cussed above.

Now, given the present lack of data, it would be difficult if not impossible to demonstrate how these specialists view their role in the organizational structure of the Party and political elite. But given the existence of an important body of confirmatory theory, we could seek clues to potential organizational change by determining the extent to which line positions have been filled by coopted specialists. If these specialists are confined only to staff positions _and_ these positions are viewed as "staff only advises; it does not command" then the threat to hierarchical authority is minimal. The risk of undermining hierarchical authority is great only to the extent that these specialists are coming to occupy more positions of line authority. Since these specialists would tend to view themselves as the ones really equipped to make (at least the technical) decisions in an industrialized society, they would probably think in terms of the delegation of hierarchical authority on the basis of expertise which cannot be accommodated by the monistic theory of organization--an approach which does not recognize as legitimate any non-hierarchical bases of authority such as specialization and expertise.

Of course, one would expect specialists to have achieved greater representation in line positions, given the presumed demands of a modern, industrialized, technologically-oriented society and especially given the attempt of the Party to control

and direct the economy.[18] That Soviet leaders are very much aware of this problem is reflected in Kirichenko's speech at the 21st Party Congress: "It has now become essential that we have more specialists and experts in various branches of the economy among leading Party, Soviet, economic and trade union personnel."[19] In view of these considerations, it is interesting that among the CPA line officials in the Central Committee there has been a decrease in the proportion of co-opted specialists since 1952 (Table 4.11). Of course, the recruited line officials during this period, along with the coopted specialists, had technical higher education, but they did not share the latter's longer experience in technical and professional non-political careers. We should hypothesize that such experience would have conditioned the coopted specialists to view authority based on specialization and expertise as more legitimate (in the sense of being more appropriate and informed) than authority based on hierarchy. The recruited specialists,

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[18]For discussions of this point see the following: Donald D. Barry, "The Specialist in Soviet Policy-making: the Adoption of a Law," Soviet Studies, XVI, 2 (October, 1964), pp. 152-165; John N. Hazard, "Has the Soviet State a New Function?" The Political Quarterly, XXXIV, 4 (October-December, 1963), pp. 391-398; Herbert Ritvo, "Twenty-First Party Congress--Before and After (Part Two)," Slavic Review, XX, 3 (October, 1961), pp. 451-452; L. G. Churchward, "The Central Committee Today," Australian Outlook, XIV, 1 (April, 1960), pp. 83-84; Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev's Russia (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1959), pp. 88-98.

[19]Pravda, 1 February 1959, p. 4. For a translation see Leo Gruliow (ed.), Current Soviet Policies, III (N.Y.: Praeger, 1960), p. 118. For a further discussion of this point see Khrushchev's speech to the 21st Congress. Ibid., pp. 41-72.

having undergone their early period of professional socialization within the hierarchically organized political and/or Party elites, would seem more likely to accept hierarchical authority.[20] To the extent that this is a valid appraisal of the willingness of coopted and recruited specialists in line positions to accept or reject the legitimacy of hierarchical authority, the aforementioned decrease in coopted specialists in CPA line positions during the Khrushchev period indicates that the threat to the Party's hierarchical principles of organization may indeed be decreasing.

Formal and Informal Cooptation

There are at least five reasons why a political elite might coopt members of specialized elites: (1) to maintain or increase the legitimacy of the political elite (which was discussed earlier), (2) to utilize the skills of the specialized elites, (3) to have greater access to the specialized elites, (4) to share power, and (5) to share responsibility. While no effort is made here to document the motives of the political elite in coopting members of specialized elites, we can nevertheless introduce some important hypotheses concerning the relationship of the selectors and the selected. In his pioneering study of cooptation, Selznick introduced a central hypothesis which, when viewed in the context of the above five motives for cooptation, performs an important heuristic function:

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[20]Cf. pp. 129-130.

"Cooptation which results in actual sharing of power will tend to operate informally, and correlatively, cooptation oriented toward legitimization or accessibility will tend to be effected through informal devices."[21]

In the Soviet Union, the Party has employed formal cooptation in that it has publicly absorbed members of specialized elites into the Party Congress, Central Committee, and Politburo. In sharing these forms of power, the Soviet political elite can share responsibility for decisions with the specialized elites, have greater access to the specialized elites through their formal representatives, and probably maintain the legitimacy of the political elite in issuing directives to the specialized elites.

At the same time, the forms of power always carry the threat of acquisition of the substance of power. It seems unlikely that specialized elites are coopted for purposes of sharing power (or at least not too much of it--the Soviet response to the recent developments in Czechoslovakia is an interesting indicator of their attitudes on that question), although having been coopted into political positions these specialized elites' potential influence on the policy-making process certainly increases, and it increases further as they go from the Party Congress to the Central Committee to the Politburo. Hence, in coopting members of specialized elites into these bodies, the political elite runs the very serious

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[21]Selznick, op. cit., p. 260.

risk of having to share power. The data indicate that the representation of specialized elites decreases as we move from the Party Congress to the Central Committee to the Politburo. Therefore, it appears that the political elite is unwilling to risk too much sharing of power in order to achieve sharing of responsibility, although it is important to note that in some areas (the Central Committee), they are "risking" it more over time.

Furthermore, specialized elites are formally coopted into staff positions in the CPA where the office-holders have considerable power in performing staffing, checking, and administrative functions within the Party. This evidence appears to be an exception to Selznick's hypothesis that "cooptation which results in an actual sharing of power will tend to operate informally."[22]

The Schwartz-Keech study of the 1958 education reforms is a clear example of informal cooptation for purposes of sharing power. In this case, when members of the Politburo could not resolve policy conflicts among themselves, they went to the educational elite seeking expert information with which to bolster their positions. This was an informal mechanism which resulted, on that issue at least, in sharing power with a specialized elite.

Certainly there is a problem for the Party in making great concessions to the technocrats in terms of decision-making and

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[22] Ibid.

control. The Soviet type of command economy requires that these technocrats be kept subservient to, or at least below the Party. Hence, Wiles suggests, whenever the Party gets the feeling that it "is doing itself out of a job" and that "a gradual Thermidor" is setting in, "it can switch to a model with fewer technocrats in it, or at least with fewer very important technocrats."[23] The important point here is that it is the professional politicians within the Party through their control of the channels of cooptation (e.g., staff agencies), rather than "the Party," who are able "to change the model, re-stir the ant-heap, re-create the discrepancy between ideology and fact."[24] In particular, not only can they decide how many members of specialized elites (technocrats and others) to let into the critical political positions, they decide which ones to admit and where to admit them. It is here that the notion of a cooptative political leadership system highlights central variables in the assessment of change in the Soviet political system.

To be sure, the professional politicians are constrained by certain considerations when deciding these "how many," "which," and "where" questions. Soviet policy makers have continually demonstrated their willingness to be impressed by successful realization of the production norms. Success can do more for the technocrats, individually and collectively, than

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[23] P.J.D. Wiles, The Political Economy of Communism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 26-27.

[24] Ibid., p. 26.

probably anything else. While the professional politicians can permit themselves temporary luxuries such as the decentralization of 1957 which reduced the relative power of the technical specialist elites,[25] over the long run influence will probably accrue to those who demonstrate that they can produce the goods, both literally and figuratively.

Specialist Elite Interest Articulation and Influence in the Policy-Making Process

Schwartz and Keech in their study of the 1958 education reforms identified one type of situation in which the various specialized elites are able to influence the outcome of events and have their views taken into account. 'Under conditions of leadership conflict, unresolved disputes may lead some of the participants to broaden the scope of conflict involving policy groups who might shift the balance."[26] This tends to confirm the findings of Lodge that "when the Party is internally divided

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[25]P.J.D. Wiles, review of Zbigniew K. Brzezinski's Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics, in Slavic Review, XXI, 3 (September, 1962), p. 557. Soviet managerial personnel, as well as some Western scholars, tended to view the 1962 administrative reforms as "a reversal for the technocrats." Cf. article by V. Stepanov in Izvestiia, 19 December 1962. Cited in Sidney I. Ploss, "Mao's Appeal to the Soviet 'Conservatives'" (Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Occasional Papers on Soviet Politics, No. 1, 19 March 1963, p. 3).

[26]Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," Paper presented at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 5-9, 1967, pp. 15-16. This paper is scheduled to appear in The American Political Science Review, LXII, 3 (September, 1968).

[specialist] elite participation increases . . ."[27] and of Azrael that "the only periods during which they [the technicians] have acquired a certain independence have been those in which the central leadership has been internally split . . ."[28] Insofar as these groups in any way influenced the outcome of events "it was through the communication of their expert judgments to people at the top of the hierarchy who were in a position to influence outcomes."[29] Thus, the groups involved became "articulators of expert judgment." Schwartz and Keech hypothesize that "the more and greater the disputes on the top policy making level, the more likely it is that policy groups will be involved and listened to."[30]

While this is a very important part of the political process and interest articulation in the Soviet Union, it must be remembered that it is only one part. It says nothing of the types of individuals at the top who are likely to come into conflict and, thus, provide a situation in which various "expert judgments" are sought out. Furthermore, we should not conclude

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[27] Milton G. Lodge, "Soviet Elite Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Era," Paper presented at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Purdue University, Layfayette, Indiana, April 27-29, 1967, p. 25. This paper is scheduled to appear in The American Political Science Review, LXII, 3 (September, 1968).

[28] Jeremy R. Azrael, Managerial Power and Soviet Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 173.

[29] Schwartz and Keech, op. cit., p. 15.

[30] Ibid., p. 16.

from this type of approach that under conditions when the top leadership is not in conflict there is no representation of various group interests. Certainly a wide range of interests would be represented among the members of specialized elites who have been coopted into the political elite, although in no way would I wish to suggest that these individuals constitute a homogeneous category within the political elite. I have argued earlier (Chapter 3) that there are compelling reasons to believe that these coopted specialists probably share a different *Weltanschauung* and approach to problem-solving than do professional politicians, yet there are undoubtedly many individual differences related to personality, length of time in a specialized elite, occupation, etc. As I have suggested in Chapter 4, elite membership constitutes one method of access to the political elite in which the various specialized interests receive direct and continuing articulation by those in the political elite who share those views, or, in one sense at least, represent them. It is unlikely that all specialized interests are represented to the same extent and some may not be represented at all. What the Schwartz-Keech study does in this context is to point out the conditions under which members of the political non-elite are given a greater chance to make their views known to the political elite and in such cases they are consciously sought out by the political elite. Taken together, these two approaches offer a more complete picture of the avenues of interest articulation and access to the policy-making process than

has been demonstrated heretofore.

Both approaches demonstrate that in the Soviet Union points of access exist in the political system for the articulation of interests: through elite representation and providing expert judgments to the decision makers. In neither case does it appear that associational interest groups played any part. Schwartz and Keech found that the views expressed by specialist elites were those of institutional and non-associational interest groups. Both of these types of interest groups have access to the decision-making process through representation in the political elite. Certainly not all interests can be represented in this way and no attempt is made to argue here that they are. These two studies do indicate that in a cooptative political leadership system mechanisms do exist for the articulation of the interests of various specialized structures in an industrialized society. In this sense, it is certainly possible that a cooptative political leadership system can be fully capable of adapting to its environment. To argue that all interests are not or cannot be represented in such a system is no argument against its adaptability.

After all, democratic pluralism, which many have argued is the only type of system permitting satisfactory adaptation, does not allow _equal_ representation of interests in the political system nor does it even guarantee representation of _all_ interest groups. In fact, as Robert Wolff has convincingly argued, while "pluralism is not explicitly a philosophy of privilege or in-

justice--it is a philosophy of equality and justice whose con- crete application supports inequality by ignoring the existence of certain legitimate social groups."

> This ideological function of pluralism helps to explain one of the peculiarities of American politics. There is a very sharp distinction in the public domain between legitimate interests and those which are absolutely beyond the pale. If a group or interest is within the framework of acceptability, then it can be sure of winning some measure of what it seeks, for the process of national politics is distributive and compromising. On the other hand, if an interest falls outside the circle of the acceptable, it receives no attention whatsoever and its proponents are treated as crackpots, extremists, or foreign agents. . . . According to pluralist theory, every genuine social group has a right to a voice in the making of policy and a share in the benefits. Any policy urged by a group in the system must be given respectful attention, no matter how bizarre. By the same token, a policy or principle which lacks legitimate representation has no place in the society, no matter how reasonable or right it may be. Consequently, the line between acceptable and unacceptable alternatives is very sharp, so that the territory of American politics is like a plateau with steep cliffs on all sides rather than like a pyramid. On the plateau are all the interest groups which are recognized as legitimate; in the deep valley all around lie the outsiders, the fringe groups which are scorned as 'extremist.'[31]

Wolff concludes that while pluralism may have been an appropriate approach to political and social problems at one point in American history (the Depression), it no longer is a satisfactory approach to human problem solving in America. America is now confronted with enormous "problems of the society as a whole, not of any particular group." These problems "concern the general good, not merely the aggregate of private

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[31]Robert Paul Wolff, "Beyond Tolerance," in Robert Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 43-45.

goods."

> To deal with such problems, there must be some way of constituting the whole society a genuine group with a group purpose and a conception of the common good. Pluralism rules this out in theory by portraying society as an aggregate of human communities rather than as itself a human community; and it equally rules out a concern for the general good in practice by encouraging a politics of interest-group pressures in which there is no mechanism for the discovery and expression of the common good.[32]

In sum, "the pluralist system of social groups is an obstacle to the general good!"[33]

If Wolff's prescriptions concerning the United States (and presumably other Western industrialized, pluralistic societies) are realized, the social and political character of Western industrialized society will have progressed through phases essentially individualistic, pluralistic, and collectivistic. At that future point in time, "modern" political systems would be those characterized by such a collectivist approach to the problems of society.

If future generations of political development and modernization theorists possess the same type of cultural bias found in the present generation, they would have to argue that in order to successfully adapt to the exigencies of an advanced industrial society a political system would have to conform to the then current collectivist approach to human problem solving. This would require an embarrassing revision of current theories

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[32] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

which tend to view pluralism as the only satisfactory direction of adaptive political development. Hence, systems would be viewed as developing toward this post-pluralist higher stage or facing decay and destruction. In this sense, perhaps the Soviet Union is again "skipping historical stages" since it has been guided by a collectivist ideology for several decades.

Yet in both the United States and the Soviet Union there are interesting differences between theory and practice. On the one hand, the official Soviet position is that there is no need for competition in the Soviet system because there is only one legitimate interest. That interest can be and is represented by the CPSU and, hence, there is no need either for more than one party or for programmatic factions within that one party. This interpretation is supported by a collectivist ideology based on the centrality of the good of society, rather than on the competition and accommodation of a variety of selfish interests. At the same time, as the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, there are institutionalized points of access for the representation of various specialized interests in the Soviet political system.

On the other hand, the dominant feeling in America is that the United States is a pluralistic system in which there is free and open competition among various groups. At the same time, as Robert Wolff has pointed out, this interpretation of political life in America is a mythical idealization of reality; such a system does not exist in the United States. Hence, political

reality in both systems is quite different from official public representations.

Finally, there are forces at work in both systems advocating change away from the dominant ideologies. In the United States there are those like Wolff who argue that the pluralist ideology should give way to some form of collectivist ideology based on the common good of society; in the Soviet Union there are those like A. I. Lepeshkin, the Deputy Editor of Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, who argue for increased competition in the collectivist Soviet society.[34]

Wolff's prescriptions are avowedly in the realm of "what ought to be." Other evaluations of political change are based on what Gustav Bergmann would call an ideological statement--a value judgment which is held "not under its proper logical flag as a value judgment but in the disguise of a statement of fact."[35] In discussing the implications of the fact that the Party schools and CPA cadres and personnel staff agencies probably do not encourage "clusters of creativity," Brzezinski writes:

> It is doubtful that any organization can long remain vital if it is so structured that in its personnel policy it becomes, almost knowingly, inimical to talent and hostile to political innovation. Decay is bound to set in, while the stability of the political system may be endangered, if other social institutions succeed in attracting the society's talent and begin to chafe under the restraints imposed by the ruling but in-

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[34]A. I. Lepeshkin in Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1965, No. 2, pp. 5-15.

[35]Gustav Bergmann, "Ideology," Ethics, LXI, 3 (April, 1951), p. 210.

creasingly mediocre apparatchiki.[36]

Several problems are evident here. First, Brzezinski offers no concrete evidence that the personnel policy of either the Party elite or the more general political elite is in fact "inimical to talent and hostile to political innovation." On the contrary, Chapters 3 and 4 of this study have demonstrated that the professional politicians and professional Party officials (the latter presumably Brzezinski's "apparatchiki") who have continued to control entrance into these elites through their domination of the Central Party Apparatus cadres and personnel staff agencies have, at least during the period 1952-1965, continued to bring men with technical and other specialized skills into the top positions in the political and Party elites by coopting members of specialized elites. These coopted specialists have had considerable experience in the specialized sectors of Soviet society, and to say that they are not "talented" would be ludicrous.

Secondly, while it may be the case that the professional politicians and apparatchiki do not encourage (and may even discourage) political innovation among those recruited and coopted into the political and Party elites, this does not mean that they are hostile to individuals possessing other talents. Hence, it does not seem to be the case that "other social institutions succeed in attracting the society's talent" as Brzezinski seems to think. Brzezinski certainly presents no supporting evidence.

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[36] Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 5.

Admittedly this study deals only with the top sector of the Soviet political elite; but we have seen that many of these individuals have considerable technical skills through both their formal higher education and their pre-political specialized careers. If later studies can show that at the lower levels of the political elite there is the same high proportion of officials with such "talents," it will be quite clear that the Soviet political leadership system will have succeeded in coopting into its ranks individuals who have been successful in other sectors of society. This would present quite a different picture of the Soviet political leadership system and its ability to adapt to the demands of a modern industrialized society than that presented by Parsons, Brzezinski, and (the even more extreme) Michel Garder.[37]

Furthermore, it is quite possible for change in the Soviet political system to take place through change in the types of individuals who hold offices in the political elite. Such evidence casts doubts on the almost apocalyptic theory of Garder:

> Already there exists a de facto opposition within the ruling class between the functionaries of the apparatus and the upper stratum of the technological intelligentsia, i.e., the scientists, the professors, the plant managers, etc. This opposition cannot but become intensified with the emergence of a new generation. . . . Inevitably, there will come the moment when the true elite of the country, the members of the technological intelligentsia, will feel impelled to seize

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[37]Michel Garder, L'Agonie de Regime en Russie Sovietique (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1965). Cf. the discussion of this work by Michel Tatu, "The Beginning of the End?" Problems of Communism, XV, 2 (March-April, 1966), pp. 44-47.

power.[38]

Since we have found that at least the top echelons of the political elite include a sizeable proportion of coopted members of specialized elites in Soviet society, a more reasonable interpretation of change is Schlesinger's statement that "the CPSU might in due course become the Soviet equivalent of the Congress Party of India or the _Partido Revolucionario Institucional_ of Mexico--a loose central party, absorbing all the significant political tendencies within the society and working out its own methods of administration and succession."[39] Such a situation could provide ample opportunity for the articulation of various special interests in Soviet society, and the cooptative system seems perfectly suited to creating that condition.

Both the establishment of mechanisms for the articulation and aggregation of various interests and bringing capable, talented individuals into the political elite are factors viewed by most students as being crucial to the adaptability of any political system to a complex, industrialized society. Many of these students argue, or at least imply, that the only way in which these two conditions can be satisfied is through development in the direction of some form of political system approxi-

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[38]Michel Garder, "Liegt das Sowjetsystem in der Agonie?" _Die Welt_ (Hamburg), 9 January 1966. Cited by Wolfgang Leonhard, "Notes on an Agonizing Diagnosis," _Problems of Communism_, XV, 4 (July-August, 1966), pp. 36-37. Leonhard's article offers additional evidence for rejecting Garder's theory.

[39]Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "'A Muddling Evolution,'" _Problems of Communism_, XV, 4 (July-August, 1966), p. 45.

mating the Anglo-American pluralistic variety. The foregoing analysis has sought to demonstrate that there is at least one viable alternative to such a culturally biased interpretation--that these two conditions of adaptability can be satisfied by a political system directed by a cooptative political leadership system which, for reasons stated earlier, is categorically different from a pluralistic political leadership system. This is not to argue that the Soviet Union may not change in the direction of political pluralism, it is merely to suggest that adaptation can be accomplished outside the pluralistic mold. It suggests, further, that we can study political change in the USSR and other Communist countries in a more theoretically fruitful fashion than merely measuring them with the yardstick of the Anglo-American political culture.

APPENDIX

At the outset of this study I intended to use eight years as the operational dividing line (or cutting point) between "recruitment" and "cooptation." The choice of that figure was more or less arbitrary, but was made with theoretical considerations in mind. I wanted a figure which would be reasonable in terms of distinguishing between the differential socializing effects of (1) having spent considerable time at the beginning of one's career in a non-political occupation or profession, and thus developing ties with and taking on the attitudes of that occupational or professional group, and (2) not having undergone such early non-political career experience, but rather entering the political elite very early in one's career.

Eight years seemed a reasonable figure, especially because, unlike the somewhat higher figures used in some studies of differential professional socialization, it did not include any educational preparation. Therefore, when the number of years spent in education for a specific career (which is undoubtedly influential in professional socialization) is added, the figure will go as high as 13 or 14 years.[1]

I then proceeded to do all my calculations of data on the basis of the eight-year distinction. It was then suggested

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[1]Graduate degrees in the Soviet Union require 5-6 years of post-graduate study. For a detailed discussion of Soviet higher professional education, see Nicholas DeWitt, Education and Professional Employment in the U.S.S.R. (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1961), Chapter 4.

that I use the mean number of years spent in professional occupation for my entire study population as an "objective" cutting point. The mean turned out to be about seven years, and I recalculated my data on that basis. I now consider that a mistake for two reasons, one empirical and one methodological.

First, I now think seven years is on the lower range of theoretical usefulness as the cutting point. I cannot prove that, since it is an empirical question, but I intend to do further research on the point. It should be noted, however, that the original analysis of my data, based on the eight-year distinction, yielded the same general findings and trends as the later analysis based on the seven-year distinction. That fact appears to corroborate my judgment that seven years is within the theoretically useful limits, although perhaps at the lower range.

But perhaps more importantly, the operationalization of the concepts recruitment and cooptation (and hence, by definition, professional politicians and specialized elites) by the calculation of the arithmetic mean establishes logically (not empirically) the existence of both professional politicians and specialized elites in the political leadership system. The empirical determination of that fact is necessary to the classification of a political leadership system. The use of any "arbitrarily" chosen figure which fell within the range of theoretical usefulness would have enabled us to make that determination empirically. I can state as an empirical matter, how-

ever, that the choice of any year from one to twenty-five as a cutting point would have yielded the empirical fact that the Soviet political leadership system from 1952 through 1965 included both professional politicians and specialized elites as defined by any of those years. Therefore, the Soviet political leadership system is inescapably (empirically) classified as a cooptative system (since it cannot be classified as a pluralistic system because it does not meet the other definitional requirements of that type of political leadership system).

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